Cowpens in Miniature 8

Part 8: The Americans Deploy
Previous: Initial Contact

Next: Morgan's Plan

Now certain that battle was eminent, Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan began his final preparations. He reported:

“An hour before daylight one of my scouts returned and informed me that Lieut. Col. Tarleton had advanced within five miles of our camp [see Note 1]. On this information, I hastened to form as good a disposition as circumstances would admit, and from the alacrity of the troops, we were soon prepared to receive them.”

Other writers made a similar remark. Lieutenant Thomas Anderson of the 1st Delaware would record in his journal, “Before day Reced Information that Col Tarlton Was Within Five Miles of us With a Strong Body of Horse and Infantry Whereon We got up and put Ourselves in Order of Battle.”

Major Joseph McJunkin of South Carolina remembered that Morgan and Colonel Andrew Pickens walked through the American encampment waking up the men and exhorting them to fight.

“Gen. Morgan being apprised of the approach of Tarleton by faithful spies, began before day to go from mess to mess with Gen. Pickens, saying ‘Boys, get up, Benny's coming; & you that have sweethearts or wives or children or parents, must fight for them and above all you must fight for liberty and for your country,’ which appeared to have the ears of Every true friend of this country, & were alive to action, but a few ‘pet Tories’ whom it seemed like poison to.”

As for the Continentals, as soon as the drums started beating, they rose and hastened into formation. According to McJunkin, “the tattoo being sounded, the line was formed commanded by Col. Howard [Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard].” Morgan then spoke to them collectively, saying “My friends in arms, my dear boys, I request you to remember Saratoga, Monmouth, Paoli & Brandywine, & this day you must play your parts for your honor & liberty's cause.”

The troops then began moving onto the battlefield. It was an unpleasant morning. Private William Neel, who was in Captain Buchanan’s company of Virginians, remembered that, “the Army paraded before day a cold morning.” Captain Henry Connelly recalled, “it was cold weather but inclined to be rainey.”

According to McJunkin, “First the regulars and some companies of Virginia militia are posted to where the final issue is expected.” However, Colonel Joseph Hayes’ small regiment may have been the first onto the battlefield. Perhaps they were directed to mark the spot where the Continentals were to deploy or they were designated to cover the Continentals’ deployment with their long-ranged rifles. Robert Long of Hayes’ regiment watched as the Continentals “marched out in sections, and divided two and two as they got [within] ten paces of Hayes' regiment already formed across the road.”

The Americans Deploy, Part 1. (Click to enlarge). Hayes' regiment is drawn up across the Green River Road. Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard's infantry march down the road behind them, followed by Major Francis Triplett's Virginians.

The Continentals deployed to the southwest of the Green River Road, that is, to the right of Hayes’ regiment [see Note 2]. Thomas Young remembered that, “The regulars, under the command of Col. Howard, a very brave man, were formed in two ranks.”

The Americans Deploy, Part 2. (Click to enlarge). Hayes' regiment is drawn up across the Green River Road. Howard's Continentals have completed their deployment. Major Francis Triplett's Virginians are beginning to deploy as well. Other units can be seen preparing to deploy.

The Virginia militia deployed behind and to the sides of the Continentals, leaving a gap between the Continentals and either wing of militia [see Note 3]. According to Neel, his company of Virginia militia “formed in single file with the Militia on the right of the Regulars, stood in ranks till Sun rise, at which time the battle commenced” [see Note 4].

Sergeant Major William Seymour of the Delaware Continentals recorded in his journal that “we were drawn up in order of battle, the men seeming to be all in good spirits and very willing to fight.”

Next came the more complicated deployment of the balance of the American militia. According to McJunkin, “the main body of militia under Gen. Pickens are drawn up at the distance of 150 yards” in front of the main line [see Note 5]. They were deployed in two wings, which were aligned with the gaps between the Continentals and militia wings on the main line [see Note 6]. The American cavalry, meanwhile, took up position on the elevation behind the Continentals [see Note 7].

The American deployment was now complete. Brigadier-General William Moultrie, an early historian of the battle, wrote that, “General Morgan drew up his men on an open pine barren in the following order… the militia of about four hundred men formed the first line under General Pickens; the continentals of about five hundred (two hundred of whom were six months men, very raw troops) formed the second line [see Note 8], commanded by Colonel Howard, about two hundred yards in the rear of the first. Colonel Washington, with about seventy-five continental cavalry, and- forty-five mounted militia, with swords, under Colonel M'Call, in the rear of the whole: in this disposition did they wait to receive the enemy.

American Deployment at Cowpens (click to enlarge). 1 = Continental Light Dragoons; 2 = Mounted Militia; 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line; 4 = Continental Infantry; 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line; 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line; 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line.

Colonel Henry Lee made similar observations in his early history [see Note 9]. He concluded, “Erroneous as was the decision to fight in this position, when a better might have been easily gained, the disposition for battle was masterly.”

Morgan indicated in his report of the battle that Hayes’ regiment was deployed on the left wing of the militia wing. However, Robert Long stated that his regiment was deployed on the right wing of the main line (see The Statements of Private Robert Long). Either Morgan or Long was mistaken in their recollection, or Hayes' regiment was ordered to the militia line, but then moved to the main line due to some last-minute adjustment in the deployment.

Why would men have been drawn from the left wing of the militia line to reinforce the right wing of the main line? It is noteworthy that the left wing of the militia line bordered a branch of Suck Creek, while the right wing of the militia line was posted on a high point on the battlefield. Perhaps it was determined that while the left wing could have fewer men without endangering the American position, but the right wing could not be reduced.

No participant account directly says that some men were shifted off of the front line to supplement the main line. However, Robert Long, of Hayes’ regiment did describe his regiment performing some peculiar pre-battle maneuvers. He stated that after the Continentals deployed,

“Hayes regiment then moved to the right of the infantry [the Continentals],” or onto the other side of the battlefield. Once they were there, there seems to have been some confusion over exactly where Hayes’ regiment was to deploy. At first Hayes’ regiment was “70 or 80 yards in advance” of the Continentals, and “70 or 80 yards” behind “Major McDowell, of North Carolina.” In other words, they were midway between the militia line and the main line. The rest of the main line militia were deployed behind the Continentals.

The Americans Deploy, Part 3. (Click to enlarge). Hayes' regiment is on the right of the Continentals, midway between the Continentals' right and Major Joseph McDowell's North Carolinians. At this stage, the American deployment is largely complete.

Eventually, the deployment was sorted out. Long noted that “Hayes' regiment having advanced too far were to retreat.” They then fell back to a more appropriate position, perhaps next to Connelly’s company. At that point, Long stood “in the center line on the right wing in Captain Ewing's company commanded by Colonel Joseph Hayes, next to Colonel Howard's Infantry.”

The right wing of the main line was described by few participants. For example, Thomas Young wrote that, “The battle field was almost a plain with a ravine on both hands, and very little under growth in front or near us. The regulars, under the command of Col. Howard, a very brave man, were formed in two ranks, their right flank resting upon the head of the ravine on the right. The militia [of the main line] were formed on the left of the regulars… their left flank resting near the head of the ravine on the left.”

Howard remembered that he had “two companies of Virginia Militia or volunteers, one commanded by Capt Tripolet [Major Francis Triplett] from Fauguhar [Fauquier County], the other by a capt Tate from Rockbridge or one of the western Counties.” He wrote, “I am positive that Triplett and Tate were on my left,” but said nothing about militia units on his right.

The right wing of the main line was on lower ground than the Continentals and the other militia units; perhaps Howard and others didn’t see them there. Alternatively, as the right wing failed to distinguish itself during the battle, their presence, while known at the time, was later forgotten.

Final American Deployment at Cowpens (click to enlarge). 1 = Continental Light Dragoons; 2 = Mounted Militia; 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line; 4 = Continental Infantry; 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line; 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line; 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line.

Notes:

1. The scout could be either a militiaman or one of Washington’s dragoons. As noted in my previous post, Sergeant Lawrence Everhart claimed that he was captured when 3 miles away from Morgan’s camp; this suggests that the main British column was 2 miles distant from the site of the initial conflict.

2. This is indicated in the pension application of Sergeant Benjamin Martin of the Virginia militia. Martin stated that "I was in the road all the time of the action... Lieutenant Ewen [James Ewing] was on the left of the Maryland Troops near me." This places Martin on the left of the Continentals, and the Continentals to the southwest of the Green River Road. A number of illustrations of the battle of Cowpens show the Americans deployed equally to either side of the Green River Road. However, the ground was more elevated to the southwest of the road than to the northeast (see The Cowpens Battlefield). Martin’s statement suggests that the American deployment was governed more by the topography of the battlefield than by the location of the road.

3. The description of the American deployment provided here is unlike that in many histories of the battle, but it is not wholly unique. A similar arrangement can be found in Edwin Bearss' 1967 Battle of Cowpens: A Documented Narrative and Troop Movement Maps.

Two Interpretations of the American Deployment (click to enlarge). My interpretation appears on the left, Bearss' on the right. The positioning of the units per Bearss' account is approximate. 1 = Continental Light Dragoons; 2 = Mounted Militia; 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line; 4 = Continental Infantry; 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line; 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line; 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line.

In both cases, heavy emphasis has been placed on Morgan's after action report and Hammond's description of Morgan's plan (see Morgan's Report, The Hammond Map). I interpreted Hammond somewhat differently than did Bearss. Other differences arose because I drew upon pension applications as a source of information.

One recent history that indicates a very different American deployment than that shown here is Lawrence Babits' 1998 A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens.

Comparison of Two Versions of the American Deployment (click to enlarge). My interpretation appears on the left, and is as described above. Babits' interpretation appears on the right; the positioning of the units per his account is approximate. On the right, 1 = American Cavalry; 2 = Main Line; 3 = Militia Line; 4 = Skirmish Line. The two accounts also differ in terms of the location of the Green River Road. The road in my version follows Bearss and is shown in brown. Babits showed the Green River Road following a different course, which I have partially sketched out in black on the right panel.

There are a number of reasons for the differences in the present account with that by Babits. Chief among these is that Babits concluded (while I did not) that Morgan's and Hammond's descriptions of the American deployment referred to a temporary battle plan that was developed the night before the battle and then greatly modified before the actual fighting began. (see Morgan's Report and The Hammond Map for a transcription of their accounts).

I have devoted a number of previous posts to arguing for the version of the American deployment shown here. In regards to the main line deployment, see in particular The Main Line: Organization, The Main Line: Composition, and The Main Line: Location.

4. Aside from Neel, the only participant to comment on the number of ranks was Thomas Young, who said that “the regulars… were formed in two ranks.” He did not indicate this deployment for the militia. Indeed, that he should have mentioned this fact at all suggests that he found such a deployment to be exceptional. A single rank for the militia line leads to their covering well the high ground between Suck Creek and Island Creek. Perhaps all of the militia were formed in a single rank, although it's not unreasonable to believe that the men also would have doubled up behind large trees where they were near the line.

5. Some sources say that distance was 150 yards, others that it was 200 yards. In the images the distance between the first and second lines is a little greater than 150 (scale) yards.

6. This is indicated in participant accounts. As noted above, Martin’s statement indicated that gap between the Continentals and the left wing of the main line would have been near the Green River Road. Hammond’s description of the militia line deployment places his regiment on the northeast of the Green River Road and Major John Cunningham’s men on the southwest of the road. In other words, the left wing of the militia line was roughly aligned with the left gap in the main line. I assume, by extension, that the same was true of the right wing of the militia line. See The Hammond Map.

7. For details about where the American cavalry were deployed, see The American Cavalry - Part 2.

8. Moultrie mistakenly referred to 200 of the troops as Continentals that were in fact Virginia militia with long terms of service. They were, in any case, “raw troops.”

9. Lee said that “The main body of the militia composed… [the front] line, with General Pickens at its head. At a suitable distance in the rear of the first line a second was stationed, composed of the continental infantry and two companies of Virginia militia, under Captains Triplett and Taite, commanded by Lieutenant- Colonel Howard. Washington's cavalry, reinforced with a company of mounted militia armed with sabres, was held in reserve; convenient to support the infantry, and protect the horses of the rifle militia, which were tied, agreeably to usage, in the rear.”

Sources:

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, includes a transcription of the statements by Morgan, Anderson, McJunkin, Neel, Connelly, Young, Seymour, Howard, and Hammond.

James Graham's (1856) The Life of General Daniel Morgan also has a copy of Morgan's report.

This issue (.pdf file) of The Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine provides a complete treatment of McJunkin's statements.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Henry Connelly (.pdf).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Robert Long (.pdf file). See also The Statements of Private Robert Long.

A transcription of William Seymour's journal can also be found on this Battle of Camden website.

William Moultrie's 1802 Memoirs of the American Revolution

Henry Lee's 1812 Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States

Joseph Johnson's 1851 Traditions and Reminiscences Chiefly of the American Revolution in the South is the original source of Hammond's statement.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Benjamin Martin (.pdf).

Edwin Bearss' 1967 Battle of Cowpens: A Documented Narrative and Troop Movement Maps.

Lawrence Babits' A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

Related: The Main Line: Organization, The Main Line: Location, The Militia Line: Composition and Organization

Cowpens in Miniature 3

Part 3: American Order of Battle
Previous: British Order of Battle

Next: Morgan's Decision

There is considerable uncertainty about the number of American participants at the battle of Cowpens, a topic about which I have previously commented on at length. I noted that two trustworthy sources (Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan and Sergeant-Major William Seymour) placed the American total at or below 800 men.

In this post I describe the American order of battle in some detail. In this description, Morgan's command has a total of 950 men.

The chief reason why I chose a larger total concerns the question of how many militia were present at the battle. Why Morgan's and Seymour's accounts imply a very low total, other credible sources explicitly indicate otherwise (see How Many Fought at Cowpens?). These statements include a total in the neighborhood of 350 for just the militia line (Otho Williams) to a total for all of the militia of about 500 (Nathanael Greene), 550 (US Congressional Resolution) or 600 men (William Moultrie). In my scheme there are around 590 militia (45 mounted militia, 230 on the main line, and 315 on the militia line).

My total of 950 men is not likely to sit well with some.

Those readers swayed by contemporary author Lawrence Babits would regard this number as too low. He estimated between 1,800 and 2,400 Americans were present at the battle. His estimate of a comparatively large total is based chiefly on an examination of pension applications filed by veterans after the war. I'm in favor of using pension application as a source of information, but I was unswayed by his analysis. This topic was covered in six previous posts (see How Many Fought at Cowpens?, Problems with Pensions, Veteran Survival, Little River Regiment, Morgan and Seymour, Fitting Large Numbers on the Militia Line).

Conversely, those swayed by early historian James Graham would regard this number as too high. I quoted him before, but a key passage bears repeating.

"It is true, his entire command, including all the militia that arrived previous to the battle, would appear to be about nine hundred and eighty men, if army returns and muster rolls were alone consulted. But every one acquainted with military affairs knows that such evidences of strength always exceed the reality. A number of his regulars were sick at the time, and many of the militia were absent. One detachment had been sent off with the baggage, another had gone to Salisbury in charge of prisoners, and a third guarded the horses of the militia. Besides, after the retreat of the militia from the front line, several of them never again appeared in the field, and a few mounted their horses and fled from the ground. Such men should not be permitted to lesson the glory of the achievement, by sharing in the honors of the victors as well as diminishing the mortification of the vanquished. The forces engaged in the battle under Morgan did not exceed eight hundred and fifty men."

Below I describe in some detail the composition of the American force, and estimate the size of each component. I don't have great confidence in the estimates of the various components, but at least there is some logic behind the decisions and the total is consistent with early sources.

American Deployment at Cowpens (click to enlarge). 1 = Continental Light Dragoons; 2 = Mounted Militia; 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line; 4 = Continental Infantry; 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line; 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line; 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line. Each miniature represents approximately 20 combatants.

Cavalry Reserve

Lieutenant-Colonel William Washington, commanding. Units #1 & #2 in the above figure.

Continental Light Dragoons: 72 men (Lieutenant-Colonel William Washington). See The American Cavalry - Part 1 for additional details.

Mounted Militia: ~45 men (served in two companies commanded by Major James McCall and Captain Banjamin Jolly). See The American Cavalry - Part 2 for additional details.

Total: ~117 men

The Main Line Continentals

Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard commanding. Unit #4 in the figure.

1st Delaware Regiment: ~60 men. (one light infantry company under Captain Robert Kirkwood; total is based on Babits' A Devil of a Whipping).

1st Maryland Regiment: ~180 men (three light infantry companies under Captains Richard Anderson, Henry Dobson, and Nicholas Mangers; information from Babits.

Virginian Continentals: ~20 men (one company under Captain Andrew Wallace). William Jewell who fought in this company wrote, "Captain Wallace... marched us to Charlotte in North Carolina where we Joined General Greene: General Morgan was here permitted to select about 20 men to reinforce his own little band of perhaps 300 men against Tarleton at the Cowpens – he was selected as one and after the battle went as guard with the prisoners to Albemarle Barracks in Virginia."

Others: ~33 men.

As noted previously, some Virginia State troops and North Carolina Continentals may have served on the main line. Like Wallace's men, they may have been handpicked to supplement Morgan's other Continentals. Colonel Otho Williams in a January 23, 1781 letter said that Morgan had 290 light infantry. There were perhaps 237 Maryland and Delaware Continentals (number based on U.S. Congressional Resolution of March 9, 1781), plus 20 men with Wallace. An additional 33 men would produce a total force of 290.

That Howard's light infantry was an amalgam of men drawn from several units rather than a single large regiment is a reflection of the destitute condition of the American army in the South. On December 7, 1780, Major-General Nathanael Greene wrote to General George Washington complaining that:

"Nothing can be more wretched and distressing than the condition of the troops, starving with cold and hunger, without tents and camp equipage. Those of the Virginia line are literally naked, and a great part totally unfit for any kind of duty, and must remain so untill clothing can be had."

It was necessary to handpick men for service with Morgan because so many were incapable of a rigorous campaign.

Total: ~290 men (based on Williams)

Main Line Militia

Units #3 & #5 in the figure.

Major Francis Triplett's Virginia militia battalion: ~170 men (four companies under Captains James Tate, Patrick Buchanan, James Gilmore, and either Captain Combs or Lieutenant Dearing). The total number is based on the aforementioned letter by Williams.

Little River Regiment of South Carolina militia: ~40 men (Colonel Joseph Hayes, commanding). Daniel Morgan's letter of Jan 4, 1781 identified "forty militia horsemen under Col. Hays." A regimental strength of about 40 men can be interpreted as being consistent with statements made by Private Aaron Guyton of South Carolina (see Little River Regiment). Statements by Morgan and Seymour likewise suggest that the South Carolina militia regiments were quite small (see Morgan and Seymour).

Babits pointed out that there were last minute arrivals adding to the strength of the militia on the eve of the battle. However, there were also last minute departures. Major Joseph McJunkin observed that these regiments included a significant number of "pet tories" who were reluctant to fight (and prone to desert), and Morgan complained that he couldn't keep the militia together.

Other Units: ~20 men (conjectural). This includes a company of North Carolina State Troops commanded by Captain Henry Connelly.

As noted previously, some other militia units have been identified with the main line by various sources. Babits noted that his review of pension applications placed two companies (50 men) of Major David Campbell's Virginia militia battalion at the battle. The pension applications in question are lacking in details. It is not clear how many companies were in this battalion, how many men were in each company, whether all or only part of the companies served in the battle, or even whether the claims made in the applications are trustworthy. As these men are not mentioned in other participant accounts, this group, if present, was not likely to have been of a significant factor in the battle.

Total: ~230 men.

Placement of Militia Units on the Main Line

Of the Virginia militia, Combs'/Dearing's company (~42 men; based on a four-way division of Triplett's 170 men) and Tate's company (~42 men) appear to have been on the left wing, while Buchanan's company (~42 men), appears to have been on the right. Hayes' Little River Regiment (~40 men), and Connelly's company (~20 men) also appear to have been on the right wing (see The Main Line: Composition). I have not been able to place Gilmore's company on either wing. To even things out, I tentatively place Gilmore's company on the left wing to bring that total over the desired threshold. This gives the left wing 126 men (all Virginians), and the right wing 102 men (a hodgepodge of units from several states).

Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard noted that at the climax of the battle that he had only 350 men with him. At this time, the right wing of the main line had fled, but the left wing remained in place. By my calculations, he would have had 290 Continental and Virginia state troops plus 126 riflemen under Major Francis Triplett. This total (416 men) is considerably above the 350 men Howard stated. It could be that some of my assumptions are in error. Alternatively, Howard, in arriving at 350 men, may have thought only half of the Virginian riflemen remained (this would have been 85 men) and forgot about the other units. He might also have subtracted about 20-25 men due to the losses he had sustained from British fire up to this point. This would result in a total of about 350 men.

Militia Line (Left Wing)

Unit #7 in the figure.

Georgia Refugees: One battalion under Major John Cunningham.

South Carolina State Troops: One regiment under Captain (Major) Samuel Hammond. Hammond is referred to as both a captain and a major. Hammond himself noted that he had been promoted to major, but technically he remained a captain, because he had not yet received his commission. Hammond stated that he

"Commanded on the left of the front line as Major of McCall's Regiment. It is here necessary to observe that Col. McCall had been promoted to the command of a Regiment of Cavalry authorized to be enrolled for six months & Applicant appointed to the Majority neither had yet been commissioned & only few armed with swords & pistols. The Refugee militia attached to their respective commands enrolled in the regiment and were promised by the Governor to be provided with clothing & arms as soon as they could be procured --- not a day was lost in recruiting nor was the full number made up before the Battle. The few 25 to 30 that were equipped as Horsemen were placed under Col. McCall and attached to Col. Washington's command. Those who were not so equipped were armed with Rifles & placed under the Applicant."

Upper Ninety-Six Regiment of South Carolina militia: I argued in a previous post that the left wing of the militia line likely included Colonel Andrew Pickens' regiment of South Carolina militia and perhaps also other volunteers from Georgia and South Carolina not affiliated with either Cunningham or Hammond. (see The Militia Line: Composition and Organization).

Total: ~115 men. I have not found information about the number of men in these units, therefore, I defer to Babits' number, which in turn comes from an unpublished study described in the Greene Papers. I haven't read the study and so I can offer no comment other than that the number seems plausible.

Militia Line (Right Wing)

Unit #6 in the figure.

Major Joseph McDowell's battalion of North Carolina militia: ~120 men. This total is based on a letter from Daniel Morgan to Nathanael Greene, dated December 31, 1780.

1st Spartan Regiment of South Carolina militia: ~40 men (Colonel John Thomas, commanding). The estimate is an extension of that for Hayes' regiment (see above).

2nd Spartan Regiment of South Carolina militia: ~80 men (two battalions; Colonel Joseph Brandon and Lieutenant-Colonel Benjamin Roebuck, commanding). Again, the estimate is an extension of the reasoning applied to Hayes' regiment.

The battalions of McDowell, Thomas, Brandon, and Roebuck are estimated to have had a total force of 240 men. However, there were some significant detachments. Captain Samuel Otterson of Brandon's battalion indicated that 30 men were detached as serving as spies and missed the battle. Captain Benjamin Jolly, also of Brandon's battalion, commanded a company of mounted militia contained men drawn, in part, from the South Carolinians' ranks (see The American Cavalry - Part 2).

Total: ~200 men (240 men - detachments).

Grand Total

• Cavalry: ~117 men
• Main Line Continentals: ~290 men
• Main Line Militia: ~230 men
• Militia Line (Left Wing): ~115 men
• Militia Line (Right Wing): ~200 men

Total ~950 men

Sources:

Lawrence Babits' A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of William Jewell (.pdf file).

A summary of the Otho Williams papers can be found here. The item in question is a letter from Williams to Dr. James McHenry, dated January 23, 1781.

A transcription of the letter from Greene to Washington can be found here.

January 23, 1781 letter from Major-General Nathanael Greene to Brigadier-General Francis Marion (not available online).

Theodorus Bailey Myers' 1881 Cowpens Papers has the U.S. Congressional Resolution, a copy of the statement by Jackson, and various statements by Morgan.

This issue (.pdf file) of The Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine provides a complete treatment of McJunkin's statements.

Will Graves trancribed the pension application of Samuel Hammond (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Samuel Otterson (.pdf file).

James Graham's 1856 The Life of General Daniel Morgan

Related: How Many Fought at Cowpens?, The Main Line: Composition, The Militia Line: Composition and Organization

Little River Regiment

This is the third in a series of posts defending the view that a relatively small number of Americans fought at Cowpens.

I think Lawrence Babits' efforts to use pension applications to better understand the battle of Cowpens is commendable, even though I disagree that a very large number of Americans fought at Cowpens, and I've previously taken issue with the argument that either the sheer number of pension applications, or pension-derived estimates of unit size convincingly show that a large number of Americans were present. In this post I take issue with a third argument in favor of a large American total, which involves "counting captains."

To illustrate my concerns, I focus on one militia regiment in particular, the "Little River Regiment," of Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Hayes. About this regiment Babits said (A Devil of a Whipping, p 39):

"The Little River Regiment was composed of five companies under Captains James Ewing, William Harris, James Dugan, Samuel Sexton, and James Irby. Captain James Ewing commanded the right flank company located on the Green River Road. Captain William Harris served under Hayes during the fight at Blackstock's Plantation. Captain James Dugan was reported as a major at Cowpens, but his brother appears to have held that rank... Captain James Lindsay commanded a platoon in Dugan's company."

He then further described the companies of Sexton and Irby, which I brought up in my last post.

Babits believed each of these companies to be of a decent size, although considerably less than a full strength company of Continentals. He noted (p 31), "The immediate impression is that a captain commanded about twenty to thirty men."

Under this formula, the five companies would combine to create a regiment of about 100 to 150 men. This falls short of the 150 to 200 men he attributed to each regiment (p 189, n. 11). However, if Sexton was correct that he had 24 men and Irby was correct that he had around 65 men, then the range would be more like 149 to 179.

In working on this project, I've read quite a few of the pension applications that have been transcribed and publicly posted on the website southerncampaign.org. There are, at this writing, a little over 5,500 applications online (and the number has been increasing almost by the day), mostly for veterans that served with units from Virginia and the Carolinas. Many of these veterans claimed service at Cowpens*

*A search for the term Cowpens generates at the moment 598 results, although not all of these "hits" involve applications in which the veteran claimed service at the battle of Cowpens. Some applications mentioned Cowpens because it was a staging ground before the battle of King's Mountain; in some other cases the term refers to an entirely different locale.

I have already disagreed with Babits about where Hayes' regiment was on the battlefield. Searching through these pensions I also found evidence for a very different organization for Hayes' regiment. Mindful that the officers comanding a given company could change with some frequency, I assembled a list of those online applications where the application clearly indicated service in Hayes' regiment under a given company commander at the battle of Cowpens. In some cases the applicant makes these connections; in other cases they appear in statements of support appended to the application. Links (all are to .pdfs) are provided for the benefit of the reader that would to examine these applications for himself/herself.

1. Thomas Blasingame's company. Jethro O'Shields and John O'Shields served in this company.

2. James Dillard's company. See Captain James Dillard's pension application. Babits (p 75) says that "Dillard's company became the left, or second, platoon under Ewing," and cites Robert Long's application as evidence. This contention is by no means clear from Long's application.

3. James Ewing's company Robert Long placed himself in this company.

4. William Harris' company. Lewis Saxon, Joel Harvey, and Joseph Griffin served in this company.

5. John Jones' company. Golding Tinsley served in this company. Although in the application of Robert Long, he implies that was in Ewing's company.

6. John Ridgeway's company. John Ridgeway (junior) places himself in his father's company. William Childress also places himself in this company.

7. Samuel Saxton's company. See Captain Samuel Saxton's pension application.

8. Daniel Williams' company. James Tinsley served in this company.

(9). James Dugan's company. This is one of the companies that Babits described. The online records I examined (which are incomplete) did not indicate a clear connection between James Dugan's company and Hayes' regiment at the time of Cowpens.

(10). John Irby's company. Neither Captain John Irby nor Richard Griffin who was also in this company say that they were adjoined to Hayes' regiment. Irby said he was in the Little River area before setting out for Cowpens. Richard Griffin indicated that he was one of the Georgian refugees, which would seemingly place Irby's company on the left wing of the militia line, while Robert Long's statements clearly place Hayes' regiment on the right wing of the main line. Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan stated that Hayes' regiment was on the left wing of the militia line near the Georgian refugees.

In short, a partial inspection of the pension applications indicates 8 companies that with some confidence can be placed in Hayes' regiment at the time of the battle. Following Babits' suggested company size, this would give Hayes' regiment between 160 and 240 men. However, there are 8 different companies described in these 12 applications, and 1 captain for every 6 applications. These numbers suggest an alternative possibility -- that the militia companies at Cowpens were both very numerous and very small.

A clear indication that the militia companies were very small can be found in a statment made by Private Aaron Guyton of Colonel Thomas Brandon's regiment of South Carolinians. Guyton said:

"I was under Col Brandon who had a few Brave Men who stood true for the cause of Liberty in the back part of the State who composed our little Army I was out the most of this time Some times we had 75 Some Times 150 men, and some times we had 4 or 5 Cols with from 50 to 150 men. Each of them had Command of a Regt at home & some times not more than 5 of his men with him. The Cols were Brandon, Hayes, Roebuck, White,--in December 1780 Genl Morgan & Col. Washington of the Cavalry came out and took Camp near Pacolet River was soon joined with what few Malitia was in our part."

In other words, even if there were a handful of South Carolina militia regiments at Cowpens, the total number of men representing those regiment could still have been very small. Babits, I think, interpreted this statement as an indication that each colonel or lieutenant colonel commanded between 50 to 150 men (although in his book he does not give the strength of any of these regiments as being under 150 men). My interpretation is that this number refers to the combined forces of these officers, as suggested by Guyton's phrases "our little Army" and "what few Malitia was in our part [of South Carolina]."

If a regiment at times could be as few as five men and a colonel, then it requires no stretch of the imagination to believe that the individual companies could also be quite small. Indeed, Guyton went on to say that, "we had no Officer in our Company & only two or three or four men, and the morning before the Battle 17 January 1781 we joined Captain John Thompson's Company."

With such small companies in existence, men would perhaps frequently jump from one company to another as the occassion warranted, especially if their officers were not always present. For this reason I was careful in my pension search to make sure that the application clearly indicated that service with a given company commander occurred at the battle of Cowpens.

Babits suggested that a typical militia company contained around 25 men, which does seem like a reasonable estimate. However, evidence for this in regards to Cowpens is poor. Only Samuel Sexton and John Collins mentioned commanding companies of this size at Cowpens, and Sexton's company was seemingly raised under unusual circumstances. John Irby claimed to have commanded a company of 60 to 70 men at the battle, but I gave reasons for why this is dubious.

In my opinion, one cannot reject the possibility that some, if not many, of the militia companies present at Cowpens consisted of groups of 10 men or less.

One also cannot reject the possibility that some of these statements about companies and commanders are inaccurate. For example, North Carolina militiaman James Patterson stated that he, "was at the battle of the Cowpens; engaged in the battle some time near the middle of January—he was under Col. Rutherford in the battle with the militia who retreated in the first attack but he was wounded and cut down but afterwards recovered and joined the regular troops under Col. Howard and assisted during the rest of the battle in defeating the British and joined in pursuit of the enemy." Rutherford's regiment is not regarded as having been present at the battle. Does Patterson's statement mean that historians have overlooked an entire regiment of North Carolinians? Of course not. More believable is that Patterson was in error. Perhaps Patterson was in Major Joseph McDowell's battalion of North Carolina militiamen and misremembered that fact. In the case of a statement about a large formation, the error is easily caught. Statements in error about smaller formations are both more likely to occur and less likely to be discovered.

As is the case with the other arguments I've considered, the argument that a large number of combatants in Morgan's force is indicated by a large number of companies is insufficient in my view to reject other evidence.

Related: Introduction, Problems with Pensions, Veteran Survival

Problems with Pensions

This is the first in a series of posts defending the view that a relatively small number of Americans fought at Cowpens.

Previously, I reviewed primary sources, and to a lesser extent, secondary sources, and arrived at a rough estimate of the number of British and American participants at the battle of Cowpens. Specifically, I suggested that the British had around 1,150 men, and the Americans had somewhere between 800 and 980 men.

Of note is that Lawrence Babits in his recent and influential history of the battle, A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens, arrived at a very different determination, for at least the American army. Babits concluded that Morgan may in fact have had as many as 2,400 men under him; or three times the number of men Morgan claimed in his after action report.

Unlike a number of earlier histories, such as James Graham's The Life of General Daniel Morgan... (1856), which I brought up before, Babits explained the sources and reasoning behind his totals. His approach both deserves and allows careful consideration.

Babits estimated American numbers using several different approaches. For the number of men in the commands of Captain Samuel Hammond of South Carolina and Major John Cunningham of Georgia, Babits deferred to past authority (he cited a study described in a footnote in the Greene Papers). However, for other units serving on the militia and skirmish lines, namely the commands of Colonel Thomas Brandon, Colonel Joseph Hayes, Colonel John Thomas, Lieutenant-Colonel Benjamin Roebuck, and Major Joseph McDowell, he relied on estimates derived from pension records. His method of using pension records to determine unit size is the focus of this post.

Babits' method of using pension records to estimate unit size is innovative and commendable. His method can be summarized as follows. First, one must identify units where the number of participants is known. Second, one must identify the number of pension applications generated by individuals serving in those units. Third, one must calculate the ratio of pension applications to participants for those units. Fourth and finally, one then estimates the size of other units by extrapolation. That is, the number of pension applications generated by other units is multiplied by the pensioner-to-participant ratio.

So long as the "known" unit sizes are accurate, and the probability that a participant of the battle would have generated a surviving pension application is constant across units, then there are no serious issues with the validity of Babits' method. (Although the estimate would have a smaller margin of error for larger units than smaller ones). Problems begin to arise if the men in some units were less likely to survive into old age and file a pension application than men in other units, or if pension applications were lost or destroyed in subsequent years in a nonrandom manner.

It stands to reason, that the problems I alluded to above would have occurred in some cases. My own cursory inspection of pension records uncovered surprisingly few from Georgians and South Carolinians serving with Major John Cunningham and Captain Samuel Hammond. If Babits had the same experience, then this would perhaps explain why he relied on past authority, and not his own estimate, in determining the number of men for those units. For related reasons, it makes sense to draw a distinction between units of regulars and units of militia as the two bodies of men tended to be drawn from different segments of society and faced differing degrees of hazards during the war. The regulars, presumably, would have been less likely to survive into old age.

In A Devil of a Whipping, Babits identifies several militia units at Cowpens with a known unit size. These are Captain James Gilmore's company of Virginia militiamen (38), Captain Mordecai Clark's company of North Carolinians (25), Captain Samuel Sexton's company of South Carolinians (24), Captain Samuel Otterson's company of South Carolinians (30), Captain John Collins' company of South Carolinians (24), and Captain John Irby's company of South Carolinians (60-70).

There is, unfortunately, a problem with these numbers that is independent of any problems with the method. Babits shows 38 men in Gilmore's company on page 31 and 44 in Table 1 on p 32. For my calculations below I used the smaller of the two numbers. Babits has 20-30 men for Clark's company and 60-70 men for Irby's company, I used the midpoint of those ranges. I haven't checked Babits' numbers for Gilmore and Clark, but I have for Sexton, Otterson, Collins, and Irby. With the exception of Irby, the numbers for these companies may be inaccurate.

Sexton, or rather, Saxton, said in his pension application (pdf) that, "I succeeded in inducing twenty-five men to join me, and was chosen their captain;" this would be a company of 26 men.

Otterson's 30 men were not of a company he commanded, nor did this group fight at the battle. Otterson recalled (pdf), "This applicant states that he omitted to name that he & the regiment commanded by Brandon to which he belonged was under the command of Col. Morgan at the Battle of the Cowpens but that he with several others about thirty were sent out as spies some days before the engagement at the Cowpens & from some cause did not arrive until the Battle was over."

Collins said in his application (pdf), "on the night before the Battle of the Cowpens I again joined General Morgan with 24 fresh men, and fought with my company the next day." This would be a company of 25 men.

Irby's statement can be found here (pdf).

Without making adjustments, Babits' numbers for these militia units include a combined 206 men in the units and 18 pension applications by survivors. This a pension-to-participant ratio of 1:11.4. Now the process of extrapolation begins. Research uncovered a total of 108 pension applications for North Carolinians at the battle (Babits, p 37). Babits noted that one cannot readily tell in many cases which of these were from veterans in Major Joseph McDowell's battalion of North Carolina militia, Captain Henry Connelly's company of North Carolina state troops, or from North Carolina Continental infantry or cavalry. It is safe to say, however, that most of these veterans would have been with McDowell, whose battalion was the only large body of North Carolinians at the battle. Taking the conservative estimate that 75% of the 108 North Carolina pensions were submitted by men that had been in McDowell's command, then it would be projected that there were 923 men in McDowell's command (81 pension applications * 11.4 men per application).

The projected total is likely to be greatly in error. Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan wrote to Major-General Nathanael Greene in late December that, "General Davidson has brought in one hundred and twenty men;" much to Morgan's disappointment Davidson did not furnish additional reinforcements. This force of 120 men was probably McDowell's command at the battle; the number is less than 1/7 the men predicted by the pension method.

How can the pension method provide an estimate that is so far off the mark? As I said before, the logic behind the method is sound. The problem, I think, is that the initial assumptions about unit size are invalid. To take one example, the Captain Irby mentioned above claimed that a band of 60-70 men elected him captain before the start of the battle. This command, in other words, was at least half the size of McDowell's command according to Morgan. Only the pension applications of Irby and one other soldier identify Irby as a company commander at Cowpens. No other account of the battle mentions his company. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that Irby did not actually command a force of 60-70 men at Cowpens. Actually the pension application does not quite say that he did. The relevant excerpt from his pension application is as follows:

"he [Irby] with others fled to the Army of Morgan's Army for protection some time before the Battle of the Cowpens – that there were many refugees then in a similar situation with himself – that they formed a volunteer Company to the amount of 60 or 70 and that he was elected Captain of said Company and was commissioned as such by General Pickens of South Carolina – that he served as Captain of said Company in the Battle of the Cowpens – at which Place Tarleton was defeated."

Irby's election to the captaincy occurred "some time before the Battle" and for all one can tell some of the 60-70 men that elected him might have decided to go back home or join up with other units before the battle occurred. Then there is also the fact that this statement appeared in a pension application written 52 years after the battle. Was Irby's recollection accurate? Might not he have overstated his importance during the battle? After all, he was trying to convince the government to award him a pension. Similar concerns can be raised whenever the "known" unit size depends on a statement in a pension application.

To be fair, Babits did not quite take the approach that I've described here. His pension-to-participant estimates were based on combined records for regulars and militia. (Counterintuitively, the regulars have a lower pensioner-to-participant ratio than the militia). He also seems to have regarded Irby as an outlier (although he didn't cast doubt on the veracity of Irby's statement). If one adds up the numbers of participants and the numbers of pension applicants for these units (listed in Babits' Table 1, on page 32), one finds a total of 88 pension applications representing approximately 447 men, or 1 application for every 5.1 participants. When this smaller ratio is applied to the North Carolina numbers, the calculated estimate is 413 men for McDowell's battalion. This estimate is still several times larger than the number indicated by Morgan. Babits himself only loosely followed the method he described. He stated that the pensioner-to-participant was about 3 or 4 to 1 (despite the numbers he was using), and he estimated McDowell's battalion as having only 200+ men in it. It is unclear why he estimated McDowell as having so few men. Again assuming that only 75% of the North Carolina applications were from men with McDowell, then the pensioner-to-participant ratio would have had to have been a mere 1:2.47 to arrive at this total.

A counterargument to the position I've adopted would be that it seems unlikely that 81 of the 120 men in McDowell's command would have lived long enough to have been able to file a pension application. I'll concede the point. It doesn't follow, however, that this makes the pension-derived estimates more credible and not less. I will address the issue of pensions and veteran survival in my next post.

Related: The Battle of Cowpens in Miniature, Part 1, How Many Fought at Cowpens?, The Militia Line: Composition and Organization

The Statements of Private Robert Long

[Minor edits 12/27/09]

Private Robert Long of South Carolina left two statements that described the deployment of American forces and important events during the battle of Cowpens. His accounts strike me as important evidence about the battle, although it has been largely overlooked by historians. Of the histories that I've read, only Lawrence Babits used them to shape his understanding of how Cowpens was fought.

One of his statements was written in support of Captain Samuel Hammond's pension application. In it, he said, "[Hammond] was in the Battle of Cowpens (that is Tarleton's defeat)... he was then promoted to Major, believes he commanded on the front line left wing and this deponent [i.e., Long] was in the center line on the right wing in Captain Ewing's company commanded by Colonel Joseph Hayes, next to Colonel Howard's Infantry."

(He did not provide any details about his service at Cowpens in his own pension application).

Long's second statement appeared in John Logan's 1859 A History of the Upper Country of South Carolina (not available online). The relevant text is as follows:

"...The infantry marched out in sections, and divided two and two as they got ten paces of Hayes' regiment already formed across the road. Hayes regiment then moved to the right of the infantry, 70 or 80 yards in advance; Major McDowell, of North Carolina, in advance of us 70 or 80 yards, and Major Triplett, of Virginia, in our rear; Cols. Thomas and Roebuck in the extreme right. The left wing was similarly formed of militia. The cavalry in rear of infantry... Hayes' regiment having advanced too far were to retreat and form on our old ground; when the North Carolinians were retreating in order to be ready to cover their retreat; failing of this the Virginians broke before we got to them. We were not rallied until Gen. Morgan did it in person. At that time Tarleton brought 200 or 300 cavalry round in the rear of our left wing of militia. Col. Washington charged them with his cavalry; at the same time our infantry charged the British with the bayonet and took their field pieces, while those on the right and left surrendered or retreated."

The text in Long's statements is somewhat difficult to follow. Below I offer a detailed interpretation of what Long said:

On the morning of the 17th, the Americans deploy on the battlefield. Hayes' regiment was deployed across the Green River Road close to the spot where Morgan planned to place Howard's continentals. The companies comprising Howard's light infantry (referred to as "the infantry" in Long's statement) marched down the road in column formation. They marched to within 10 paces of Hayes' regiment, then deployed in a line of two ranks to the right (south) of the road.

The Americans Deploy, Part 1. (Click to enlarge). Hayes' regiment is drawn up across the Green River Road. Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard's infantry march down the road behind them, followed by Major Francis' Triplett's Virginians.

The Americans Deploy, Part 2. (Click to enlarge). Hayes' regiment is drawn up across the Green River Road. Howard's Continentals have completed their deployment. Major Francis' Triplett's Virginians are beginning to deploy as well. Other units can be seen preparing to deploy.

After the continentals deployed, Hayes' regiment moved to the right of the infantry until they reached a point at which they were midway (i.e., about 75 yards) between the Continentals and McDowell's North Carolinians. Describing the rest of the American deployment, Long noted that Triplett's Virginians were in their rear, the South Carolina militia under Thomas and Roebuck were on "the extreme right" of the right wing of the militia, and that there was also a "left wing" "similarly formed of militia." The cavalry were positioned behind the Continentals.

The Americans Deploy, Part 3. (Click to enlarge). Hayes' regiment is on the right of the Continentals, midway between the Continentals' right and Major Joseph McDowell's North Carolinians. At this stage, the American deployment is largely complete.

When Hayes' regiment took up this position they had "advanced too far," and were ordered to fall back to their "old ground." This does not mean 10 paces in front of the continentals, but rather further back from the militia line. Completing this move, they were "in the center line on the right wing... next to Colonel Howard's Infantry." Long called this the center line to distinguish it from the militia line in front and "The cavalry in rear." From this position they would "be ready to cover" the retreat of McDowell's North Carolinians.

The Americans Deploy, Part 4. (Click to enlarge). The positions of the American units at the start of the battle. Hayes' regiment has now joined the right wing of the main line.

When the militia line broke early in the battle, Hayes' regiment did not stand their ground (his words were "failing of this"). Falling back, they might have rallied behind the Virginians (Buchanan's company). Instead, "the Virginians broke before we got to them. We were not rallied until Gen. Morgan did it in person."

Sources:

John Logan. (1859). A History of the Upper Country of South Carolina.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Samuel Hammond, which includes a statement by Robert Long (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Robert Long (.pdf file).

The Main Line at Cowpens: Composition

[Minor edits 12/26/09]

In my last post, I noted that Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan provided few details about the deployment of the American main line at the battle of Cowpens; however, comments by other writers suggest the formation illustrated below. In this post I comment on the units that were deployed main line.

Here is a listing of units that were on the main line:

Left Wing (Major Francis Triplett)

• Major Francis' Triplett's company of Virginia militia. Sergeant Martin of this company recalled that, "I was in the road all the time of the action... Lieutenant Ewen [James Ewing] was on the left of the Maryland Troops near me." This places Triplett's company on the far right of the wing. Triplett was promoted to major and commanded the entire left wing during the battle. Sources disagree as to who commanded his company in his place. Either it was Ensign Combs (promoted to Captain) or Lieutenant Dearing.
• Captain James Tate's company of Virginia militia. Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard, writing long after the war, noted, "I am positive that Triplett and Tate were on my left."

Continentals in the Center (Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard)

• Three companies of Maryland Continentals. According to Lawrence Babits, in A Devil of a Whipping, these companies were commanded by captains Richard Anderson, Henry Dobson, and Nicholas Mangers.
• Captain Robert Kirkwood's company of Delaware Continentals. Lieutenant Thomas Anderson, Sergeant-Major William Seymour and Private Henry Wells of this company left accounts of the battle.
• Captain Andrew Wallace's company of Virginia Continentals. This company featured prominently in Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard's description of the battle. Private William Jewell of this company stated in his pension application that "He enlisted as a regular... under Captain Wallace of Augusta County Virginia for three years." At "Charlotte in North Carolina... we Joined General Greene: General Morgan was here permitted to select about 20 men to reinforce his own little band of perhaps 300 men against Tarleton at the Cowpens – he was selected as one."
• Other musket-and-bayonet-wielding infantry. Babits stated his belief that some Virginia State troops served on the main line (as a unit distinct from Triplett's or Wallace's Virginians). Some North Carolina Continentals also may have served. John Hill, a North Carolina Continental, was said to have pursued, at the end of the battle of Cowpens, "a British soldier – some 60 or 75 yards. He the said Hill stuck his Bayonet in the back of the British soldier by throwing his musket at him this wound was slight and the British soldier continued to retreat."

Right Wing

• Captain Patrick Buchanan's company of Virginia militia. Private William Neel wrote this company "...formed in single file with the Militia on the right of the Regulars..." Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan, in his after action report, also stated that Buchanan's company was on "the right of the line.”
• Captain Henry Connelly's company of North Carolina state troops. Connelly claimed, in his pension application that, "The company which belonged to this applicant was placed under Col Howard, on the extreme right of the division, and this applicant commanded a company in the center."
• Colonel Joseph Hayes' regiment of South Carolina militia. (See The Statements of Private Robert Long). Comments by Neel, Connelly, and Long when taken together suggest that Buchanan's company was closest to the Continentals, followed by Connelly's company, and finally Hayes' regiment.

Other Militia Units:

There are some other units of militia whose position on the main line cannot be so easily ascertained. These include:

• Captain James Gilmore's company of Virginia militia. This company was definitely at the battle, but it is unclear whether it served on the left wing or on the right.
• Captain Mordecai Clark's company of North Carolina militia. There are indications in pension applications that this company served on the main line.
• "Captain Beaty's" company of militia. This company of South Carolina militia are placed on the right wing in Captain Samuel Hammond's account of the battle. Babits discussed several different possibilities for the identity of this captain, but he did not place this company on the main line.
• Other Virginia militiamen. Babits stated, based on pension applications, that some Virginia militiamen in Major David Campbell's battalion of Virginia militiamen were present at the battle, and presumably (although the pension applications do not provide details) served on the main line.

Sources:

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Benjamin Martin (.pdf).

Lawrence Babits' A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, includes a transcription of statements by Howard, Anderson, Seymour, Wells, Neel, and Morgan.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of William Jewell (.pdf).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of John Hill (.pdf).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Henry Connelly (.pdf).

Morgan's Report on Cowpens

[Minor edits 12/25/09]

Two days after the battle of Cowpens, the American commander, Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan, wrote the following report of his victory to his superior, Major-General Nathanael Greene.

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"Dear Sir: The troops I have the honor to command have gained a complete victory over the detachment from the British Army commanded by Lieut.-Col. Tarleton. The action happened in the 17th inst., about sunrise, at the Cowpens... An hour before daylight one of my scouts returned and informed me that Lieut. Col. Tarleton had advanced within five miles of our camp. On this information, I hastened to form as good a disposition as circumstances would admit, and from the alacrity of the troops, we were soon prepared to receive them. The light infantry, commanded by Lieut. Col. Howard, and the Virginia militia under the command of Major Triplett, were formed on a rising ground, and extended a line in front. The third regiment of dragoons, under Lieut. Col. Washington, were posted at such a distance in their rear, as not to be subjected to the line of fire directed at them, and to be so near as to be able to charge them should they be broken. The volunteers from North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, under the command of the brave and valuable Col. Pickens, were situated to guard the flanks. Maj. McDowall, of the North Carolina volunteers, was posted on the right flank in front of the line, one hundred and fifty yards; and Maj. Cunningham, of the Georgia volunteers, on the left, at the same distance in front, Colonels Brannon and Thomas, of the South Carolinans, were posted on the right of Maj. McDowall, and Cols. Hay and McCall, of the same corps, on the left of Maj. Cunningham. Capts. Tate and Buchanan, with the Augusta [Virginia] riflemen, to support the right of the line.

"The enemy drew up in single line of battle, four hundred yards in front of our advanced corps. The first battalion of the 71st regiment was opposed to our right, the 7th regiment to our left, the infantry of the legion to our centre, the light companies on our flanks. In front moved two pieces of artillery. Lieut. Col. Tarleton, with his cavalry, was posted in the rear of the line.

"The disposition of battle being thus formed, small parties of riflemen were detached to skirmish with the enemy, upon which their whole line moved on with the greatest impetuosity, shouting as they advanced. McDowall and Cunningham gave them a heavy and galling fire, and retreated to the regiments intended for their support. The whole of Col, Pickens' command then kept up a fire by regiments, retreating agreeably to their orders. When the enemy advanced on our line, they received a well-directed and incessant fire. But their numbers being superior to ours, they gained our flanks, which obliged us to change our position. We retired in good order about fifty paces, formed, and advanced on the enemy, and gave them a fortunate volley, which threw them into disorder. Lieut. Col. Howard observing this, gave orders for the line to charge bayonets, which was done with such address that they fled with the utmost precipitation leaving their fieldpieces in our possession. We pushed our advantage so effectually, that they never had an opportunity of rallying, had their intentions been ever so good.

"Lieut. Col. Washington, having been informed that the Tarleton was cutting down our riflemen on the left, pushed forward, and charged them with such firmness, that instead of attempting to recover the fate of the day, which one would have expected from an officer of his splendid character, broke and fled.

"The enemy's whole force were now bent solely in providing for their safety in flight-the list of their killed, wounded, and prisoners, will inform you with what effect. Tarleton, with the small remains of his cavalry, and a few scattered infantry he had mounted on his wagonhorses, made their escape. He was pursued twenty-four miles, but owing to our having taken a wrong trail at first, we could never overtake him.

"As I was obliged to move off of the field of action in the morning, to secure the prisoners, I cannot be so accurate as to the killed and wounded of the enemy as I could wish. From the reports of an officer whom I sent to view the ground, there were one hundred non-commissioned officers and privates, and ten commissioned officers killed, and two hundred rank and file wounded. We now have in our possession five hundred and two non-commissioned officers and privates prisoners, independent of the wounded, and the militia are taking up stragglers continually. Twenty-nine commissioned officers have fell into our hands... The officers I have paroled: the privates I am conveying by the safest route to Salisbury.

"Two standards, two fieldpieces, thirty-five wagons, a travelling forge, and all their music are ours. Their baggage, which was immense, they have in a great measure destroyed.

"Our loss is inconsiderable, which the enclosed return will evince. I have not been able to ascertain Col. Pickens loss, but know it to be very small.

"From our force being composed of such a variety of corps, a wrong judgment may be formed of our numbers. We fought only eight hundred men, two-thirds of which were militia. The British, with their baggage-guard, were not less than one thousand one hundred and fifty, and these veteran troops. Their own officers confess that they fought one thousand and thirty-seven.

"Such was the inferiority of our numbers that our success must be attributed, under God, to the justice of our cause and the bravery of our troops. My wishes would induce me to mention the name of every sentinel in the corps I have the honor to command. In justice to the brave and good conduct of the officers, I have taken the liberty to enclose you a list of their names from a conviction that you will be pleased to introduce such characters to the world."

----------------------------

This is clearly an important document pertaining to the battle. Probably the most important document. Morgan was the architect of the victory, he was able to view the entirety of the battle. In the 2 days since the end of the battle, he had time to replay the events of the day in his head and confer not only with his officers afterwards, but with those of the enemy that became his prisoners. The events of the day were no doubt very clear to him; clearer certainly than participants writing about the battle many years later. It was also imperative for him to get the account right. His description of how the battle was fought and won would likely influence the behavior of other American commanders in future engagements.

Sources:

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, includes a transcription of Morgan's report.

James Graham's (1856) The Life of General Daniel Morgan also has a copy of his report, including an appendix naming many of the officers that fought at Cowpens.