October 27, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 27th: Synopsis for October 27: Hugh Percy made a feint at Fort Washington; Waldeckers were ambushed near Mamaroneck; the British planned a move to White Plains.

Previous entry: October 26th; next: Morning of October 28.

On October 18, Lieutenant-General William Howe cut one of the main supply lines of the American forces in Manhattan (the Boston Post Road). Not long after, George Washington pulled his army away from Manhattan, and took a strong post at the town of White Plains, New York. Howe, meanwhile, established a base for his army at New Rochelle, brought up reinforcements, examined the countryside, and made plans to battle the American army.

Howe’s battle plan came to consist of two main parts. First, his army would attack Washington’s men at White Plains. Second, Lieutenant-General Wilhelm von Knypahusen’s recently arrived Hessian division would advance on upper Manhattan from the north. Although Washington had pulled out of Manhattan, some men were left behind to garrison Fort Washington and the other defensive works in upper Manhattan.

The twin advance was scheduled to begin on the 28th. To draw attention away from Knyphausen’s advance, Lieutenant-General Hugh Percy had orders to make a feint at Fort Washington from the south on the 27th. It was hoped he might also seize some of the Americans’ defensive works in the process.

Percy took with him six British regiments (the 10th, 17th, 37th, 40th, 46th, and 55th regiments of foot), and two Hessian regiments from Stirn’s brigade. The troops advanced in line of battle with the Hessians on the left, and the British regulars on the right. Percy later wrote:

“I approached… with caution, for I had not force enough to attack them. By the time I had advanced within random musket shot [range], their [defensive] lines (three in number) were all completely manned… As our moving forward did not make them evacuate their works, I tried what a few shots from six-pounders and shells from two howitzers would do”.

The shot and shell had little effect: “they were too well secured by their parapets.”

American defenses in upper Manhattan (click to enlarge). Upper Manhattan is bounded on the left by Hudson's River and on the right by the Harlem River. Fort Washington appears at the top of the image; below the fort are three defensive lines spanning the width of the island. On October 27th, Percy's men skirmished with American forces defending the first (lowermost) line. The troop movements shown on this map pertain to a later engagement (the assault on Fort Washington on November 16, 1776).

Charles Lefferts illustration of drummers and infantrymen of the 10th Regiment of Foot.

Percy observed that the Americans brought cannon down to their lines, and he “retired with the main body about halfway between their works and ours.” Soon, he added, “The rebels… began to cannonade us”. This fire, however, was not very dangerous: “Their cannon were so ill pointed, that tho' they fired annoyingly at us, they hit nobody.” Nevertheless, he noted, “I retired a little out of reach.” Percy’s men then encamped for the evening.

While these movements took place on land, the frigates Repulse and Pearl advanced up Hudson’s River. Soon the vessels began to be bombarded by the guns from Fort Washington and Fort Lee (the renamed Fort Constitution).

Major-General Nathanael Greene boasted about the battering the Repulse received:

“Colonel [Robert] Magaw got down an eighteen-pounder and fired sixty shot at her, twenty-six of which went into her. She slipped her cable and left her anchor, and was towed off by four boats. I think we must have killed a considerable number of their men, as the confusion and distress exceeded all description.”

Captain Henry Duncan of HMS Eagle, acknowledged that “Many shots were thrown into the Repulse, and some into the Pearl”. However, he heard that “no men [were] killed in either, and only one man's leg broke on board the Repulse.”

Percy’s losses were also modest: five were killed or wounded in the 37th Foot; two in the 10th Foot, and three among the Hessians.

Greene stated that one man “was killed by a shell that fell upon his head” and that Major Andrew Colburn (Knowlton’s Rangers) was wounded.

The British made light of the whole affair. Lieutenant-Colonel Enoch Markham of the 46th Foot wrote that “Lord Percy very properly called it ‘the little excursion.’”

Closer to White Plains, the British sent out parties to reconnoiter. Archibald Robertson noted that he accompanied William Erskine on another expedition to the Mile Square area. He was surprised that “We returned [to that area] without firing a shot… as the enemy might have suspected our intention of occupying these heights.” Instead, according to Major Carl Leopold Baurmeister, Erskine “brought back nine prisoners and the assurance that all the rebels had left this part of the country and gone to White Plains”.

Meanwhile, Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton was ordered, as he later wrote, “to take out a part of the army to reconnoiter” the American position at White Plains. Clinton made a cursory effort, turned around, and gave Howe a discouraging report: “I suspected that the enemy’s lines at the White Plains shouldered to the Bronx and to the mountains, whereby their flanks were safe and their retreat practicable when[ever] they pleased.” He concluded, “[I] could not from what I saw recommend a direct attack”.

Howe could not have been pleased either with the incomplete information or the lack of support for his plans.

American scouting parties were also active. Baurmeister noted that one party attacked some men from the Waldeck Regiment:

“Eighteen men of this regiment went marauding in the region around Mamaroneck, where they were surprised and attacked by forty rebels and disarmed. One subaltern and twelve soldiers were captured and hurriedly sent away. Two men remained on the field, wounded.”

October 25, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 25th: The British army advanced towards White Plains; Clinton and Howe grew irresolute; the Americans prepared for battle; New Yorkers celebrated George III.

Previous entry: October 24th; next: October 26th.

In the morning, one of the British vessels on the Hudson came under fire near Dobb’s Ferry. The Americans fired on it with a 12-pounder gun they brought down to the shore under cover of darkness. An officer in New Jersey bragged, “They hulled her eleven times out of fifteen” before the British ship was towed out of range. He added, “Little skirmishes happen almost every day; but they are thought so little of that they seldom are mentioned as news.”

Since October 21st, Major-General Charles Lee’s division had been defending the crossings of the Bronx River while the rest of the American army moved to White Plains. It's mission now virtually complete, Lee's men began to move towards White Plains also.

Sergeant John Smith (Lippitt’s Regiment, Nixon’s brigade) wrote:

“about one o’clock in the morning the major called to us in our tents and ordered us to strike out tents at 4 o’clock in the morning and to cook our provisions… and get in readiness to march by day[light][.] We turned out immediately and cooked our provisions… and ate our breakfasts… and got ready to march[.] About 9 or 10 o’clock we began to load our baggage[.] The officers destroyed their chests not being allowed any wagons to carry them… and about 12 o’clock we began to move forward… We marched about northwest 7 or 8 miles and then east 2 miles[.]… we halted about two miles from the White Plains and posted ourselves as a picquet[.] We were 250 in number[.] It was very cold lodging on the ground without tents and but little fire[.]”

At about 9 A.M. the British army marched towards White Plains in two columns. The right column halted “at the distance of four miles from the White Plains”, according to Howe, on the Mamaroneck Road. The left column halted on the East Chester Road, about 6 miles from White Plains.

The troops in the left column could see part of Major-General Charles Lee’s division, but the two forces remained on opposite sides of the Bronx. According to Archibald Robertson (Royal Engineers) “[we] took a position on the East Chester Road… facing west[,] the Bronx River in our front and the rebels on the heights [on the] other side of the river facing us.”

Situation of the armies on October 25th (click to enlarge). Howe’s forces in Westchester County were divided into three parts. One part, under Henry Clinton, approached White Plains from the direction of Mamaroneck (10). Another part, under Leopold Philip von Heister, approached White Plains from the direction of Eastchester. The third part, under Wilhelm von Knyphausen, remained near New Rochelle. Washington had four divisions at White Plains (11); Charles Lee’s division was at Mile Square (9), and Nathanael Greene’s division was positioned along the Hudson.

This map shows the location of British and American army units between New Rochelle (lower left) and White Plains (upper right). Heister's column encamped on the East Chester Road, near the Bronx River; Clinton's column encamped on the Mamaroneck Road, only 4 miles from White Plains. Lee's division is shown at Mile Square, the position he held in the morning; by nightfall, his brigades were 2 miles from White Plains. North is at upper right.

Charles Blaskowitz made this representation of British units on the road leading from Mamaroneck to White Plains. Text on the map states that this was the position held by the British army on October 21st, but a comparison with the accounts of the campaign by William Howe and others suggests that this was the position occupied by Clinton’s forces on the 25th. Clinton commanded the first and second battalions of light infantry (red triangles at top), the British Reserve (which included three battalions of British grenadiers), a brigade of British regulars, a brigade of Hessian grenadiers, the Brigade of Guards, part of the 16th Light Dragoons, and a company of jaegers (green triangles at right).

The British were now within easy striking distance of Washington’s army, but Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton had become irresolute. He later wrote, “not knowing the ground about White Plains or how the rebels had posted themselves on it, I could not think an immediate attack of their camp there prudent”. He felt that if Howe “had any such intention” as attacking, he should first “reconnoiter in force,” develop a plan of attack, and then engage in an elaborate ruse so as to surprise the Americans at daybreak. He recommended first marching back to New Rochelle, then making a feint towards the town of Rye (to the east of Mamaroneck, on Long Island Sound), and then finally performing a countermarch to White Plains during the night.

Whether these maneuvers would have improved the odds of a successful assault on White Plains was doubtful; whether the marching would have tired the troops was certain. Howe ignored Clinton’s suggestion, but he clearly harbored reservations of his own, for no attack plans were made.

The Americans closely monitored the British advance. Robert Harrison (Washington’s secretary) wrote: “The general officers are now reconnoitering the several passes leading from the enemy, [so] that the most important may be immediately secured.”

Before long, parties of armed men were sent out to watch the British movements and contest the roads to White Plains. Among these was Sergeant James McMichael of the Pennsylvania State Rifle Regiment; he wrote: “One captain, two subalterns, three sergeants with one hundred men, were ordered on a scouting expedition. We left White Plains at 11 P. M. direct for the enemy’s advance sentries.”

At the end of the day, according to British Ensign Henry Stirke, “the pickets” of the two armies were “within musket shot of each other.”

Washington even considered making some kind of preemptive attack. Major-General William Heath recalled that “Eight American regiments were ordered to be ready to march in the approaching night. [Major] General [Israel] Putnam was to command them; and they were intended to make an attack on the enemy’s advance, if it should appear to be practicable.” One of these may have included Sargent’s 16th Continental Regiment (Sargent’s brigade, Sullivan’s division). Private How wrote, “This evening we all marched to East Chester in order to attack the enemy there[,] but the General thought best not to attack them there and we returned to camp in the morning.”

Captain Johann von Ewald (2nd Jaeger Company) was placed in a position to guard the left flank of the British army. He felt vulnerable in this situation and he took every precaution to ensure the security of his men:

“Here I was left alone for the first time with my own theory of partisan warfare, which I had acquired through much reading. I took my post in a large apple orchard surrounded by a wall of fieldstones, behind which, since it lay on a hill, I thought I could defend myself well against an enemy attack. I placed two pickets on two knolls from which we could see far around, and dispatched constant patrols as far as Mile Square.”

In New York City, the British celebrated the anniversary of George III’s accession to the throne. According to the New York Gazette:

“the day was celebrated here with every demonstration of joy. The flag ships hoisted the royal standard; and all the ships in the harbour gave a salute of twenty-one guns each. So noble an appearance, and so grand a salute, was never known in this port before. The two admirals [i.e., Richard Howe and Molyneux Shuldham] gave entertainments, and many loyal toasts were drank upon the occasion.”

October 13, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776.Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 13th: The Americans brought reinforcements into Westchester County; the British prepared for their next move.

Previous entry: October 12th; next: October 14th.

Major-General William Heath commanded the American troops in lower Westchester County. He observed that at Throg’s Neck “a large number of vessels, ships, brigs, schooners, sloops… etc.” were at anchor offshore. During the night of October 12-13, “[their] lanthorns were lighted and hung out at their yard arms which made a very extraordinary appearance.”

The Americans suspected the landing on Throg’s Neck was only a feint, and they thought the British might make a new landing elsewhere. Sure enough, the British showed no signs of attempting to force their way overland from Throg’s Neck. Instead, there was only scattered firing between the armies. According to Heath, “Captain Bryant [of Knox’s Artillery Regiment], now and then… saluted the British with a field-piece.”

To prepare against the various possible British moves, the Americans poured reinforcements into Westchester County. Alexander McDougall’s marched into Westchester County from Manhattan, and the brigades of John Glover and John Nixon were sent across the Hudson from New Jersey to Kingsbridge.

Screenshot of a Google Maps satellite view of Throg’s Neck (click to enlarge). The marked sites of the British landing and of Westchester Creek bridge are based on the Charles Blaskowitz map, shown partially below.

Excerpt of a Charles Blaskowitz showing the position of British and American forces on either side of Westchester Creek (click to enlarge). The American positions at the bridge (lower left) and at the head of the creek (upper left) were defended by troops from Colonel Edward Hand’s Pennsylvania brigade, Colonel William Prescott’s 7th Continental Regiment, Colonel Morris Graham’s New York militia regiment, and a couple of pieces of artillery. These troops (among others) were commanded by Major-General William Heath. Only part of the British army is visible. Blaskowitz depicted close to the bridge some companies of British light infantry (the red triangles), the 1st Jäger Company (two green triangles), and a detachment of light dragoons (the red and white square). Near the head of the creek is the 2nd British brigade (5th, 28th, 35th, 49th regiments of foot). The rest of the British army was encamped to the east or southeast.

The Throg’s Neck area is today heavily urbanized. The image below (screenshot using Google Maps) shows that the humble Westchester Creek Bridge has given way to several major traffic arteries.

British Commissary Charles Stedman later criticized Lieutenant-General William Howe for not immediately making another move. He called the landing on Throg’s Neck a “mistake” and said that it “should have been remedied instantly, by pushing along some other route”. The British landing craft were on hand, and the troops were already carrying provisions for this day and the next, but no move was made. Howe explained later that another move “would have been an imprudent measure, as it could not have been executed without much unnecessary risk.” Instead, Howe decided to wait until he was more fully prepared. During this time, he later wrote, “we were employed in getting up stores and provisions” and “the carriages and horses for transporting provisions, artillery, ammunition, and baggage.” More men were on the way as well.

October 12, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 12th: The British army crossed to Throg’s Neck; the Americans prevented the British from advancing far inland.

Previous entry: October 11th; next: October 13th.

During the night, the British army began to cross to Throg’s Neck (also known as Frog’s Point). Captain Henry Duncan of HMS Eagle, oversaw part of the crossing. He wrote:

“About three o'clock [on] Saturday morning, the 12th, the troops were embarked in the flat boats and bateaux, to the number of between four and five thousand men; the Guards and 42nd regiment, between fourteen and fifteen hundred men, were embarked on board sloops under my direction. At daybreak in the morning the boats set off, and no sooner had they put off, with an amazing strong tide, but it came on a fog equal to pitch darkness, with now and then an interval of light for a few seconds. The boats were put off; to attempt to stop them would have been very dangerous, for the headmost boats must have anchored, and the boats that followed would in all probability run [a]foul of them, to the imminent danger of sinking each other; the admiral [i.e., Vice Admiral Richard Howe], therefore, rather chose to run the risk of passing Hell Gate with all the boats in that rapid tide and dark fog. I went astern and ordered all the boats to move forward. Soon after their putting off, a galley towing one of the artillery boats, in endeavouring to cross a vessel lying in the passage, towed her athwart hawse; the boat ran directly up her cable, and overset instantly. Many of the people were picked up; there were three field-pieces lost, and I suppose five or six people. There were very few people in the flat boats [that] had ever been through or knew anything of the passage of Hell Gate. This made the danger much the greater.”

Captain George Harris (grenadier company, 5th Regiment of Foot) also had a close call:

“the point of an island… divides the river into two rapid streams, and causes a very dangerous whirlpool…. through the ignorance of our pilot, we were on the edge of the pool… too late to avoid the suction, and found ourselves, circle after circle, attracted to the centre, in spite of all our efforts, till at last the boatmen were on the point of quitting their oars, despairing of escape, when, animated I suppose by the love of life, I began to storm at them for their cowardice, and made them stick to their oars. We at length perceived that we made progress, and emerged from the whirlpool, escaping without other accident than the dislocation of a man's wrist”.

Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton had much praise for Vice Admiral Richard Howe and his fellow Royal Navy officers for getting the army through Hell Gate “almost miraculously” despite the heavy fog and treacherous waters. He added:

“About eight o’clock we arrived off Frog’s Point, where we found a frigate stationed to cover our embarkations. A few rebels made their appearance as we approached the shore; but some scattering shots soon dispersed them, and the landing was effected without loss.”

Two watercourses lay between Throg’s Neck and the American army: Westchester Creek and the Bronx River. Securing the passage over Westchester Creek was especially important as a single bridge over this creek provided the only good route inland. Therefore, according to Clinton, “As soon as the troops could be formed, we pushed for Westchester Bridge in hopes of securing it.”

The area nearest Throg’s Neck was defended by Colonel Edward Hand’s brigade of Pennsylvanians (this included Hand’s own 1st Continental Regiment, Colonel Henry Haller’s Berks County Regiment, and Colonel James Cunningham’s 1st Lancaster County Regiment; see footnote).

Major-General William Heath had previously stationed “25 picked men” from Hand’s brigade to watch over the Westchester Creek bridge at all times, “and, in case the enemy made a landing… to take up the planks of the bridge”.

The men quickly performed their duty, and when the head of the British column appeared, they “commenced a firing with their rifles.”

Clinton lamented: “the enemy had been too quick for us”.

The British then attempted to bypass the wrecked bridge and cross at the head of Westchester Creek. However, according to Heath, they “found here also the Americans in possession of the pass.”

Both sides called up reinforcements.

Situation of the British and American armies on October 12, 1776 (click to enlarge).

Throg's Neck area circa 1781. The map shows the solitary road leading inland from Throg's Neck, which crossed Westchester Creek. Colonel Edward Hand’s brigade had its headquarters at DeLancey's Mills on the Bronx River, but a detachment carefully guarded the Westchester Creek bridge. The town of West Chester was a short distance west of the bridge.

The site of the British landing on October 12th; from a map by Charles Blaskowitz.

Heath stated that “he immediately ordered Colonel Prescott, the hero of Bunker Hill, with his regiment, and Captain-Lieutenant Bryant of the artillery, with a 3 pounder, to reinforce the riflemen at West Chester causeway [i.e., the bridge]; and Colonel Graham of the New-York line, with his [militia] regiment, and Lieutenant Jackson of the artillery, with a 6 pounder, to reinforce at the head of the creek; all of which was promptly done, to the check and disappointment of the enemy.”

Captain-Lieutenant Archibald Robertson (Royal Engineers) wrote that “the [British] guns were taken forward to the bridge, 16 pieces” but no attempt was made to take either pass by force. Instead, he wrote, “we were ordered to encamp.” He noted that the remainder of the day was punctuated by “popping shots across the water.”

George Washington arrived in person to examine the situation of the British army. He later wrote that Throg’s Neck “is a kind of island” although “the water that surrounds it is fordable at low tide.” However, he was pleased to find that “The grounds from Frog's Point are strong and defensible, being full of stone fences, both along the road and across the adjacent fields, which will render it difficult for artillery, or indeed a large body of foot, to advance in any regular order, except through the main road.” He then ordered fortifications erected to guard the road and the pass at the head of the creek. He noted that “Our men, who are posted on the passes, seemed to be in good spirits”.

These fortifications, according to Hessian Major Carl Leopold Baurmeister, soon made “everything still more unapproachable.” At the same time, the Americans “cannonaded the camp of the 71st Regiment, which lost six killed and three wounded.” He claimed that “If the rebels had accurately aimed their guns, the balls of which flew over English headquarters, they could have annihilated the Guards and the 33rd Regiment in the reserve.”

October 11, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 11th: Friendly fire killed men on the Hudson; Joseph Reed contemplated defeat; Ambrose Serle watched the new offensive get underway.

Previous entry: October 10th; next: October 12th.

The Americans closely watched Hudson’s River for signs of renewed British activity. A vessel was observed coming down the river. Sergeant John Smith (Lippitt’s Rhode Island State Regiment) noted “she hoisted an uncommon sail,” and Major-General William Heath wrote that she was thought “to be one of the British tenders”.

Henry Hallowell (Hutchinson’s 27th Continental Regiment) remembered: “I was ordered with a party to place ourselves near the shore [with muskets] all loaded to stop [the vessel]… and [we were] just about to fire” when “Knox’s Artillery threw a shot from the fort” at it. In fact, the Americans were firing on their own men – the vessel was one of the few vessels to have escaped the Royal Navy on the 9th.

According to Smith, the shot “killed three men as they was sitting aft and wounded the captain slightly”. Afterwards, the dead men were “landed at the ferry and buried in one grave”. Hallowell called it “a sorrowful sight.”

Colonel Joseph Reed was Washington’s adjutant general. He was shocked by the poor showing of American troops when the British first landed on Manhattan one month earlier (September 15, 1776), and he was convinced that the American army lacked the discipline to defeat the British in battle. Reed also didn’t think the situation was likely to improve. He complained in a letter to his wife:

“To attempt to introduce discipline and subordination into a new army must always be a work of much difficulty, but where the principles of democracy so universally prevail, where so great an equality and so thorough a leveling spirit predominate, either no discipline can be established, or he who attempts it must become odious and detestable…”

Reed previously informed the Continental Congress that he wished to resign from his post, but he was stuck in this position as they had not appointed a replacement.

He told his wife, “I never meant to make arms a profession, my duty to you and my dear children will lead me to pursue that course of life which will contribute most to their and your happiness, for though I would wish to serve my country… I have not the least desire to sacrifice you and them to fame, even if I was sure to attain it.”

He feared that “if France or some other foreign power does not interfere” in this conflict “we shall not be able to stand” against the British “next spring”. But he consoled his wife that if the war were lost, they would not suffer too much for it: “my estate is no object of confiscation, my rank is not so high as to make me an example”.

New York City was devastated by a massive fire on September 21st. Its port was closed, many of its inhabitants had fled, and it was now occupied by hundreds of British soldiers. The remaining citizens attempted to maintain a degree of normalcy. Ambrose Serle (Vice Admiral Richard Howe’s secretary) recorded that he “walked about the town, which begins to fill, and has some of its markets open for meat and vegetables.” He noted disparagingly that “The meat is sweet, but generally lean: the vegetables are mostly good: but both very inferior to those of England; at least, what I have seen.”

In the afternoon Serle saw that the invasion of Westchester County was getting underway:

“all the flat-boats, belonging to the fleet were ordered up the East River in order to effect a landing for the troops… The admiral [Howe] and the other principal officers of the navy went up to conduct the embarkation and debarkation, intended in the morning; so that tomorrow or next day, warm work may be expected.”

He exulted, “May God prosper the king’s arms, and the cause of my country!”

No spies or deserters warned the Americans of the British plans. Nevertheless, the Americans closely watched the shore, and they had an inkling of what was coming. Major-General William Heath observed, “There was a considerable movement among the British boats”.

October 10, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 10th: Gunning Bedford described life in the American army; the Americans feared the British would seize key points on the Hudson; William Howe prepared for the move to Throg’s Point.

Previous entry: October 9th; next: October 11th.

The passage of the British ships up the Hudson on the 9th alarmed the American army. Once it became clear that no major movement was afoot, the officers and men returned to their usual routine. Lieutenant-Colonel Gunning Bedford (the Delaware Regiment) described the situation of the army on this date:

“We are strengthening our [defensive] lines,--the enemy are also busy with theirs. Our duty continues hard, having the lines to man every morning before day, and they are a mile and a half from here, and [we have] a great deal of other duty… many of our men have deserted to the enemy, though none from our regiment... [British] deserters say the enemy are apprehensive of an attack from us. They all, likewise, say they are healthy, and their army strong,--above thirty thousand… Our army is very sickly yet. We have one hundred and forty of our regiment unfit for duty. We have neither hospitals nor medicines for them, which makes them suffer much… Our army seems in good spirits, and we think our lines are secure, if they should be attempted.”

Although the British vessels on the Hudson posed no immediate threat to the American army, their presence was suggestive of Britain’s longer-term plans. Writing from the town of Fishkill, the New York Committee of Safety described to George Washington their fears that British vessels, acting in conjunction with local Loyalists, would take control of key points on the river:

“Nothing can be more alarming than the present situation of our state; we are daily getting the most authentic intelligence of bodies of men [i.e., Loyalists] enlisted and armed in order to assist the enemy[.] We much fear that they[,] cooperating with the enemy may seize such passes as will cut off all communication, between the army and us and prevent your supplies.”

This map (click to enlarge) shows the lower Hudson River, which was a primary route for the flow of men and materials to and from Washington’s army. On October 9th, a handful of British vessels successfully passed Fort Washington (4) and Fort Constitution (5) and took post in a wide stretch of the Hudson’s River near Dobb’s Ferry (7) and Tarrytown (8). The Americans had previously begun construction on Fort Montgomery (10) to defend one vital chokepoint on the river, but other points seemed vulnerable, such as Stony Point (9) and West Point (11).

The painting is Dominic Serres’ depiction of the frigates Phoenix, Roebuck, and Tartar passing, on October 9th, between the American batteries in and around Fort Constitution (left) and Fort Washington (right).

The Americans were well aware that their supply lines extending north and east of Manhattan were also vulnerable. Although they had no forts to control the shoreline (like they did on the Hudson), the Americans were at least aided by geography: British vessels moving troops into Long Island Sound would have to pass through a treacherous passageway known as Hell Gate.

Colonel George Weedon (3rd Virginia Regiment) wrote with amazement that the British kept a vessel anchored in this passage: “at this time a 28 gun frigate lays in Hellgate, a place not much wider than the streets of Williamsburg, [Virginia]”

Lieutenant-General William Howe had in fact decided to move his entire army through this passage and land on Throg’s Point (cf. October 8, 1776). At this time he was attending to the details of this operation. In brief, the British occupied several posts in the New York City area: the lower half of Manhattan, western Long Island, Staten Island, Paulus Hook on the New Jersey shore, and a couple of islands in New York’s East River. Howe decided to largely strip these posts of troops, although on Manhattan Lieutenant-General Hugh Percy would be left with three brigades of British troops and one of Hessians.

Howe’s force would consist, at first, of the 1st, 2nd, and 6th brigades of British regulars, the British Reserve (three battalions of British grenadiers, and the 33rd and 42nd regiments), the brigade of Guards, one brigade of Hessian grenadiers, one brigade of Hessian musketeers and fusiliers, three battalions of light infantry, two battalions of the 71st Foot, some light dragoons, the Hessian jaegers, and a couple of recently formed Loyalist corps.

Howe expected to receive substantial reinforcements while the campaign was underway, including an entire division of Hessian troops that was then crossing the Atlantic. In addition, Percy would be able to release some of his men to Howe if and when Washington pulled back from Manhattan.

The exact timing of these decisions was unrecorded, but by this time the British were nearly ready for the offensive to begin. On this date the army was issued 6 days’ worth of provisions (a sure sign that a move was imminent) and they were ordered to “dress” these provisions on the 11th.

October 9, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 9: British vessels on the Hudson River cut an important communications link to George Washington’s army.

Previous entry: October 8th; next: October 10th.

The Americans defended their position in and about upper Manhattan with an extensive series of fortifications. Particularly impressive were the forts and batteries designed to keep the British navy from ascending the Hudson River (then commonly called the North River). British vessels would have to pass between a series of batteries in and around Fort Constitution on the New Jersey side of the river and Fort Washington on the New York side. In between, the river was obstructed by hulks that had been intentionally sunk. The Americans also had a small flotilla of row galleys on the far side of the obstacles.

Captain Andrew Snape Hamond of HMS Roebuck recalled that “the rebel army was chiefly supplied by the North River, and placed great dependence upon it… they looked upon it to be perfectly secure: and it is possible, from seeing the great preparation they had made, we might also have thought so”.

But then, in early October:

“a deserter… informed the admiral [Vice Admiral Richard Howe] that there was a passage open between two of the sunken vessels… and offered himself as a pilot. This intelligence was exceedingly agreeable to both the General [Lieutenant-General William Howe] and admiral, conceiving, that if ships could be got up the North River, the rebel’s supplies would not only be cut off from Albany and that country, but even their communication with the Jerseys would become very uncertain and unsafe which could not fail of distressing them, and would very much assist in the intended operation of surrounding their army”.

On October 9th, a southerly breeze made the expedition possible. The British dispatched three frigates (Phoenix, Roebuck, and Tartar), a schooner (Tyral), and two tenders.

According to Captain Hammond:

“Much praise is due to Captain [Hyde] Parker on this occasion (who led, in the Phoenix) for his steadiness and good conduct – when they drew near to the danger, the pilot, in great confusion told him, that the marks which then appeared were not those that had been described to him, and he was totally at a loss[,] upon which Captain Parker, very prudently, immediately determined to take his chance where he knew the deepest water to be, which was close to the eastern shore…”

The Americans watched with incredulity as the British vessels eased past their defenses.

George Washington wrote, “to our surprise and mortification, they all ran through without the least difficulty, and without receiving the least apparent damage from our forts, which kept playing on them from both sides of the river.”

Appearances were a little deceiving: the British lost 9 killed and 18 wounded. Among these were a servant boy killed by a cannonball on the Phoenix and a Captain-Lieutenant of His Majesty’s Marines flayed by splinters on the Tartar. The ships were also considerably damaged, although none came close to sinking.

On the far side of the forts, “the enemy began to fire small arms from the woods,” according to Captain Cornthwaite Ommanney of the Tartar. Apparently, the British fired back, for Lieutenant Enoch Anderson of the Delaware Regiment remembered:

“they gave us some volleys of grape-shot… and some bombs. The grape-shot made holes in our tents, and some of the bombs broke in the air. One fell amidst our tents, but one of our boys ran and soon had pulled out the fuse. We had one man wounded.”

Heading north, the British gave chase to the American vessels on the river.

Captain Hyde Parker of the Phoenix wrote, “at Noon… [we were] in chase of four of the rebel galleys[,] etc. [and I] sent the Tartar ahead to cut them off… at 1 P.M. two of [the] galleys, a schooner, and two sloops ran onshore”. At 1:30 the Phoenix “anchored … [and] fired several broadsides to scour the shore…”

Among the men on the row galleys were two junior officers of Hutchinson’s 27th Continental Regiment. They claimed the vessels were run on shore once it became clear they could not outrun the British vessels. They recalled, “We run her [i.e., their vessel] on shore just above Dobb’s Ferry where we had not time enough to get our people and things on shore…” Instead, the fast approaching enemy “obliged us to swim on shore. But no lives [were] lost”. Then the British “fired a broad side of grape shot as we lay in the bushes…”

In the end the British captured two of the American row galleys (Independence and Crane), two sloops, and a schooner. According to Major-General William Heath of Massachusetts, one of the sloops “had on board the machine invented by… a Mr. Bushnell, intended to blow up the British ships.” This was the famous Turtle, the world’s first submarine.

The American infantry now had the awkward task of chasing the British navy. Orders went down the line from George Washington (the commander in chief), to Major-General William Heath (a division commander), to Colonel Paul Dudley Sargent (a brigade commander), to send men north and prevent the British from doing additional damage.

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General Heath’s orders to Colonel Sargent:

“Sir: The enemy, as it is reported, have landed a number of troops at or near Dobbs's Ferry; and it being thought indispensably our duty to dislodge them, you are immediately to take the command of the detachment designed for that purpose, consisting of five hundred men. You will march without the least loss of time, with the said detachment and forty light-horse, to Dobbs's Ferry, taking with you one howitzer and a detachment of the artillery, now at Philips’s Mills [i.e., two 12-pounders]… You will take particular care that the howitzer is properly covered, and defended by the battalion men.

You will, if possible, dislodge the enemy; killing or taking prisoners, as occasion may require…”

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The British expedition caused a good deal of marching and countermarching for some of the Continentals. Among these was Private Davie How of Sargent’s 16th Continental Regiment. Like many journalists of this era he described the events of the day in simple terms, and left out how difficult such marches were for poorly clothed and often inadequately fed troops:

“This morning three ships sailed up the North River[.] Our people kept a hot fire at them[.] We were all alarmed and marched down to Morrisania – 6 miles – then we all marched back before night [another 6 miles]. This night I went with a party of men to Dobb’s Ferry[,] about 12 miles[; we] got there at daybreak.”

St. Kitts (10): The Campaign Concludes

This is the tenth and final entry in a series of posts on the St. Kitts campaign of 1782. The St. Kitts campaign took place in what is known as the West Indies theater of the Revolutionary War. [Click for Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6, Part 7, Part 8, Part 9].

Surrender

On the evening of February 12th, the officers of the St. Kitts militia petitioned Governor Shirley to be allowed to surrender. They stated that they were “fully determined, from our zeal to our Sovereign, and a proper regard to the interest of this island, to defend it while prudence justified us, or till we should be relieved by his Majesty’s fleet or army”. However, “the fleet and troops which we looked upon for relief, have been arrived near three weeks, without affording us any assistance, and in all human probability cannot, from the superiority of the enemy by sea and land.” They feared that if they did not open surrender negotiations now they “would lose their estates and properties, and possibly would be sent to a French island or Old France.” [1]

Governor Shirley and Brigadier-General Thomas Fraser conceded that surrender had become the best option, and sent envoys to the French.

A French officer, the Chevalier de Goussencourt, noted the event in his journal: “On the 12th, to the great joy of all, we saw a white flag raised on the breach of the redoubt. We could scarcely believe our eyes”. He added, “the toil and hardship that de Bouillé’s army had to undergo are incredible… There were officers and men who slept only one night under their tents during the whole siege.” [2]

The Marquis de Bouillé granted the garrison generous terms, including the provision that the troops could return to England so long as they did not serve again against France for the duration of the war.

On the 13th, the British regulars and the St. Kitts militia (close to 1,000 men in total) marched out of the garrison with the honors of war and laid down their arms. The British regulars had lost about 250 men between the siege of Brimstone Hill and the January 28th battle on the Mooring Hills. The Marquis de Bouillé claimed to have lost a little more than 300 men between these affairs. [3]

The French were buoyant after the fall of the island. One of their officers was later heard to boast “that it was not necessary to keep their intentions any longer secret, that Barbadoes and Antigua were the next objects, then Jamaica, and lastly New York, and then they will consent to make peace…” [4]

Hood Escapes

Hood learned that the garrison surrendered on the evening of the 13th. He later wrote, “Under this situation of things I had no longer any business in Basseterre Road”. He also thought it was only a matter of time before the French army began to place guns and mortars on the high ground along the shore in order to bombard his ships. [5]

Fortunately for Hood, on February 14th, de Grasse’s ships were anchored near Nevis, taking on badly needed provisions that had arrived from Europe. [6]

Hood decided to sail that night, under cover of darkness. He added: “I judged it necessary… that every ship should be under sail as nearly as possible at the same moment, for the better preserving [of] a compact body”. The ships’ captains were instructed to cut their cables at the same time. Hood also had lights fixed to small boats or buoys that were placed alongside each of his ships. At the same time, the lights were extinguished on his vessels. When the British fleet set sail, the decoy lights remained behind, making it appear as if the British were still at anchor. [7]

The French did not discover Hood’s departure until morning. The Chevalier de Villebresme, recalled that “when M. de Grasse went on deck to see his enemies ...., they were fifteen leagues away. De Grasse, more and more surprised at the inventive genius of his opponent, returned to the anchorage that he had left [i.e., Basseterre Roadstead]”. [8]

French ships at sea.

Rodney Arrives

After St. Kitts fell to the French, Nevis capitulated as well. De Bouillé’s army then embarked on de Grasse’s navy and they set sail on February 20th for the French base at Martinique. De Bouillé placed Colonel Arthur Dillon (the Comte de Dillon) in command of the captured islands and left him a garrison of 850 men and part of the artillery. En route, Comte de Barras was dispatched to seize Montserrat with some ships and soldiers of regiment Auxerrois. The island had no regular army garrison. [9]

Meanwhile, Admiral George Brydges Rodney (at right) had at last reached the West Indies. He wrote:

On the 19th of February, after five weeks passage with the fleet under my command, I arrived in Carlisle Bay, Barbadoes, and instantly proceeded to join the fleet under Sir Samuel Hood, in hopes of bringing the enemy’s fleet to battle, and saving the island of St. Christopher’s [i.e., St. Kitts], which I heard they were then besieging. [10]

Rodney immediately sailed for St. Kitts, via Antigua. Meanwhile, Hood left Antigua and sailed for Barbados in hopes of finding Rodney. The two fleets took different routes and initially missed each other. It wasn’t until February 25th that Hood and Rodney finally united, in the waters west of Antigua. At that point, according to Rodney, “Every endeavour was used to arrive off Martinique before the enemy”. De Grasse, however, narrowly reached Martinique first, and anchored in Port Royal Harbor on February 26th. [11]

So concluded the St. Kitts campaign of 1782, a campaign that marked the high point of French fortunes in the West Indies. In the spring of 1782, de Bouillé and de Grasse embarked on the conquest of Jamaica. De Grasse’s fleet, however, was attacked and defeated at The Saintes by the united fleet of Rodney and Hood. This bloody battle ended France’s island-hopping campaign, for while they remained strong on land, thereafter the British controlled the seas.

Notes:

1. The Remembrancer, Vol. 14.

2. John Gilmary Shea (1864). The operations of the French fleet under the Count de Grasse in 1781-2 as described in two contemporary journals.

3. The 1st Foot lost 30 killed, 97 wounded, and 2 missing. The grenadier and light infantry companies of the 15th Foot lost 7 killed, 17 wounded, and 6 missing. The Royal Artillery detachment lost 1 killed, 10 wounded, and 5 missing. Prescott’s loss on January 28th was around 71 men. De Bouille stated his total loss was 13 officers and about 290 men.

4. The statement was allegedly made by Colonel Arthur Dillon; Captain Robert Manners was relaying a statement he received second hand; see Letters and papers of the Duke of Rutland.

5. David Hannay (1895). Letters written by Sir Samuel Hood (Viscount Hood) in 1781-2-3.

6. Shea, ibid.

7. Shea, ibid; Hannay, ibid; Souvenirs du Cheavlier de Villebresme.

8. Souvenirs du Cheavlier de Villebresme (Translation is my own).

9. Shea, ibid; R. de Kerallain (1928). Bougainville à l’Armée du Cte de Grasse. Journal de la Société des Américanistes de Paris, 20, 1-70; Attaque et prise de Saint-Christophe dit le «Gibraltar» des Antilles (janvier-février 1782), in Revue Historique des Armées, Vol. 1, 1974. This article includes extracts from «Mémoires Secrets» de Bouillé. René Chartrand and Francis Back (1991). The French Army in the American War of Independence.

10. George Basil Mundy (1830). The life and correspondence of the late Admiral Lord Rodney, Volume 2.

11. Shea, ibid; Mundy, ibid.

St. Kitts (9): The Limits of Endurance

This is the ninth entry in a series of posts on the St. Kitts campaign of 1782. The St. Kitts campaign took place in what is known as the West Indies theater of the Revolutionary War. [Click for Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6, Part 7, or Part 8].

Standoff at Sea

After failing to defeat the British fleet on January 26th, the Comte de Grasse (at right) kept the British navy hemmed in along the southeastern coast of St. Kitts. Each day, the French ships came within sight of the British fleet, and more it looked as if a major attack might commence. The only real combat that occurred, however, was an occasional clash involving a few frigates, schooners, or other, smaller vessels. [1]

De Grasse was frustrated with this business. His fleet had no proper anchorage, and the constant patrols at sea wore down his ships and crew. His vessels ran out of their original store of provisions in early February, and the crews then subsisted on provisions seized or commandeered from merchant ships. The French fleet was also low on ammunition after the several battles with the British on January 25th-26th. De Grasse seems to have feared being caught in this situation once an expected British reinforcement (Admiral George Rodney’s squadron) arrived and made the British fleet larger than his own. [2]

Around the time that the original provisions gave out, de Grasse was arguing that the further prosecution of the siege was inadvisable. However, the Marquis de Bouillé, who commanded the French troops on land, was determined to continue. Through some mysteries grapevine, the British naval officers almost immediately learned of this division and it gave them fresh hope. On February 8th, Captain Robert Manners of the Resolution wrote:

I understand the French commanding officers are all at variance. De Grasse is not for risking his squadron, probably wishing to preserve it for the more important conquest of Jamaica. The Marquis de Bouille declares he will not give the island up, though Dr Grasse should leave him, and [Comte de] Bougainville sides with De Bouille… [3]

De Grasse relented and maintained a thankless watch on the British fleet.

Battered Brimstone Hill

The Marquis de Bouillé’s determination to maintain the siege was well founded. On land the French were at last making good progress battering Brimstone Hill into submission.

On the night of January 31st, French infantry found at the base of Brimstone Hill a large, abandoned cache of artillery. This included eight brass 24-pounders, with 6,000 cannonballs, and two brass 13-inch mortars, with 1,500 shells. These guns had been part of the “travelling artillery of the West Indies,” kept in storage on St. Kitts. As the artillery belonged neither to the British garrison, nor to the island’s militia, neither had thought to remove the guns and mortars to a more secure location when the French invasion began. This windfall allowed the ammunition-starved French army to escalate its bombardment of the British garrison. [4]

A few days later (February 3), de Bouillé was reinforced with a battalion of Regiment Hainault, dispatched from Grenada. Also, the ship of the line Caton lent two of its 18-pounders and ten of its 24-pounders to the besieging army. [5]

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The Marquis de Bouillé (at center, holding sword) at the siege of Brimstone Hill. In the background are burnt-out houses in the town of Sandy Point. At right, a mortar battery fires on the hill. (Excerpt of a French illustration).

Artillery are dragged forward during the siege of Brimstone Hill. (Excerpt of a French illustration).

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The British naval commander, Vice Admiral Samuel Hood, could do little to aid the garrison. Brigadier-General Robert Prescott had returned to Antigua after the inconclusive battle on January 28th. Hood wrote that on February 8th, he was informed by signals from Brimstone Hill “that the enemy’s batteries had been successful in damaging the works and buildings [on the hill], [and] that the garrison was reduced and short of ordnance stores.” Therefore, he dispatched several officers to provide moral support to the garrison, but although the men went at night and worse disguises, all were captured. [6]

By February 11th, the state of the garrison had grown quite grim. Governor Thomas Shirley noted in his journal:

[The French] opened a battery of 4 guns near… the foot of the Hill, against the north-west front, from whence they very much annoyed the garrison on the highest parts. Twenty-three pieces of cannon and all their mortars were this day incessantly played upon the Hill, whereby the breaches already made were greatly widened and the garrison became much reduced by killed and wounded. [7]

Matters were even worse on the 12th. Shirley wrote:

This day, on the northwest front was an entire breach and all the guns disabled. In the curtain were two very large breaches; the whole parapet was destroyed… In the left flank all the guns were disabled and in the left face was a practicable breach of forty feet. [7]

Lieutenant George Lewis Hamilton described the woeful condition of the garrison’s artillery:

Upon our opening the batteries on the lower works, on the first appearance of the enemy, there was two twenty four pounders, four twelve pounders, two nine pounders and one eight inch howitzer mounted… The progress of the enemy, since they have opened their gun batteries, has been so heavy and rapid… that the eight inch howitzer only remains serviceable, and from the present ruinous and exposed state of the whole front[, it] can only be brought into action in the night, when it is supposed that the enemy's fire has abated and they are making approach to assault. [7]

He found the situation to be little better in the upper citadel and concluded that the “guns and carriages… are in the worst state and are absolutely insufficient to prevent the approaches of the enemy.”

The French could clearly see the breeches in the fortress walls, and the Marquis de Bouillé decided to mount an assault. He wrote:

The day of the 13th was to be used to reconnoiter and make dispositions, and the attack was to be on the 14th, one hour before daylight. The Marquis de Chilleau, one of the bravest men that I have known, was to command the head of my attack. The grenadiers and soldiers were full of ardor, and although I assumed that I would lose many, I counted on success. [8]

Notes:

1. John Gilmary Shea (1864). The operations of the French fleet under the Count de Grasse in 1781-2 as described in two contemporary journals; John Ross (1838). Memoirs and correspondence of Admiral Lord de Saumarez, Vol. 1.

2. Shea, ibid.

3. Letters and papers of the Duke of Rutland.

4. The Journal Politique for 1782; Attaque et prise de Saint-Christophe dit le «Gibraltar» des Antilles (janvier-février 1782), in Revue Historique des Armées, Vol. 1, 1974. This article includes extracts from «Mémoires Secrets» de Bouillé; The Remembrancer, Vol. 14.

5. Attaque et prise..., ibid.

6. Attaque et prise..., ibid. Charles Middleton (1907). Letters and papers of Charles, Lord Barham, Volume 1. David Hannay (1895). Letters written by Sir Samuel Hood (Viscount Hood) in 1781-2-3.

7. Algernon Aspinall (1915). West Indian tales of old.

8. Attaque et prise..., ibid. (Translation is my own)