November 1, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for November 1st: The Americans pulled back from White Plains; the British abandoned the pursuit of Washington’s army.

Previous entry: October 31st.

In the early morning hours, the last of the Americans in the entrenchments pulled back. Chaplain Benjamin Trumbull (5th Connecticut State Battalion) noted in his journal:

“This morning our guards come off and leave the lines in the centre of the town called White Plains, and to distress the enemy [they] burn all the barns of hay and grain and houses, where the inhabitants had stores of wheat and corn and also stacks and barracks of hay and grain.”

The British officers looked with surprise on the burning buildings and empty defensive works. When they rode forward they could see American forces encamped on a line of hills to the north, but the American army had been so reduced by sickness and other causes, that they thought this force was no more than a rear guard. Major Stephen Kemble wrote of this force, “[we] suppose them to be about 7,000 strong”.

The British concluded that the rest of Washington’s men had fled even deeper into the hills, which meant that their attack plans had gone to naught. However, as the British were not particularly eager to attack the American lines in the first place, there was undoubtedly some sense of relief.

Lieutenant-General William Howe opted not to attack this “rearguard”. He later explained that the Americans’ actions “plainly” indicated a “desire to avoid coming to action,” and added “I did not think the driving their rearguard further back an object of the least consequence.”

Instead, the British advanced and occupied the Americans’ former entrenchments. Ensign Henry Stirke (light infantry company, 10th Foot) wrote: “At half after 9 o’clock we got under arms, and pushed into the village of the White Plains, which the enemy had just abandoned, and the army advanced at the same time”.

This advance brought the armies within range of each others’ cannons. Major-General William Heath, on the left of the American army, wrote:

“In the morning, the British advanced, with a number of field-pieces, to the north of the road near late headquarters… and commenced a furious cannonade on General Heath’s division, which was nobly returned by Captain-Lieutenant Bryant and Lieutenant Jackson, of the artillery.”

During this cannonade, according to Heath, George Washington rode up to him and expressed concern over one of Heath’s regiments that was separated by a hollow from the rest of the division. “Take care that you do not lose them”, he warned. But the British did not attack this force. Instead, Heath wrote, the British guns withdrew from his front, “made a circuitous movement, and came down toward the American right.” As these guns moved into position, they were fired upon by some American heavy guns. Heath noted that “upon the discharge” from the American guns, the British crews “made off with their field-pieces as fast as their horses could draw them. A shot from the American cannon, at this place, took off the head of a Hessian artilleryman. They also left one of the artillery horses dead on the field.”

Sergeant John Smith (Lippitt’s Regiment, Lee’s division) witnessed the British movement towards the American right. He wrote:

“we saw the enemy advance down the hill towards us in three parties[,] one party coming towards the road the other [two] through a swamp[.] We sent some 25-pound shot to them that stopped some before they could get over the bridge to us and the others passed through the swamp to a hill opposite to us… we sent over some shot… that knocked down a light horse”. [see footnote]

British Major Stephen Kemble summarized the day’s action by writing: “[they] cannonaded us… the greatest part of the day; we lost 9 men [killed] by this business. Six of them Hessians.”

Isolated fatalities were noted by several British officers.

Ensign Henry Stirke wrote:

“We received a few straggling shot, which did no execution. The 15th regiment had one man killed, and another wounded, by the rebel cannon”.

Captain Francis Rawdon observed:

“We had some cannonading with their rear guard, by which my brother John (who is an excellent soldier in every respect) was very near killed. Two men who stood close to him were killed by a twelve-pounder, and a splinter of one of their skulls stuck in his thigh, but did not hurt him much.”

American losses were even fewer. Apparently one man in Levi Paulding’s New York militia regiment was killed, and two other New Yorkers were wounded. Their brigade commander (George Clinton) commented, “I have heard of no other injury done [to] us.”

Brigade-Major Benjamin Tallmadge characterized the American withdrawal from White Plains as something of a victory: He claimed that Howe was “baffled” by this maneuver, and as a result gave up the pursuit of Washington’s army. Thus, Washington’s army, brought perilously close in this campaign to capture or collapse, had survived to fight another day.

William Howe had a rather different perspective. Howe did not wish to place his own army at risk by chasing the Americans into the wild hills on the New York-New England border. He was sure, too, that if Washington did make a firm stand, it would only be on some set of steep and heavily fortified hills. Howe had had enough of this business. He felt he could now turn his back on Washington without losing face and proceed once again to wage war on his own terms. Howe’s preference was to capture Fort Washington and consolidate his hold on the New York City area. His developing plan also came to include sending expeditions into New Jersey, Rhode Island, and, if all went well, the American capitol at Philadelphia.

Heath noted that during the rest of this day, November 1st:

“The two armies lay looking at each other, and within long cannon-shot [range]. In the night time the British lighted up a vast number of fires, the weather growing pretty cold. These fires, some on the level ground, some at the foot of the hills, and at all distances to their brows… seemed to the eye to mix with the stars, and to be of different magnitudes. The American side, doubtless, exhibited to them a similar appearance.”

The bright orange flames licked the cold November sky, and another chapter of the Revolutionary War came to a close.

Footnote: Smith indicated that this event took place on Friday the 31st. Friday was November 1st. A comparison of Smith’s description of other events occurring at the time with the journals of other Americans suggests that he was right about it being Friday and wrong about it being the 31st.

Concluding Comment: The standoff at White Plains did not end on November 1st. For a few days the two armies glowered at each other, and during that time more men were killed in little brushes or perished from illness. The British left White Plains on November 5-6 and soon joined Knyphausen’s division near Manhattan. On November 16th, Howe captured Fort Washington and completed the conquest of Manhattan.

October 29, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 29th: The Americans strengthened their position at White Plains while the armies skirmished; Knyphausen advanced to Kingsbridge, and Howe vacillated.

Previous entry: Evening of October 28; next: October 30th.

During the night, the American army at White Plains began moving their camps to a line of hills to the north. Chaplain Benjamin Trumbull (5th Connecticut State Battalion, Spencer’s division) wrote, “at 2 o’clock [AM] the troops in General Spencer’s division had orders to strike their tents and carry them out about one mile and an half by hand and then return to the lines [i.e., the fortifications at White Plains].” The troops then made the roundtrip again, this time carrying their camp kettles and other cooking utensils. It was hard work for the exhausted men. Trumbull wrote that many “had no sleep at all” “though they had been engaged almost all day [yesterday] with the enemy and had been obliged to wade through a river [the Bronx] and were very wet”. “I was afraid I should be sick for I had been in the river almost all over, and could not change [clothes]… [and] was much fatigued with the action… but I am today well and vigorous”. Trumbull praised God for seeing him safely through the battle, and wrote that this protection “lay me under new obligations to live wholly to God and to seek his honor and glory in the little time I have to live in the world”.

Joseph Plumb Martin, who was also in the 5th Connecticut, was not so fortunate. He recalled:

“During the night we remained in our new made trenches, the ground of which was in many parts springy; in that part where I happened to be stationed, the water, before morning, was nearly over [our] shoes, which caused many of us to take violent colds… I was one who felt the effects of it, and was… sent back to the baggage to get well again, if I could, for it was left to my own exertions to do it, and no other assistance was afforded me. I was not alone in my misery; there were a number in the same circumstances. When I arrived at the baggage, which was not more than a mile or two, I had the canopy of heaven for my hospital, and the ground for my hammock. I found a spot where the dry leaves had collected between the knolls; I made up a bed of these, and nestled in it, having no other friend present but the sun to smile upon me. I had nothing to eat or drink, not even water, and was unable to go after any myself, for I was sick indeed. In the evening, one of my messmates found me out, and soon after brought me some boiled hog’s flesh (it was not pork) and turnips, without either bread or salt. I could not eat it, but I felt obliged to him notwithstanding; he did all he could do—he gave me the best he had to give, and had to steal that, poor fellow;--necessity drove him to do it to satisfy the cravings of his own hunger, as well as to assist a fellow sufferer.”

Beginning in the morning and continuing throughout the day, the two armies skirmished.

For Captain Peter Kimball (Stickney’s New Hampshire militia regiment), it was a tense day:

“we lay on our arms. The enemy appeared all round on every hill[,] the riflemen [were] firing on their guards. One of the riflemen [was] killed this day and at night our guard was alarmed. Another fired and killed Captain Buntin.”

Matters were no easier for the British light infantry across the way. Ensign Henry Stirke (light infantry company, 10th Foot) noted:

“I had a very troublesome picket, at the entrance of the village[;] at daylight my sentries were fired on which continued by popping shots all day. I had one man wounded”.

Meanwhile, Lieutenant-General William Howe had an enormously difficult decision to make. He had at last caught up with Washington’s army, but he loathed sending his troops against the Americans’ entrenchments. Although he was sure he could carry these works, he believed the assault would lead to the death of many of his men and produce little strategic gain.

The obvious alternative was to force the Americans from their trenches by threatening their flank. He later stated that this was his preference:

“I do not hesitate to confess, that if I could by any manoeuvre remove an enemy from a very advantageous position, without hazarding the consequences of an attack, where the point to be carried was not adequate to the loss of men to be expected… I should certainly adopt that cautionary conduct, in the hopes of meeting my adversary upon more equal terms.”

But on this occasion, Howe was unable to find a low-risk way of turning the Americans’ flank. Thus Howe was left with the unpalatable choices of either making a bloody frontal assault, or retreating.

Howe vacillated. His official excuse for not attacking was that the situation at White Plains had changed and that he now needed more men. He later explained:

“The enemy drew back their encampment on the night of the 28th, and observing their lines next morning much strengthened by additional works, the designed attack upon them was deferred, and the 4th brigade, left with Lord Percy, with two battalions of the 6th brigade were ordered to join the army.” [see footnote]

Curiously, when pressed by Parliament several years later to explain his conduct at White Plains, Howe mysteriously claimed that “I have political reasons, and no other, for declining to explain why that assault was not made”.

To the west, Lieutenant-General Wilhelm von Knyphausen continued his operation against upper Manhattan. First he detached Major General Martin Conrad Schmidt with regiments von Wissenbach and von Huyne to hold Valentine’s Hill. Then he proceeded with grenadiere battalion Köhler and regiments Wutginau, von Stein, and Buenau to Kingsbridge.

Footnote: The 4th brigade consisted of the 17th, 40th, 46th, and 55th regiments of foot. The two regiments drawn from the 6th brigade were the 44th and 64th regiments of foot. The 6th brigade had been encamped near Mamaroneck since October 25th.

October 28, 1776 (Part 4)

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

This is the fourth of four posts chronicling the events of October 28.

Synopsis for the evening of October 28th: The battle of White Plains came to an end; Washington prepared for the next British move; Knyphausen occupied Mile Square.

Previous entry: Afternoon of October 28; next: October 29th.

The battle of White Plains gradually petered out after the British and Hessian infantry broke the American line on Chatterton’s Hill.

Joseph Plumb Martin (5th Connecticut State Battalion) recalled that after his regiment was driven from Chatterton’s Hill, “We fell back a little distance and made a stand” and at the same time “detached parties [were] engaging [the enemy] in almost every direction. We did not come in contact with the enemy again that day, and just at night we fell back to our encampment.”

The “detached parties” probably included some groups of Continentals on the northern end of Chatterton’s Hill. Colonel John Haslet of the Delaware Regiment recalled:

“The left of the regiment took post behind a fence on the top of the hill with most of the officers, and twice repulsed the light troops and [light] horse of the enemy; but seeing ourselves deserted on all hands, and the continued column of the enemy advancing, we also retired.”

Captain William Hull of the Webb’s 19th Continental Regiment stated that his command also held out for awhile:

“Colonel Webb’s regiment maintained the conflict for a time, after the other part of the brigade had abandoned the field, and it had the honour to receive the particular thanks of Washington for its bravery and orderly retreat.”

One observer (Sergeant John Smith of Lippitt’s Regiment) wrote, “this battle lasted from 9 in the morning till night tho the hottest of the battle… was but about 20 or 30 minutes”.

During this prolonged phase of the fighting, Washington sent some reinforcements towards Chatterton’s Hill, including Brigadier-General Rezin Beall’s brigade of Maryland militia (the Maryland “flying camp”) and Sargent’s 16th Continental Regiment. However, as Jacob Francis of Sargent’s Regiment noted, before these troops could cross the Bronx, “the British got possession of the hill, and we retreated back to the camp.”

Afterwards, the British made no further attacks. According to Captain Johann von Ewald (2nd Jäger), “Since the soldiers had climbed over nothing but hills, cliffs, and stone walls the whole day, constantly dragging their guns over all obstacles, it was impossible to ask anything more from them.”

The British lost around 230 men during the battle: Most of these losses occurred in the 28th Foot (67 men), 35th Foot (about 60 men), 49th Foot (28 men), and Regiment von Lossberg (about 46 men). The Americans lost more than 200 men [see Footnote 1], but the exact total is not known. Among the regiments that had considerable losses were the Maryland Battalion (44 men), the 3rd New York Regiment (34 men) and the Delaware Regiment (32 men).

During the evening, the British discovered that Chatterton’s Hill was of dubious value. Charles Stedman noted: “The possession of that hill… [did] not enable the royalists to annoy their camp, for it rose so gradually from the Bronx that its crest was not within random cannon shot”. In other words, the British could hit the main American defensive works with their cannon, but the range was too great for the fire to be accurate or destructive.

Stedman couldn’t understand why the Americans had detached a part of their army to defend Chatterton’s Hill. He wrote: “The reason of their occupying” the hill “is inexplicable… It seems to have been a blunder of General Washington’s to have placed so considerable a corps entirely out of the capacity of supporting the rest of the army”.

Stedman believed that if the British had attacked the center of the American line instead (as he wanted), the men on Chatterton’s Hill would have had a hard time aiding in the defense. [see Footnote 2]

The Americans kept close watch on the British, not knowing when another attack might come.

Jacob Francis (Sargent’s Regiment) recalled, “I stood sentinel that night in a thicket between the American camp and the hill, so near… that I could hear the Hessians”.

Joseph Plumb Martin observed that:

“The enemy had several pieces of field artillery upon this hill [Chatterton’s], and, as might be expected, entertained us with their music all the evening. We entrenched ourselves where we now lay, expecting another attack. But the British were very civil, and indeed they generally were, after they had received a check from Brother Jonathan, for any of their rude actions”.

Meanwhile, Washington decided that the American army would be in a stronger position if it occupied the hills further north (agreeing with the assessment Major-General Charles Lee made that morning). Therefore, some of the troops were ordered to begin moving their camps to the new position.

Washington expected that the British would either launch a major assault against his defensive works or move to threaten his flank. To shore up his right flank, he sent William Alexander’s brigade (Spencer’s division) to occupy high ground between White Plains and the Hudson River.

Alexander’s brigade moved quickly, and without their baggage. It was a hard night for men already exhausted by the day’s fighting. Lieutenant-Colonel Gunning Bedford of the Delaware Regiment had been shot in the arm on Chatterton’s Hill (it was a flesh wound). He wrote that he and his men spent the night “without a tent or anything but the ground to lay on, and not a blanket to cover us”. Similarly, Lieutenant Enoch Anderson of the Delaware Regiment remembered that “This night we lay in the woods without tents or blankets. It was cold and we made a fire in the woods,--turned our feet to the fire and slept comfortably, although it snowed in the night.”

Situation of the armies on October 28th (click to enlarge). While Howe fought Washington at White Plains (11), Knyphausen advanced on the Mile Square (9) / Valentine's Hill area.

Off to the west, Colonel John Lasher had a detachment of men guarding the landward approaches to Manhattan. After the British raided Mile Square he was ordered to abandon his position and join the American army at White Plains. On this date he burned the American barracks at Kingsbridge and set out on a wide arch that would take his men north and east towards White Plains, and around the British army.

The same day, Lieutenant-General Wilhelm von Knyphausen, occupied Valentine’s Hill with his division of Hessians. These troops missed cutting off Lasher’s command by a matter of hours. However, by seizing Valentine’s Hill they did cut off the landward retreat of the American forces garrisoning upper Manhattan.

Footnote 1: I’ve estimated a greater American number of casualties than are stated by most authors. If one simply totals up all the numbers available in Peter Force’s American Archives, the total is 53 killed, 96 wounded, and 24 missing (or 175 in total). The relatively high proportion of killed to wounded is at least partially due to the fact that two regiments reported only the former total, not the latter. After estimating, through extrapolation, the number wounded in these regiments, the total American loss becomes about 197.

Doctor John Pine of Maryland wrote after the battle, “the number of killed and wounded, as the report is in the camp, amounts only to about 90, but from the wounded I saw myself in the hospital, and adjacent houses, there must at least be an hundred and twenty or thirty wounded[,] the number of killed I don’t know.”

Documents show that there were several casualties between the Pennsylvania State troops and New Hampshire militia not listed in Force. Brooks’ and Moseley’s Massachusetts militia regiments likely suffered a fair number of casualties on Chatterton’s Hill, but no return exists of their losses. A conservative estimate of losses in these units, added to the losses in the other units, raises the American total to close to the reported British total.

Footnote 2: To the best of my knowledge, Washington did not describe why he chose to defend Chatterton’s Hill. Tallmadge claimed he alerted Washington to the presence of American militia on Chatterton’s Hill and the advance of British troops in their direction. Afterwards, Washington directed several units to the hill, and ordered a trusted officer (John Haslet) to take command of the militia. Perhaps Washington intended simply to support troops (militia) that were well-positioned to impede the British attack. In other words, the defense of Chatterton’s Hill may have been another manifestation of Washington’s general strategy of harassing the British at every opportunity (consider how Washington used his forces on the 21st, the 26th, and the morning of the 28th). The Staten Island raid, the American defense of Pell’s Point and the engagement near East Chester can be understood in these terms as well.

October 28, 1776 (Part 3)

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

This is the third of four posts chronicling the events of October 28.

Synopsis for the afternoon of October 28th: British and Hessian regiments attacked and seized Chatterton’s Hill.

Previous entry: Midday on October 28; next: Evening of October 28.

The first British troops to attack the Americans on Chatterton’s Hill were Regiment von Lossberg and the 28th and 35th Regiments of Foot. They crossed the Bronx River under cover of a cannonade

The Americans had two or three of their own field pieces on the hill. Colonel John Haslet (Delaware Regiment) tried to gall the approaching British infantry with one piece. However:

“[the gun was] so poorly appointed, that myself was forced to assist in dragging it along [in] the rear of the regiment. While so employed, a cannon-ball struck the carriage, and scattered the shot about, a wad of tow blazing in the middle. The artillerymen fled. One alone was prevailed upon to tread out the blaze and collect the shot. The few that returned made not more than two discharges, when they retreated with the field-piece.”

The two British foot regiments crossed at a ford, and made it across the river quickly. Then, according to Orderly Sergeant Thomas Craige, they “turned to their left and came up to storm the entrenchment” occupied by the Massachusetts militia regiments of John Moseley and Eleazer Brooks.

Brigadier-General Alexander McDougall sent the Maryland battalion to the support of the militia. According to a Maryland officer, “Colonel [William] Smallwood… was ordered to march down the hill and attack the enemy... and a smart contest ensued, in which the enemy gave way”.

Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton attributed this setback to the officer leading this advance. He observed that when the British “suddenly found themselves exposed to a very heavy fire… The officer who led them… marched forward about twenty paces… halted, fired his fuzee, and began to reload (his column remaining during the time under the enemy’s fire)”. Watching this, he predicted “that they would break. It happened as I said [it would]”.

To the south, Regiment von Lossberg also experienced difficulty. According to Johann Caspar Ries, “[we] found a little river [the Bronx] before us, though which we had to wade, the water going into the cartouche pouches of most of the men. Scarcely were we through the water, than a rain of shot fell upon us, by which many were wounded.”

Major Carl Leopold Baurmeister claimed that the regiment was exposed because “On the far side [of the river there] is a steep slope, where the right wing had to halt while the left maneuvered to the front”. Ries added that “the left wing had to march through a wood that had been set alight, so that many men burnt the shoes on their feet.”

The Hessians advanced towards the 1st and 5th Connecticut State Battalions, which were jointly led by Colonel William Douglas. The Connecticutians claimed that they drove back the Hessians just as the Massachusetts militia and Marylanders had with the British regulars.

One of the Connecticutians wrote that:

“[the Hessians] came up in the front of Colonel Douglas' s regiment, and we fired a general volley upon them, at about twenty rods distance, and scattered them like leaves in a whirlwind; and they ran off so far, that some… ran out to the ground where they were… and brought off their arms and accoutrements, and rum, that the men who fell had with them, which we had time to drink round… before they came on again.” [see Footnote 1]

More succinctly, Colonel Gold Silliman of the 1st Connecticut wrote, “We gave them a heavy fire which made them retreat but they soon returned”.

The British, it seems, intensified their cannonade after this initial check; possibly some field pieces were wheeled closer to the hill. Haslet described this as a “cannonade from twelve or fifteen pieces, well served, [which] kept up a continual peal of reiterated thunder.” A Connecticutian recalled, “the air and hills smoked and echoed terribly with the bursting of shells: the fences and walls were knocked down, and torn to pieces, and men' s legs, arms, and bodies, mingled with cannon and grape-shot all round us.” [see Footnote 1]

The British formed a line of battle on the lower part of Chatterton’s Hill. The troops crowded together, as there was little room for them to form. According to Thomas Sullivan (49th Regiment of Foot):

“Lieutenant Colonel [Robert] Carr, who commanded the 35th Regiment, behaved with great courage, being obliged to force the left of his battalion through the right wing of the 28th… The 49th Battalion formed as well as the ground would admit, [and] every company engaged as they came up… The hill was so narrow that the right-hand company of our battalion had scarcely room to form”.

The 49th Foot found itself opposite the Delaware Regiment. According to Thomas Sullivan:

“Captain[-Lieutenant William] Gore, who commanded the right wing of our battalion, seeing the rebels which we engaged on the right wing were dressed in blue, took them to be Colonel Rall’s brigade of Hessians, and immediately ordered us to cease firing; for, says he, ‘you are firing at your own men.’ We ceased for about two minutes. The rebels, hearing him, made answer that they were no Hessians, and that we should soon know the difference”.

Other British units moved to threaten the flanks of the American position.

Regiment von Rall advanced against the American right flank, with Regiment von Knyphausen and the Lieb Regiment in support.

According to Major John Brooks of Charles Webb’s 19th Continental Regiment, the American left flank was threatened by “a body of light infantry and jaegers”.

Brigadier-General Alexander McDougall spotted the threat to the left, and he ordered Webb’s Regiment, (and perhaps also the 3rd New York Regiment), partially down the hill to meet them.

This movement greatly exposed the men to British cannon fire. According to Second Lieutenant Elisha Bostwick of Webb’s Regiment:

“a cannon ball cut down Lieutenant Young’s platoon which was next to that of mine[;] the ball first took the head of [Nathaniel] Smith, a stout heavy man and dashed it open, then it took off Chilson’s arm… it then took [Joel] Taylor across the bowels, it then struck Sergeant [Amasa] Garret of our company on the hip [and] took off the point of the hip bone[.] Smith and Taylor were left on the spot. Sergeant Garret was carried [away] but died the same day[.] Now to think, oh! What a sight that was to see within a distance of six rods those men with their legs and arms and guns and packs all in a heap[.] There was not a better sergeant in the army than Sergeant Garret when the soldiers were murmuring, weary, without shelter cold and hungry[;] he would stir about among them build fires and get them all in good humour and cheerful.”

For this cost, Webb’s Regiment succeeded in turning back the threat to the left. According to Captain William Hull, “After a sharp conflict, the object was completely attained.”

Meanwhile, the British began a major push against the right and center of the American position. Their line now included, from left to right, Regiment von Lossberg, the 28th, 35th, and 49th regiments of Foot. Behind these troops crowded up two battalions of Hessians grenadiers (von Linsing and Block) and the 5th Regiment of Foot.

Joseph Plumb Martin (5th Connecticut State Battalion) recalled:

“There was in our front, about ten rods distant, an orchard of apple trees. The ground on which the orchard stood was lower than the ground that we occupied, but was level from our post to the verge of the orchard, when it fell off so abruptly that we could see the lower parts of the trees. A party of Hessian troops [Regiment von Lossberg], and some English [the 28th Regiment of Foot], soon took possession of this ground: they would advance so far as just to show themselves above the rising ground, fire, and fall back and reload their muskets. Our chance upon them was, as soon as they showed themselves above the level ground, or when they fired, to aim at the flashes of their guns—their position was as advantageous to them as a breastwork.”

Lieutenant Enoch Anderson (Delaware Regiment) remembered:

“Now began our firing with small arms on the hill and a hot fire was kept up for some time. Many lives were lost on both sides and many were wounded.”

He remembered in particular seeing a mortally wounded soldier of his regiment who “fell to the ground” and “in falling, his gun fell from him.” Then “He picked it up,--turned on his face,--took aim at the British, who were advancing,--fired,--the gun fell from him,--he turned over on his back and expired.”

This map (click to enlarge) illustrates the position of British (red numbers) and American units (blue circles) during the British assault on Chatterton’s Hill.

I relied on Thomas Sullivan's account for the placement of the British foot regiments on Chatterton's Hill. Other details about the construction of this map can be found in the post for Midday on October 28.

Although the Connecticut battalions and Delaware Regiment offered stiff resistance, the units in between soon began to collapse. First, according to Haslet, “The [Massachusetts] militia regiment behind the fence fled in confusion, without more than a random, scattering fire” [see Footnote 2].

The Maryland battalion gave way next. According to Lieutenant William Harrison:

“We were badly disposed to receive the attack of the enemy’s small arms, and unfortunately much exposed to their artillery, which flanked us so heavily as to render the post tenable but a short time. The matter was ended by a confused and precipitate retreat on our part”.

The remaining American units were soon hard pressed. Haslet wrote that “the first three Delaware companies [those closest to the retreating troops] also retreated in disorder, but not till after several were wounded and killed.”

The Connecticut state troops found themselves almost surrounded. The collapse of the center of the American line allowed British and Hessian troops to threaten the left flank of the Connecticut men, while at the same time Regiment von Rall drove against their right flank.

One of the Connecticut men wrote:

“they advanced in solid columns upon us, and were gathering all round us ten to our one. Colonel Douglas's and Silliman's regiments fired four or five times on them as they were advancing, and then retreated; but not till the enemy began to fire on their flanks. Colonels Silliman, Douglas and Arnold behaved nobly, and the men [afterwards] gained much applause.” [see Footnote 1]

Most of the Connecticutians who were killed or wounded were struck down when they fled. According to Colonel Silliman, “we were obliged to retreat which we did through a most furious fire from the enemy for half a mile for so far there was nothing to cover us from it…”

Joseph Plumb Martin recalled:

“finding ourselves flanked and in danger of being surrounded, we were compelled to make a hasty retreat from the stone wall. We lost comparatively speaking, very few at the fence: but when forced to retreat, we lost, in killed and wounded, a considerable number. One man who belonged to our company… said, “Now I am going out to the field to be killed;”… and he was—he was shot dead on the field.”

Footnote 1: This passage is from an anonymous letter published in newspapers after the battle. Ezra Stiles believed the author was Chaplain Benjamin Trumbull of the 5th Connecticut State Battalion.

Footnote 2: Orderly Sergeant Thomas Craige of Moseley’s Regiment offered this curious recollection:

“While they [the British] were rallying [after the first unsuccessful attack], the Highlanders came down, stacked their arms, drew their broadswords, and formed in rear of the [British] infantry. Then they all came up. Our men opened fire as before, and soon the enemy’s infantry opened, and the Highlanders marched into our entrenchments, and the Americans retreated down the hill westwardly.”

None of the British or Hessian accounts make mention of a Highlander regiment participating in this attack (though there were two with the army – the 42nd and 71st regiments). This description would make considerably more sense if Hessian grenadiers were substituted for highlanders. The Hessian grenadiers were placed in the second line, and although they were not armed with broadswords, they did carry short swords called hangers.

October 22, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 22nd: The Americans concentrated at White Plains; the British received a large reinforcement.

Previous entry: October 21st (Part 2); next: October 23rd.

Two American divisions (those of William Heath and Joseph Spencer) marched to White Plains on the night of October 21-22 [see footnote]. They reached White Plains early in the morning in an exhausted condition. Chaplain Benjamin Trumbull (5th Connecticut State Battalion, Spencer’s division) wrote:

“The men slept on the ground in the streets [and] had nothing to cook with or to cover them, and many of them were exceeding[ly] hungry as well as sleepy and weary.”

It took some time for the new arrivals to become established. Major-General William Heath noted that his division “took post on the high strong ground… on the left of the line”. Looking around at the situation of the rest army, he saw that:

“The ground, from General Heath's left to the right, descended gradually a very considerable distance, and then gradually ascended up to the plain, and still on to the right to more commanding ground. On this was the American army formed, the line running nearly from northeast to southwest. There were some strong works thrown up on the plain, across the road, and still to the right of it… Headquarters were on the plain, near the crossroads.”

It wasn’t until the evening that a decision was made as to where to place Trumbull’s battalion. At last they were ordered from the center of the village over to the right side of the line, which meant, according to Trumbull, recrossing “with weary steps the ground we had… with so much labour travelled over [earlier].” Trumbull groused, “The men are worried in a manner to death and are treated with great hardship and severity, and in my opinion are put to much unnecessary hardship and fatigue.”

More men were on the way. On this date John Sullivan’s division marched for White Plains; probably so too did the division of Israel Putnam, which had been manning the defenses in upper Manhattan [see footnote].

Major-General Charles Lee’s men continued to occupy the Mile Square area. They had been defending the left flank of the army. However, the movement of Washington’s army to White Plains meant that their role was becoming one of defending the right flank of the army. In this position they safeguarded the slow-moving procession of provisions and other stores from upper Manhattan to White Plains.

As the British remained near the coast, Lee’s men had the opportunity to forage and look for plunder in the surrounding countryside. According to Sergeant John Smith (Lippitt’s Regiment, Lee’s division):

“Amaziah Blackmore[,] a sergeant in Captain Blackmore’s company[,] went to Eastchester amongst the deserted houses to see what he could plunder[. He] was surrounded in the house with a lieutenant and a fifer and was made prisoner by about 30 Hessians and plundered of his shoe and knee buckles and 18 dollars in paper money and carried away… he watched [for] an opportunity and sprang from between [his guards]… and kicked away his shoes that were loose on his feet and got clear of them and came into camp again… Last night Captain Bailey and Lieutenant Richmond went down and plundered some houses at East Chester of household furniture to the value of 400 dollars and one colt[,] which the general made a present of to Captain Bailey”.

The British were aware of the desperate condition of the American army. As Commissary Charles Stedman later put it:

“The American army was now in a disagreeable situation. The soldiers were very poorly clothed, and a scarcity of provisions among them had been followed by much illness. Nor, amidst these disadvantages, was their position either secure or eligible in other respects. Their sole resource was to avoid action”.

Meanwhile, the British awaited fresh provisions and welcomed the arrival of more reinforcements. A second division of Hessians had recently crossed the Atlantic and was at New York City. This force consisted of six Hessian regiments (plus jaegers and artillerists) under the command of Lieutenant-General Wilhelm von Knyphausen, and an additional regiment from the German state of Waldeck. On this date, the division left New York City and landed near New Rochelle.

Ambrose Serle witnessed the passage of these troops northward:

“This morning the Hessians… passed in flat-boats up the Eastern River towards the grand army. They were all in high spirits, and rowed along with drums beating, trumpets and fifes sounding, and colors flying in a very gallant order. They made a fine appearance altogether.”

The New York Gazette noted:

“It being a very fine day, the scene was rendered extremely beautiful by the crowds upon the water, [and the Hessians] cheering their military brethren and other spectators on shore, and making the hills resound with trumpets, French horns, drums and fifes, accompanied by the harmony of their voices.”

Among the new arrivals was Captain Johann von Ewald, who commanded the detachment of jaegers. Ewald wrote:

“…early on the morning of the 22nd[,] the flatboats appeared and took in the troops. As soon as the boats, each containing fifty men, had assembled on the western side of the city, the journey toward land was started up the East River. It was very pleasant. On the right we observed the well-cultivated shore of Long Island, and on the left the shore of York Island [i.e., Manhattan]. Everything was new to us and we liked it all.”

“Night overtook us and we continued our journey for several more hours in utter darkness. Since no one knew when or where we would land, we were plagued with boredom and curiosity. But at last we set foot on the coast of the province of New York in the vicinity of New Rochelle…. In the darkness all we could see was that the area was wooded. Dogs were barking nearby, hence we could assume that people must reside in the area.”

“The commanding general ordered the regiments to encamp and light fires… which was carried out promptly… sooner had several fires blazed than we heard cries of chickens, geese, and pigs which our resourceful soldiers had discovered. Within the hour, several roasts hung from long sticks before each fire. The whole camp was as busy as an anthill. From this one can see how easily a good soldier knows his way about.”

Footnote: The exact position of Washington’s divisions from one day to the next is difficult to piece together from the source material. That Alexander’s brigade (Spencer’s division) arrived in White Plains on the 21st is indicated by Rufus Putnam’s memoir, the journal of James McMichael, and the presence of men from this brigade in the action at Mamaroneck. That Heath’s division, followed by the remainder of Spencer’s division, reached White Plains on the morning of the 22nd is indicated by William Heath’s memoir, and Benjamin Trumbull’s journal. That Sullivan’s division reached White Plains on the night of the 22nd is indicated by Heath’s memoir and the journal of David How. At about the same time that Sullivan’s men moved, three companies of Knox’s Artillery marched from a point near Kingsbridge to White Plains. An artillerist in this detachment (Solomon Nash) recorded in his journal, “today about 10 o’clock we struck our tents and set out for White Plains and arrived there about 12 o’clock at night and encamped.”

I don’t have a copy of a journal by an infantryman in Israel Putnam’s division, but the overall pattern of activity in the army strongly suggests that Putnam’s men at least started the move from Manhattan to White Plains on the 22nd and that they completed the move no later than the 23rd.

October 21, 1776 (Part 1)

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 21st (Part 1): George Washington’s Continentals occupied White Plains; William Howe moved cautiously by the coast.

Previous entry: October 20th; next: October 21st (Part 2).

George Washington learned on the night of the 20th that he faced the potential for a catastrophic defeat if the British army reached the village of White Plains before he did. Indeed, the Americans wondered why the British had not already made such a move. Major-General William Heath wrote, “it is not a little unaccountable that they did not attempt to stretch themselves across to the Hudson, which [they] might have been done with great ease.” Colonel Rufus Putnam commented on “the stupidity of the British general in that he did not… send a detachment and take possession of… White Plains[,] for had he done this we must then have fought him on his own terms”.

Throughout the day, and into the night, the American army began streaming towards White Plains. The first troops on the road belonged to Brigadier-General William Alexander’s brigade (Spencer’s division). They reached White Plains sometime between midmorning (Rufus Putnam’s memoir) and early afternoon (journal of Sergeant James McMichael). Rufus Putnam accompanied these men and he breathed a sigh of relief when they reached the village: “thus was the American army saved… from a probable total destruction.”

William Heath’s division followed Alexander’s brigade on the road to White Plains. Heath recalled:

“At about four o' clock, p. m., General Heath's division moved from above King’s Bridge… About eight o' clock in the evening, they passed General Lincoln's quarters, on Valentine's Hill, where the Commander-in-Chief was to spend the night…. The division reached Chatterton's Hill, to the south of White-Plains, at four o' clock in the morning… having marched all night.”

Following Heath’s division was the rest of Spencer’s division (the brigades of James Wadsworth and John Fellows). Chaplain Benjamin Trumbull (5th Connecticut State Battalion, Wadsworth’s brigade) recorded in his journal:

“Marched about 10 o’clock at night for the White Plains, [we] carried our tents on our backs[,] packs[,] pots[,] kettles[,] and provisions[,] etc. The army marched all night excepting some small halts, [and the men] almost fainted under their burdens and were greatly fatigued.”

Joseph Plumb Martin served in the same battalion as Trumbull, and had a similar experience:

“We marched from Valentine’s Hill for the White Plains in the night… We had our cooking utensils (at that time the most useless things in the army) to carry in our hands. They were made of cast iron and consequently heavy. I was so beat out before morning with hunger and fatigue that I could hardly move one foot before the other. I told my messmates that I could not carry our kettle any further… my arms were almost dislocated; I sat down in the road, and one of the others gave it a shove with his foot, and it rolled down against the fence, and that was the last I ever saw of it. When we got through the night’s march we found our mess was not the only one that was rid of their iron bondage.”

The British commander, Lieutenant-General William Howe, was perhaps unaware of the opportunity at White Plains (just as Washington had been before the 20th). But that does not sufficiently account for his inactivity along the Westchester coastline. Howe, it seems, was extraordinarily cautious about sending men into the countryside. Perhaps this was, as Stephen Kemble (Howe’s assistant adjutant general) put it, because American deserters claimed that their generals “propose to surround us and cut off our communication with our shipping.” On this date, Howe did shift his army 2 miles further from the landing place, but, Kemble noted, “we keep the [Long Island] Sound in short views on our right”.

Howe’s army may have been slow to act, but it was quickly becoming more powerful. Recent reinforcements included Lossberg’s brigade of Hessians from Staten Island, a large detachment of light dragoons from Long Island, and the 2nd and 6th British brigades from Throg’s Neck (minus the 28th Foot, which was left to hold that post awhile longer).

Situation of the armies on October 21st (click to enlarge). Howe’s army remained near Pell’s Point (8) and New Rochelle, although a detachment was sent east to Mamaroneck (10). Most of Washington’s army was in the process of moving from the area of Kingsbridge (6) to White Plains (11). Washington himself made his headquarters on Valentine’s Hill near Mile Square (9). Major-General Nathanael Greene’s men remained in upper Manhattan and at Fort Lee in New Jersey.

Charles Blaskowitz made this representation of British army units on the heights of New Rochelle. Much of the army is visible, including the light infantry and jaegers (red and green triangles, respectively), the British Reserve (the British grenadiers, and the 33rd and 42nd regiments), the Brigade of Guards, the 71st Foot (Fraser’s Highlanders), and two brigades of Hessians. Other troops were encamped to the south and east.

The Hutchinson River bisects the map. To the left of the river can be seen the town of East Chester (which was plundered by both armies), and a position formerly held by John Glover’s brigade.

October 20, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 20th: British victory appeared close at hand; Rufus Putnam made an unwelcome discovery; Washington decided to move his army to White Plains.

Previous entry: October 19th; next: October 21st (Part 1).

Lieutenant-General William Howe led the British army into the New York mainland from Pell’s Point on October 18th. However, he made no aggressive moves on the 19th or 20th. The inaction was partly due to the need to bring up provisions and other supplies. Perhaps too Howe was trying to get a sense of the lay of the land. He later explained to Parliament, “The [American] country is so covered with wood, swamps and creeks, that it is not open in the least degree to be known, but from post to post, or from accounts to be collected from the inhabitants entirely ignorant of military description. These circumstances were, therefore, the cause of some unavoidable delay in our movements.”

The British may also have felt little urgency because they believed victory was inevitable. A Loyalist in New York City wrote about what he saw as the impending end of the war:

“The Howes [i.e., General William Howe and Admiral Richard Howe] do all that is possible to alleviate the sufferings of a persecuted people [i.e., the Loyalists]… we are now protected in our lives and properties; and some thousands have joined the King's troops; and every time they attack the rebels they rout them with great loss; they fly before our victorious army on every onset; and I don't doubt but in a very little time this daring rebellion will be crushed… It is resolved to attack Washington directly. Proper dispositions are making for that purpose; and I hope by the next letter to give you an account of an end being put to a government that have dared to call themselves the Independent States of America. Almost all the New Yorkers have returned to their allegiance, and there is not a doubt but the other colonies will do the same when they dare declare themselves, and be properly supported by [the British] government.

“There is a broad R [for Rebel] put upon every door in New York that is disaffected to government, and examples will be made of its inhabitants; on the other hand, every person that is well affected to government finds protection.”

A further reason for confidence was that the arrival of a large reinforcement at New York City: the second Hessian division, commanded by Lieutenant-General Wilhelm von Knyphausen. Ambrose Serle witnessed their arrival and wrote:

“The ships made a most beautiful appearance in coming up this morning, the sun shining clear, and the wind wafting only a gentle breeze. All the colors were flying; and the cheerful congratulations of the sailors as they passed along contributed to the beauty of the scene. Here are now between 4 and 500 sail—a number, which never appeared in this harbor together before.”

Whereas the British army had many thousands of professional soldiers, well equipped and supplied, the American rebellion tottered along.

Joseph Plumb Martin (5th Connecticut State Battalion) was encamped on Valentine’s Hill, near the Bronx River. There, he remembered, “[we were] keeping up the old system of starving. A sheep’s head which I begged of the butchers, who were killing some for the ‘gentleman officers,’ was all the provisions I had for two or three days.”

Washington continued to prepare for the next British move as best he could, and he dispatched his adjutant general (Colonel Joseph Reed), and his chief engineer (Colonel Rufus Putnam) to reconnoiter the position held by the British army.

According to Rufus Putnam, “when we arrived on the heights of East Chester we saw a small body of British near the church”. They dared proceed no further, although they had not yet seen the camps of the British army. Reed then departed and Putnam set out to reconnoiter the area around White Plains, a key crossroads to the north. Putnam wrote that he disguised himself “by taking out my cockade, loping my hat and secreting my sword and pistols under my loose coat”. It was a calculated risk; he reasoned that if he were captured while wearing this disguise “the probability is that I should have been hanged for a spy”.

The journey was especially hazardous because Putnam was liable to run into the British at any time. He wrote:

“I did not then know where White Plains was, nor where the road I had taken could carry me. I had gone about 1 ½ mile, when a road turned off to the right, I followed it perhaps ½ a mile and came to a house, where I learned from woman that this road led to New Rochelle that the British were there and that they had a guard at a house in sight. On this information I turned and pursued my route toward White Plains (the houses on the way all deserted) until I came with[in] 3 or 4 mile[s] of the place. Here I discovered a house a little ahead with men about it[.] [B]y my [eye]glass I found they were not British soldiers, however I approached them with caution.”

Fortunately for Putnam, the men turned out to be friendly militia.

Putnam then explored the White Plains area and found that the Bronx River could be crossed there in two places, that the British were only 9 miles away and that in between there was only “good roads and in general level open country”. In addition, “at White Plains [there] was a large quantity of stores, with only about three hundred militia to guard them”.

In other words, Putnam could see how the British could easily seize these vital stores and cut Washington’s connections with New England and upstate New York. Putnam then set out to share these disturbing findings with Washington. He wrote:

“[I]t was now after sunset…. I took some refreshment, and set off for headquarters… [along] a road I had never traveled, among Tory inhabitants and in the night. I dare[d] not enquire the way, but Providence conducted me – I arrived at headquarters near Kingsbridge (a distance of about 10 miles) about nine o’clock at night. I found the General alone. I reported to him the discoveries I had made, with a sketch of the country[. H]e complained very feelingly of the gentlemen from New York from whom he had never been able to obtain a plan of the country—that from their information he had ordered the stores to White Plains as a place of security— the General sent for [Major] General [Nathanael] Greene, and [Brigadier] General George Clinton [Greene was one of Washington’s most trusted generals, Clinton was from New York]… as soon as General Clinton came in[,] my sketch and statement were shown to him and he was asked if the situation of those places were as I had reported,– General Clinton said they were”.

Washington now knew that the safety of his army, and perhaps the future of the United States, depended on his getting to White Plains before the British. He began issuing orders for his troops to march.

On the Origins of the Defense in Depth

At the battle of Guilford Courthouse, the American army deployed in a formation quite unlike those traditionally used by European armies. The American commander, Major-General Nathanael Greene, drew his men up in three successive lines that were designed to attrite the attacking British army. First, the British would be confronted by a line of North Carolina militia, then by a line of Virginia militia, and then finally by a line of Maryland and Virginia Continentals.

Three American Lines at Guilford Courthouse (based on the "Haldane" map).

An obvious inspiration for this deployment was that used by Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan at the battle of Cowpens, 2 months earlier. However, Guilford Courthouse and Cowpens were hardly the first time that such a deployment was used during the war. A less elaborate version of this strategy was employed on numerous occasions, including at the battles of Long Island, White Plains, Brandywine, and Freeman's Farm. On each of these occasions, the Americans dispatched a strong force to wear down the advancing British before the British could attack the Americans’ main defensive line. On Long Island, for example, the advanced force was placed on a rocky, wooded spine well in advance of the American fortifications at Brooklyn. However, the British were able to outflank this force and inflict a major defeat on the Americans. Conversely, at Freeman's Farm the advanced American party brought the British advance to a standstill, and the main line was never seriously threatened.

The battles of Long Island and Freeman's Farm are relatively well known. Below is a description of how the Americans used this strategy at the lesser-known battle of White Plains, New York (October 28, 1776).

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George Washington’s army entrenched at White Plains, New York, after having been driven from Manhattan. The British army advanced on his position in two columns. Washington detached a handful of regiments to harry their advance.

The party confronting the left British column included the 1st and 5th Connecticut State Battalions. At the head of the opposing British column was the 2nd Jäger company, the 3rd battalion of light infantry, and half of the 17th Light Dragoons.

In brief, the Americans used stone walls as impromptu breastworks from which they fired on the head of the advancing British column. The British then halted, brought up some field pieces, and fired on the Americans from outside of musket range. The Americans were finally forced to retreat when their flank was threatened. The advanced party prolonged the fight as long as it could, but unlike Cowpens or Guilford Courthouse, they were unable to inflict serious losses on the British. [1]

Here are several descriptions of this incident:

Colonel William Douglas (commander of the 5th Connecticut State Battalion):

I was ordered out with my regiment [and] with three others to meet and endeavor to retard their [the British] march. We moved on and at about twelve were attacked by their advanced guard. We drove them back but soon after the main body came on and we stood them until they got on our flank and I ordered a retreat. We had a most severe fire to retreat under, ten men to our one, but we came off in good order and very surely fired on our retreat all the way. I lost three dead and five wounded. They cut my regiment off from our main body and got ahead of me but I took advantage of a wood and got clear of them. [2]

Colonel Gold Silliman (commander of the 1st Connecticut State Battalion):

... Yesterday about 10 o'clock in the morning we had news that the enemy were approaching, when I with my regiment & 3 others were ordered out about 1 1/2 miles below our lines to take post on a hill to gall them in their march as they advanced. We accordingly took our post & mine & one other regiment had the advantage of a stone wall right in front at which we had been waiting but little time before the enemy came up within 6 or 8 rods,--when our men rose from behind the wall, poured in a most furious fire.

The enemy retreated & came on several times & were so hotly received every time that finally we drove them off from the hill. We killed some they did not carry off & some they did.

I had not one either killed or wounded. On this the enemy were coming upon us with a number of field pieces & as we had none there to meet them with, we were ordered to retreat over West on to another Hill [Chatterton's] & join another party of men & accordingly did it & formed a line of battle. [2]

Captain Johann Ewald (commander, 2nd Jäger Company):

The army had marched scarcely two hours when the left column encountered an advanced corps of the enemy, which I had to engage supported by the light infantry. The area was intersected by hills, woods, and marshes, and every field was enclosed with a stone wall. This enemy corps had taken a stand behind the stone walls on the steep hills between two plantations. Several guns were set up on the main road at some distance, which were covered by cavalry. General Heister [commander of the left British column] immediately mounted a battery on the main road and cannonaded the enemy, who withdrew to his own lines behind a creek with high banks and deployed upon the steep hills. [3]

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Notes:

1. The actions involving the 1st and 5th Connecticut State Battalions are fairly well described in the sources that I’ve encountered. Douglas’ and Silliman’s account suggest that there were other units on hand, but do not name them. As far as I’ve been able to deduce (my reading and research on this battle is not exhaustive), these two units were accompanied by Sage’s 3rd Connecticut State Battalion and Selden’s 4th Connecticut State Battalion, neither of which distinguished itself in this fight. The right British column was led by the 1st Jäger Company, half of the 16th Light Dragoons, and the 1st and 2nd battalions of light infantry (according to Ewald). At a minimum, some Pennsylvania riflemen were dispatched to resist their advance. There may have been other American units present too, but frankly I’m unsure (it is difficult to identify, for several American regiments reporting casualties, where those losses occurred).

As mentioned by Douglas, the British cut off the 1st and 5th Connecticut State Battalions from the American main line. Therefore, they retreated in a westerly direction (towards their right) and took up position alongside a hodgepodge of other American units on Chatterton’s Hill. The British left column was then sent to attack this position, and the subsequent assault is what is usually described when historians write about the battle of White Plains. (That is, the fight by the advanced parties has received comparatively little attention).

2. The Long Island Historical Society. (1878). The campaign of 1776 around New York and Brooklyn.

3. Joseph P. Tustin (1979). Diary of the American War: A Hessian journal. Captain Johann Ewald.

Final Bombardment of Fort Saint-Jean

The siege of Fort Saint-Jean dragged on for weeks. Brigadier-General Richard Montgomery, who led the American forces, was impatient to finish the siege, so that he could capture Montreal before winter set on. In the meantime it was hoped that a second American army, led by Brigadier-General Benedict Arnold, would capture the town of Quebec, thereby completing the conquest of Canada.

Early in the siege Montgomery identified a hill to the northwest as the key spot from which to threaten the fort. In early October, he “had a road cut to the intended ground and some fascines made.” [1]

However, his army disapproved of this plan and Montgomery “was informed by Major Brown that a general dissatisfaction prevailed; that unless something was undertaken, in a few days there would be a mutiny.” The army preferred to bombard the fort from afar -- especially the east bank of the Richelieu. Montgomery confessed in a letter to Major-General Philip Schuyler, that when he laid his plans, “I did not consider I was at the head of troops who carry the spirit of freedom into the field, and [who] think for themselves.”

The British took little action to thwart the Americans beyond the exchange of long-range artillery fire. Occasional sorties were made by armed boats, but these efforts ended once a battery was established east of the fort (October 11). On land, a party of Canadians, led by Captains David Monin and Samuel McKay, ambushed some Americans in the woods (October 9), but no sorties were directed against the American camps or gun emplacements.

By the end of October, Montgomery was ready to bring the siege of the fort to a close. He had been reinforced by mortars and ammunition captured at Fort Chambly, and some additional infantry companies from the colonies (specifically, the bulk of the 1st Connecticut and 4th New York regiments). On October 27-28, he abandoned the fortifications south of Fort Saint-Jean and brought his whole force to Grosse Pointe northwest of the fort. There, construction of a new battery overlooking the fort was begun on the evening of October 29.

Lieutenant-Colonel Rudolphus Ritzema of the 1st New York Regiment oversaw the construction:

“In the Evening I was ordered with 200 Men to erect a Battery [the Ground for which having been previously laid out by the Engineers] within 250 Yards of the Fort—In the Morning the Breast Work & Ambresurs completed”

The British soon learned what the Americans were planning:

“Captn Monin and Captn McKay went out this morning in hopes of getting a prisoner, and if possible to survey the Enemys position. An Officer & 25 Men were order’d to be in readiness to support them. They had been out a very little while, when they fell in with a Man who we afterward found was a straggler from a party of 200 Men, who were very near the same Spot [i.e., they captured one of Ritzema’s men]. The Man inform’d us there were 2,000 Men at the rapids (i.e., the lower Camp) and 50 Indians… He shew’d us the place of the Battery…” [2]

Because of the prisoner’s confession, the new battery quickly became a harrowing place for those that guarded it.

According to Aaron Barlow of the 5th Connecticut Regiment:

“The Regulars discovered our Battery. We guarded it with 100 men, I being one of the Guard. They flung upwards of 100 Bomb shells, some cannon and grape shot at us. Wounded one man, broke two guns. One bomb shell broke within 4 feet of me which made me almost deaf. I believe there were 20 shells broke within 2 rods of me. This night [October 29-30] we dragged four cannon and five mortars to this Breast work in order to play on the Fort.” [3]

The battery opened on November 1, and was joined by the guns east of the fort. Together, they devastated the fort.

A British officer recorded:

“Large pieces of the Wall were knock’d in. The Chimneys of the House in the South Redoubt were thrown down and the few Corners where some little Shelter from the Weather was to be had were now no longer tenable. A great many shot pass’d thro’ the parapets and some wounded Men behind them. 3 Men were kill’d and 4 or 5 wounded. A good deal of provision was destroy’d.—”

British counterfire was also deadly.

According to Benjamin Trumbull of the 5th Connecticut Regiment:

“On our Side one man was killed right out on the Platform, another had his Leg[,] foot and Thigh torn all to Pieces with a shell, had his Leg cut of[f] about nine o’clock as near the trunk of his body as possible, he bore the Operation with great magnanimity but did not Survive the Night. Three more were wounded but two of them very Slightily.”

Late in the day, Montgomery attempted to open surrender negotiations with the British. An officer in Lamb's artillery recalled:

“I received a message from General Montgomery, ordering me to cease firing till further orders; these orders were extremely disagreeable to me, when I saw some of my men bleeding before my eyes, and dying with the wounds which they had received. On our ceasing to fire, the General ordered a parley to be beat...”

The messenger Montgomery sent was one Lacoste, a Canadian militiaman captured at Longueuil. From him, the British learned that Governor Guy Carleton had been defeated and that there was no hope of relief. The garrison was left with enough rations for 8 days at 2/3 the usual allotment, not including those rations destroyed in the bombardment. The British agreed to a cease fire and pondered their few remaining options.

Notes:

1. A copy of the letter is available here.

The journal attributed to British Lieutenant John André seemingly confirms the wisdom of Montgomery’s assessment. He noted at the end of the siege:

“We may thank our Enemy in some sort for leaving us in such slight field Works the credit of having been only reduc’d by Famine… Their Batterys might with their numbers [of infantry] by means of Approaches have been brought much closer to our Redouts have overlook’d us, destroyed our breastworks, and by a slaughter from which there cou’d have been no Shelter, have render’d our holding out, a meer sacrifice of Men who might have been reserv’d for better Services.”

2. From a journal attributed to British Lieutenant John André.

3. Sources disagree on the composition of this battery. For example, Montgomery referred to "our battery of four twelve-pounders" (see here). Colonel Timothy Bedel wrote, "I have a battery of four twelve-pounders, one mortar, and three royals, fixing at my post" (see here). Ritzema claimed it consisted of four 12-pounders and six Royal Mortars. An officer with Lamb's Artillery company (likely Captain John Lamb himself) stated that it consisted of "three twelve and one nine-pounders, three mortars, and as many cohorns" (see here). For additional comparison, see this description of the American ordinance used during the siege.