Final Bombardment of Fort Saint-Jean

The siege of Fort Saint-Jean dragged on for weeks. Brigadier-General Richard Montgomery, who led the American forces, was impatient to finish the siege, so that he could capture Montreal before winter set on. In the meantime it was hoped that a second American army, led by Brigadier-General Benedict Arnold, would capture the town of Quebec, thereby completing the conquest of Canada.

Early in the siege Montgomery identified a hill to the northwest as the key spot from which to threaten the fort. In early October, he “had a road cut to the intended ground and some fascines made.” [1]

However, his army disapproved of this plan and Montgomery “was informed by Major Brown that a general dissatisfaction prevailed; that unless something was undertaken, in a few days there would be a mutiny.” The army preferred to bombard the fort from afar -- especially the east bank of the Richelieu. Montgomery confessed in a letter to Major-General Philip Schuyler, that when he laid his plans, “I did not consider I was at the head of troops who carry the spirit of freedom into the field, and [who] think for themselves.”

The British took little action to thwart the Americans beyond the exchange of long-range artillery fire. Occasional sorties were made by armed boats, but these efforts ended once a battery was established east of the fort (October 11). On land, a party of Canadians, led by Captains David Monin and Samuel McKay, ambushed some Americans in the woods (October 9), but no sorties were directed against the American camps or gun emplacements.

By the end of October, Montgomery was ready to bring the siege of the fort to a close. He had been reinforced by mortars and ammunition captured at Fort Chambly, and some additional infantry companies from the colonies (specifically, the bulk of the 1st Connecticut and 4th New York regiments). On October 27-28, he abandoned the fortifications south of Fort Saint-Jean and brought his whole force to Grosse Pointe northwest of the fort. There, construction of a new battery overlooking the fort was begun on the evening of October 29.

Lieutenant-Colonel Rudolphus Ritzema of the 1st New York Regiment oversaw the construction:

“In the Evening I was ordered with 200 Men to erect a Battery [the Ground for which having been previously laid out by the Engineers] within 250 Yards of the Fort—In the Morning the Breast Work & Ambresurs completed”

The British soon learned what the Americans were planning:

“Captn Monin and Captn McKay went out this morning in hopes of getting a prisoner, and if possible to survey the Enemys position. An Officer & 25 Men were order’d to be in readiness to support them. They had been out a very little while, when they fell in with a Man who we afterward found was a straggler from a party of 200 Men, who were very near the same Spot [i.e., they captured one of Ritzema’s men]. The Man inform’d us there were 2,000 Men at the rapids (i.e., the lower Camp) and 50 Indians… He shew’d us the place of the Battery…” [2]

Because of the prisoner’s confession, the new battery quickly became a harrowing place for those that guarded it.

According to Aaron Barlow of the 5th Connecticut Regiment:

“The Regulars discovered our Battery. We guarded it with 100 men, I being one of the Guard. They flung upwards of 100 Bomb shells, some cannon and grape shot at us. Wounded one man, broke two guns. One bomb shell broke within 4 feet of me which made me almost deaf. I believe there were 20 shells broke within 2 rods of me. This night [October 29-30] we dragged four cannon and five mortars to this Breast work in order to play on the Fort.” [3]

The battery opened on November 1, and was joined by the guns east of the fort. Together, they devastated the fort.

A British officer recorded:

“Large pieces of the Wall were knock’d in. The Chimneys of the House in the South Redoubt were thrown down and the few Corners where some little Shelter from the Weather was to be had were now no longer tenable. A great many shot pass’d thro’ the parapets and some wounded Men behind them. 3 Men were kill’d and 4 or 5 wounded. A good deal of provision was destroy’d.—”

British counterfire was also deadly.

According to Benjamin Trumbull of the 5th Connecticut Regiment:

“On our Side one man was killed right out on the Platform, another had his Leg[,] foot and Thigh torn all to Pieces with a shell, had his Leg cut of[f] about nine o’clock as near the trunk of his body as possible, he bore the Operation with great magnanimity but did not Survive the Night. Three more were wounded but two of them very Slightily.”

Late in the day, Montgomery attempted to open surrender negotiations with the British. An officer in Lamb's artillery recalled:

“I received a message from General Montgomery, ordering me to cease firing till further orders; these orders were extremely disagreeable to me, when I saw some of my men bleeding before my eyes, and dying with the wounds which they had received. On our ceasing to fire, the General ordered a parley to be beat...”

The messenger Montgomery sent was one Lacoste, a Canadian militiaman captured at Longueuil. From him, the British learned that Governor Guy Carleton had been defeated and that there was no hope of relief. The garrison was left with enough rations for 8 days at 2/3 the usual allotment, not including those rations destroyed in the bombardment. The British agreed to a cease fire and pondered their few remaining options.

Notes:

1. A copy of the letter is available here.

The journal attributed to British Lieutenant John André seemingly confirms the wisdom of Montgomery’s assessment. He noted at the end of the siege:

“We may thank our Enemy in some sort for leaving us in such slight field Works the credit of having been only reduc’d by Famine… Their Batterys might with their numbers [of infantry] by means of Approaches have been brought much closer to our Redouts have overlook’d us, destroyed our breastworks, and by a slaughter from which there cou’d have been no Shelter, have render’d our holding out, a meer sacrifice of Men who might have been reserv’d for better Services.”

2. From a journal attributed to British Lieutenant John André.

3. Sources disagree on the composition of this battery. For example, Montgomery referred to "our battery of four twelve-pounders" (see here). Colonel Timothy Bedel wrote, "I have a battery of four twelve-pounders, one mortar, and three royals, fixing at my post" (see here). Ritzema claimed it consisted of four 12-pounders and six Royal Mortars. An officer with Lamb's Artillery company (likely Captain John Lamb himself) stated that it consisted of "three twelve and one nine-pounders, three mortars, and as many cohorns" (see here). For additional comparison, see this description of the American ordinance used during the siege.

Skirmish at Rivière Saint-Jean (1)

The first two American movements against Fort Saint-Jean ended in disappointment (cf. here and here. On the third attempt, however, the Americans were able to cut the roads leading to the fort, placing the garrison in a state of siege. This attempt, like those that preceded it, produced a sharp skirmish between the two opponents.

The Americans advanced close to the Fort Saint-Jean on September 17, 1775. That same day, a small force of Canadians and Americans, led by Major John Brown of Massachusetts, skirted Fort Saint-Jean, and cut the roads to the fort. These men first took down the bridge over Rivière Saint-Jean, and then built a crude fortification from the bridge pieces. Brown's men also captured a supply train that was headed to the fort.

On September 18, the British in Fort Saint-Jean learned of Brown’s presence, and drove him from his post. However, a second American force then appeared, led by Colonel Timothy Bedel. This force compelled the British to retreat and reestablished the siege of Saint-Jean. A map of these movements appears below.

Skirmish at Rivière Saint-Jean (click to enlarge). The British attack is shown in red. The advance of the American relief force is shown in blue.

In this post I share how the events of this day were described in the journals of 7 different men that were present at Fort Saint-Jean (5 Americans, 1 Briton, and 1 Canadian). A more detailed description of the skirmish will appear in a future post.

Journal Entries

John André was a lieutenant in the 7th Regiment of Foot. He is thought to have been the author of a journal kept by a British officer during the siege of Fort Saint-Jean. The following extract from that journal describes the events of September 18.

“18th—This morning we were inform’d that the rebels intended to take Post about 2 miles lower than St John’s, at a Rivulet near which we had had a redoubt ‘till within a fortnight, when the Enemy made their first Appearance at the Isle aux Noix. Lieutt Duff with 30 Men was sent for intelligence, with order to bring in the cattle belonging to the neighbouring farms. At his return he reported that there appear’d to him to be about 200 Men on the other Side of the rivulet entrench’d with the logs of a Bridge which they had broken. Captn Strong was then sent with a detachment of 100 Men, an Officer of Artillery with a field piece and the Volunteers. The Rebels on their Appearing fir’d a few Shot and ran off into the wood.

“Our people took two wounded prisoners, and lost one man. (Monsr Beaubien a Volunteer.) We had two or three wounded.

“After this little Skirmish whilst the breastwork was destroying more Ammunition was sent for from the Fort which an Officer and 20 Men brought up. The Bridge was scarce repair’d when some noise was heard an Indian who appear’d at the Edge of the wood was seiz’d by two or three who were with us. A good many Shot were fir’d from behind the Trees and Bushes upon our returning the fire very briskly nothing more was heard of the Enemy. A Soldier of the 26th Regiment was kill’d in this last fray.

“Captn Dundee, on the second firing being heard at the Fort, was order’d out with a reinforcement of 40 Men and met the first detachmt on their return to the Fort.

“During this time, the Enemys Gondola’s had been insulting the redouts with a few Shot which had no Effect.

“The Indian who was taken was buffeted by our Indians and sent back. Mr Hazen and Mr Tucker who were found with the Rebels (tho’ indeed without Arms) were kept prisoners in the Forts. In this Affair, as there have since been throughout the Campaign in Canada There were Englishmen fighting Englishmen, French against French, and Indians of the same Tribe against each other.

“Both the last night and this the Rebels were heard at work entrenchg themselves.—”

Aaron Barlow was a sergeant in the 5th Connecticut Regiment. He was south of the fort (in the American main camp) at the time of the skirmish. The "Shambalee" (or Chambly) party refers to John Brown's men.

“They cut a road toward the Fort in order to draw their cannon. The Shambalee party took this day 12 waggon loads of Provision, Rum, Wine, & Ammunition, from the Regulars and received no damage from them. Towards night the Regulars came out upon the Shambalee party. They wounded 3 of our men and took 2 prisoners. Our men took some provisions and drove them to the Fort.”

John Fassett was a lieutenant in the Green Mountain Boys. The Green Mountain Boys was one of three regiments in Bedel's relief force.

“18 Sept. In the morning our army fired their cannon and they fired from the fort. There was a hot fire from both sides sometime, but in the midst of it Col. Warner’s Regiment was ordered to march about three miles thro’ the wood around St. Johns. We had to travel knee deep in water expecting every minute to meet with the enemy. We at length came very near to Major Brown’s encampment, where the Regulars were. They gave us a hot fire. The grape shot and Musket balls flew very thick, but our pilots, not knowing the ground, we had not an equal chance for they all fled to St. Johns. They wounded Capt. Watson, but killed none of our men. We took the ground and staid there all night and had a very tedious night with our feet wet and cold, no houses nor tents to lie in.”

Foucher was an officer serving with the pro-British Canadian Volunteers. Although the Canadian volunteers participated in this engagement, Foucher, who was ill, did not. The following extract is a translation of the original French.

“Sept. 18th.—The Bostonians arrived at St. Johns in two sloops and barges, numbering about one thousand men. Major Preston, who commanded this fort, sent on the same day about thirty men of the Canadian troops to bring in the cattle which was in the bush near St. Johns. Soon after he was informed by a Canadian that there were two or three hundred Bostonians on the other side of a bridge about half a league from St. Johns, who were raising fortifications and who had taken four cart loads of provisions which were on their way to St. Johns, and also the cattle he had sent for; and that the bridge was already demolished, so that communication between St. Johns and La Prairie de la Magdeleine was cut off by the enemy. Immediately Major Preston ordered out one hundred men under command of Captain Strong, together with one hundred Canadian volunteers and a piece of artillery to feel the enemy. This detachment advanced and the Bostonians fired upon them. The fire was brisk on both sides and lasted about half an hour. The enemy left the battle field and was pursued for some distance. The Srs. Moses Hazen and Toker, and also Hazen's servant, who were within the enemy's line, were made prisoners and brought to the fort. Beaubien Desauniers, a Canadian volunteer, and a soldier of the 26th regiment were shot; another soldier was dangerously wounded. During this action the artillery of the fort and of the gun boat, continued to fire for three hours; the enemy kept up the fire in return; but the above mentioned were the only casualties on our side.”

Rudolphus Ritzema was lieutenant-colonel of the 1st New York Regiment. He was south of the fort (in the American main camp) at the time of the skirmish. The following journal entry spans the events of September 17th and 18th.

“The whole Army amounting to about 1500 Men under General Montgomery [General Schuyler from his ill state of Health being gone to Ticonderoga] embarked again for St Johns—About Noon we landed at the Breast Work nearest the Enemy. The General detached Col Bedel with his Corps to occupy the Road, leading from St Johns to Chamblee, in order to cut off the Enemy’s Communication with the Country, which they effectually accomplished.”

Benjamin Trumbull was a chaplain in the 5th Connecticut Regiment. He was south of the fort (in the American main camp) at the time of the skirmish.

“Monday Morning September, 18th Major Brown who had been previously sent of from the Isle Aux Noix into Canada, and on the 17 had taken 4 Hogsheads of Rum and several Carriages and some clothing from the Enemy was attacked by them above the forts. The Fire was heard in the Camp South of the Forts. On this 500 men under the Command of Colonel Bedel who had orders to Pass the Forts and cut of the Communication between them and the adjacent Country were hastened off immediately to assist major Brown and his Party w[h]o at the Time of the Action did not exceed 50, men of the Provincials, joined with 30 or 40 Canadians. His Party consisted originally of towards 100 men, but one half of them were placed as Guards at Chambly and the adjacent Country. The General marched at the Head of the Detachment of 500 men and passed the Forts. The Regulars who came out with several Field Pieces and 3 or 400 men drove Major Browns Party from their Breast Work and took the Ground on the Appearance of Colonel Beadles Party the Regulars Fire their Field Pieces and discharged a few vollies of small Arms and retreated, almost before our men had marched into open view so as to fire on them with any Advantage.

“No man was lost on the Side of the Provincials. Capt. Watson was badly wounded and afterwards taken up by our men another was wounded and taken. This was all the loss we sustained. The Regulars lost one or two. One was killed with a Cannon ball Shot from their own Canon. Our People took and ever after maintained their Ground.

“The Rest of the Army Advanced to the lower Breast Work and began to clear a Place for an Encampment. Encamped and cast up a Breastwork.”

Bayze Wells was a sergeant in the 4th Connecticut Regiment. The 4th Connecticut was one of three regiments in Bedel's relief force. Wells, (like many of the men in the Connecticut regiments) was sick at the time of the engagement. He did not participate in the action.

“18th three Regiments Col Hinmans With the Rest about 300 of them Ware ordred to march Round St Jo we travild Round St Johns we ware beset by A Party which Give us A warm fire but I was unwell I Did not Get So Near as to See any Enemy I was Abligd to Get my Pack Carried to A house that Day St Johns was Besedged I being So unwell that I Got to mr minneeres with Cpt Watson that was badly wounded...”

Second Skirmish at Petite-Rivière-du-Nord

An American army, under Major-General Philip Schuyler, advanced into Canada on September 4, 1775. Two days later it made what amounted to a reconnaissance-in-force against British-held Fort Saint-Jean. By September 10, reinforcements increased the size of his army from fewer than 1,000 men to 1,394 effectives. The new arrivals included parts of the 2nd New York and 4th Connecticut regiments, and a small number of cannon. [1]

Schuyler believed himself strong enough to begin siege operations against Fort Saint-Jean. His plan to divide the American force into three parts. One part would consist of infantrymen turned sailors and marines. A second part would consist of infantrymen and the army’s artillery. Together these first two parts would establish a base south of the fort and protect the American supply line. The third part would consist of a detachment of infantry that would circle around the fort and cut the British supply line. Schuyler anticipated that additional men and guns would arrive in the days and weeks ahead, at which point he would be able to begin attacking the fort itself.

Ritzema's Planned Advance (approximate path shown in light blue) and Actual Advance (in dark blue). Click to Enlarge.

Schuyler’s army advanced from L'Île-aux-Noix on the 10th, and landed late in the day at the abandoned “upper breastwork.” Schuyler, who was unwell, gave command of the expedition to Brigadier-General Richard Montgomery. Lieutenant-Colonel Rudolphus Ritzema commanded the detachment that was to cut the fort’s supply line.

While the infantry proceeded on land, two American row galleys, the Schuyler and Hancock, proceeded downstream. Each was armed with a 12-pounder cannon and 12 swivel guns. The galleys came under fire as they neared the “lower breastwork” from British forces on land and in the river.

The British commander at Fort Saint-Jean, Major Charles Preston, had anticipated a second American advance. To watch for such a movement, he had dispatched thirty some Canadian gentlemen volunteers and Indian allies under the command of Joseph-Dominique-Emmanuel Le Moyne de Longueuil. This force travelled upstream in two bateaux armed with swivel guns, and halted when it reached the abandoned lower breastwork. There, de Longueuil landed one part of his force, while the others remained in the boats.

Le Moyne de Longueuil

When de Longueuil's men saw the American row galleys, the land forces began a long-range musket fire, and the bateaux fired grape shot from the swivel guns.

According to the one of the Americans, “Our armed boats perceiving the fire on the lake, fired three twelve-pounders, one of which took the enemy' s principal batteau directly in the bow, and tore her from stem to stern; she immediately sunk, with all the men in her, amounting to thirty-five.” [2]

Clearly overmatched, de Longueuil ordered a retreat, and all but six of his land force embarked in the remaining bateau and headed for the fort. The retreating bateau was fired at by the galleys, but the men aboard escaped without injury. The six who remained behind were sieurs Boucherville, de La Bruere, Campion, La Madeleine, and Perthuis, and an Abenaki indian. These men occupied a small house near the lower breastwork and kept watch on American movements.

Meanwhile, Ritzema's detachment set off to make a night march around the fort. Ritzema was in front with a small vanguard. Behind him were 60 men of the 4th Connecticut, followed by 300 men of the 5th Connecticut, and finally 140 men of the 1st New York.

Ritzema had just reached the lower breastwork when the advance fell apart. The 5th Connecticut had been ambushed in the advance on September 6, and the evening gloom promised another attack. These troops panicked when they unexpectedly encountered another group of men in the woods. Soon they, along with most of Ritzema's other men, were in flight for the upper breastwork. The Americans thought that “they had been waylaid by a party of Regulars and Indians” [emphasis in original], but “not a gun had been fired, except one by a man of the detachment.” The men in the woods had been their own comrades. [3]

After some time, Montgomery, Ritzema, and other officers were able to reorganize the men and put them back on the march. However, they had advanced only about 1/4 mile when the Connecticutians panicked a second time after some random shells from Fort Saint-Jean burst in the woods.

After this second retreat, Ritzema was left with less than half of his original force. Ritzema resolutely pressed on, and his men struggled to keep up in the dark, swampy woods. Near midnight, Ritzema, now with only about 50 men, at last reached the lower breastwork. There, the Americans observed a fire had been lit in a small house, and they moved to surround it. Sieurs Boucherville and La Madeleine, who were outside the house, gave the alarm and fled. When the men inside the house ran out the door, they were met with a hail of gunfire. Sieur Perthuis and the Abenaki were killed, Sieur de La Bruere was shot in both arms (but escaped), and Sieur Campion got away unharmed.

Realizing how few men were still with him, Ritzema halted and waited for stragglers to appear. Meanwhile, his men stripped and scalped Sieur Perthuis and beheaded the dead Abenaki. [4] Sometime before 3am, Montgomery cancelled the operation and ordered Ritzema's men back to the upper breastwork.

The next morning [September 11] the senior officers announced, in a council of war, that they favored continuing operations against Saint-Jean. However, word then came that the enemy was on the move. According to one officer: “we saw their armed schooner [the Royal Savage], of one hundred and eighty tons, carrying twelve nine-pounders, coming towards us.” It was a critical moment: the American flotilla was no match for such a vessel. [5]

According to Ritzema, the New York troops “remained in their Ranks & shewed a ready Spirit to proceed,” but the Connecticutians panicked and fled to the bateaux. Ritzema, in a rage, wounded several fleeing men with his sword, and had to be restrained by a doctor from using his pistol, too. He concluded, “This infamous conduct so much dispirited the General that he ordered the whole to embark and to proceed to Isle au Noix.” [6]

Once again, an American movement against Fort Saint-Jean had ended in disappointment.

Montgomery complained bitterly in a letter to his wife:

“…such a set of pusillanimous wretches never were collected. Could I, with decency, leave the army in its present situation, I would not serve an hour longer. I am much afraid the general character of the people has been too justly represented. However, there are some whose spirit I have confidence in; they are taking pains with the men, and they flatter me with hopes of prevailing on them to retrieve their characters.”

He also feared that any chance that the Canadians would rise up en masse to support the Americans was now lost:

“ We were so unfortunate as to have some Canadians witnesses of our disgrace! What they will think of the brave Bostonians [7], I know not! My own feelings tell me they are not likely to put confidence in such friends.”

Notes:

1. I've had some difficulty discerning the exact composition of Schuyler's army on September 10. The following represents my understanding of the organization as of this writing (keep in mind that I'm working with a limited set of sources):

• 1st Connecticut: 2 companies, commanded by captains William Douglass and David Welch. Douglass commanded a row galley; it's possible that all of these men were used to man vessels in the American flotilla.
• 4th Connecticut: A part of the regiment, commanded by Major Samuel Elmore.
• 5th Connecticut: Most or all of the regiment, commanded by Colonel David Waterbury.
• 6th Connecticut: 1 company, commanded by Captain Edward Mott. These men were likely serving the American cannon and/or helping to man the vessels.
• 1st New York: A part of the regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Rudolphus Ritzema.
• 2nd New York: A part of the regiment. The officers that I have been able to place with the army at this time are Captain Christopher Yates, Captain Joseph McCracken, and Lieutenant Cornelius Van Slyck.

2. I haven’t been able to find any confirmation of this disaster among Canadian sources. Although the Americans suspected that most or all of the men aboard this vessel were killed or drowned, this is may have been a case of wishful thinking. The men in the boat were thought to have been either Canadian volunteers or British regulars. At the very least, it appears from Canadian sources that no seigneurs died in his incident.

Another mystery (to me) is when exactly this incident took place. One source implies that it occurred immediately before the skirmish on land, while others imply that it took place considerably earlier.

3. Montgomery believed that the men who inadvertently triggered the panic were stragglers. Another source claimed that they were a party guarding the flank of the American column.

4. The mutilation of the dead bodies was done in retaliation for similar acts attributed to the Indians. One American claimed that after the skirmish on the 6th, “they dug up our dead and mangled them in the most shocking manner.” Perthuis may have been wearing a red coat, for he was mistaken for a British regular. An observer wrote, “We stripped the Regular and found a very fine gun and sword--the gun with two Barrels the neatest I ever saw, a fine watch some money, and very neatly dressed.”

5. The Royal Savage had only recently been launched. It was unavailable to contest the American advance on September 6. Unbeknownst to the Americans, the Royal Savage actually carried only 3, 4, and 6-pounders.

6. Ritzema was convinced that the Connecticut troops were the chief problem. Montgomery, who was also a citizen of New York, found cause for complaint with the troops as a whole.

7. This is in reference to the Canadian slang word Bostonnais, which literally means person from Boston, but was used in reference to all Americans. It carried roughly the same meaning as Yankee does today to some non-Americans.

An Aside on Research

A few days ago, I posted a description of the first inaugural skirmish in the American invasion of Canada. For good or ill, the post was just a straightforward description of the skirmish itself. I didn't present a long list of sources or explain how and why my account differed from those of others. Because I intend to continue with this style of post for other incidents in the campaign, I feel I should provide a bit of background information.

When researching a project I rely more on online sources than print ones. In particular, I search Google Books, the Internet Archive, and lists of journals. I then make a library of .pdf files and "copy" and "paste" the relevant text into a single electronic document. Below is a listing of the first-hand accounts of the inaugural skirmish in the invasion of Canada. All of these were found in online, out-of-copyright books or Peter Force's American Archives.

• Richard Montgomery, general. Letter dated September 5 (but, when compared to other accounts, probably was not written before September 7).
• Benjamin Trumbull, soldier. Journal entry dated September 6, 1775
• Rudolphus Ritzema, officer. Journal entry dated September 6, 1775
• Philip Schuyler, general. Letter dated September 8, 1775
• Anonymous. Letter dated September 8, 1775
• James Van Rensselaer, officer. Letter dated September 14, 1775
• Anonymous. Letter dated September 16, 1775
• Philip Schuyler, general. Letter dated September 20, 1775
• [Guillaume?] de Lorimier, officer. Memorial dated December 1, 1777
• Guillaume de Lorimier, officer. Undated memoir.

Next, I do a little bit of writing, and try to establish what I want to say. I don't trust (with good reason) this initial take on the material, so I then read (and re-read) everything again. Reading and reflection on the source material gets spread out over months. The final write-up happens in an evening.

The product of these efforts is not exactly serious scholarship, but it's also not exactly inconsequential. My descriptions are grounded in primary sources, but my method of researching events is crude, and my writing lacks polish. Both strengths and weaknesses are in evidence when comparisons are made with typical military histories. By way of an example, consider the following description of this inaugural skirmish in Boatner's Encyclopedia of the American Revolution. Boatner's account is admirable in how he engages the interest of the reader with remarkably economical prose. However, the account also relies on some dubious sources, and my numbers in brackets refer to critical comments that follow.

“When the Americans approached on 5 Sept. [1], the place was defended by 200 regulars, several cannon [2], a small Indian contingent, and the British were building two 60-foot, 12-gun vessels. Maj. Chas. Preston was in command of the post…

“Montgomery’s command comprised about 1,200 men and a few cannon [3]; their advance was made in a small fleet of two sailing vessels (the sloop Enterprise and schooner Liberty), gondolas, bateaux, rowing galleys, piraguas, and canoes [4]. (Ward, W.O.R., 150) Troops involved were most of Waterbury’s Conn. Regt., four companies of Ritzema’s 4th N.Y. [5], and Mott’s small artillery section. (Ibid.)

“Schuyler caught up with his aggressive subordinate the morning of 4 Sept., (surprisingly) approved his action, and that night the invaders were at Ile aux Noix. Although the expected Canadian allies did not appear to reinforce them [6], Schuyler stripped his men of baggage and pushed toward St. Johns. Landing a mile and a half away, the Americans were advancing through the swamps to attack when a flank patrol was ambushed by 100 Indians under the command of a N.Y. Tory (Capt. Tice). A skirmish developed in the dense underbrush; the Indians were driven off, but the Americans lost 16 men and did not pursue. That night a man who was apparently sympathetic to the American cause visited Schuyler’s entrenched camp and convinced him that St. Johns was too strongly held for him to capture.” [7]

Comments:

1. Taken as a whole, the first-hand accounts listed above clearly indicate that the skirmish was on the 6th. The journals maintained by Ritzema and Trumbull are particularly convincing.

2. The British were stronger than stated. Compare, for example, this document, and this one with this rather detailed listing of British troop totals. The British also had considerably more than "several cannon."

3. Schuyler claimed to have had fewer than 1,000 men with him on the 6th. The "few cannon" did not include field pieces. From Ritzema's journal, entry dated September 6: “The General ordered the whole army without one Piece of Artillery, save two twelve Pounders in the Bows of the Gondolas, to embark for St Johns.”

4. Ritzema's journal, quoted above, in combination with this document, indicate that the Liberty and the Enterprise did not accompany this expedition. Rather, the only armed vessels were the Hancock and the Schuyler. Boatner might have noted, but did not, that the British also had the service of a variety of small vessels.

5. Ritzema's command consisted of five (not four) companies of the 1st (not 4th) New York. See this document, and his journal entry for September 4.

6. I have seen no evidence that a rendezvous was planned between Canadian and American forces at L'Île-aux-Noix. Certainly it would’ve been difficult for Canadians to get there in large numbers, as Fort Saint-Jean sat astride the only route. It wasn’t until the 5th that Schuyler announced his arrival in Canada (see here and here) and sent envoys to his Canadian supporters.

7. The man was Moses Hazen (compare this document with this one). Schuyler had long known that the fort was quite strong (see, for example, here), and it was not the cause of the American return to L'Île-aux-Noix. The true causes of the retreat can be found here, here, and in Ritzema's journal.

Skirmish at Petite-Rivière-du-Nord

The American invasion of Canada began on September 4, 1775, when an army commanded by Major-General Philip Schuyler encamped on L'Île-aux-Noix, in southern Canada. Two days later, this force sets out for Fort Saint-Jean. This advance against Fort Saint-Jean is intended primarily to probe the fort’s defenses and to encourage the support of pro-American Canadians. Schuyler’s force consists primarily of the 5th Connecticut Regiment (commanded by Colonel David Waterbury), a part of the 1st New York Regiment (commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Rudolphus Ritzema), and “Mott’s” artillery company [1]. Mott’s men have no field guns; the only American cannon are two 12-pounders that are placed in the bows of the armed bateaux Hancock and Schuyler.

The Americans travel by boat down the Richelieu River and come within sight of the fort around 2pm. The Americans then make an unopposed landing on the western bank, a little more than 1 mile from the fort. Schuyler, who is sickly, remains on board one of the vessels; Brigadier-General Richard Montgomery is given command of the land troops. Montgomery forms a line of battle and orders an advance northward towards the fort. The ground over which the Americans march is swampy and wooded.

Seeing the American vessels, Major Charles Preston, commandant of Fort Saint-Jean, sends out a scouting party consisting of approximately 90 Indians. Around one-quarter of the men are Six Nations Iroquois, the rest are Canadian Indians, including Kahnawake and Kanesetake Mohawk, and some Hurons [2]. The Indian party is accompanied by Captain Samuel Tice of the Indian Department, and the de Lorimier brothers (Claude-Nicolas-Guillaume and Jean-Claude-Chamilly). This party conceals itself among the trees and sedge on the north bank of the Petite-Rivière-du-Nord, “a deep muddy brook” that feeds into the Richelieu [3].

Petite-Rivière-du-Nord (modern day Rivière Bernier), as recently imaged for Google Maps.

As the Americans advance, a detachment of about 50 men advances somewhat ahead and to the left of the main body. This detachment consists of Major Thomas Hobby’s and Captain Matthew Mead’s companies of the 5th Connecticut. When the detachment reaches the stream, they wade out into the waist-deep water. Suddenly, they are suddenly fired upon by the Indian party. A Kahnawake chief called Sotsichoouane charges into the stream and plunges a lance into one American and a knife into another. He is about to kill a third man when he is brought down by two balls. Captain Tice is also soon wounded. Nevertheless, the Americans reel back before the superior numbers.

The Ambush is Sprung.

The Connecticut troops in the main body are quick to respond. According to one private, “The Army immediately wheeled to the Left in order to Face the Fire of the Enemy, and charged them with great Spirit & Firmness.” The New Yorkers, however, are “little acquainted with wood-fighting” and fail to get into action. Nevertheless, the arrival of the Connecticutians is decisive: the Indian party falls back through the trees under cover of a scattering fire.

Indians losses were between 6 and 8 killed and as many wounded. The Americans had five men killed outright: Privates Patrick Kenney, James Shaw, Caleb Hutchins, Samuel Knap of Hobby’s company, and Corporal Elijah Scribner of Meade’s company. Eleven men were wounded, including three officers: Major Hobby was shot through the thigh, Captain Mead was shot through the shoulder, and Lieutenant Bazaleel Brown (Hobby’s company) was shot in the hand.

The Americans build a breastwork south of the stream. After a while, the British in Fort Saint-Jean open fire with their mortars. According to Montgomery, the men “showed a degree of apprehension that displeased me much” and some flee the breastwork. He therefore orders the men to reembark. After much confusion, his force lands about 1 mile upstream where a second breastwork is constructed. The Americans then settle down for the night.

Operations at Fort Saint-Jean: September 6, 1775 (click to enlarge).

At the new campsite, Schuyler receives an unexpected visitor: retired British officer and local resident Moses Hazen. Hazen provides intelligence to the Americans, and in return, Schuyler promises Hazen that his property will not be stolen or damaged. Hazen claims, perhaps duplicitously, that the British force in the fort is quite strong and that the Canadians will not aid the Americans. This dispiriting news, plus the poor performance of the troops and the lack of cannon, convinces Schuyler to return his force to Isle-aux-Noix the following day (September 7). Three of the wounded men in Mead’s company die during the night (Sergeant John Avery and Privates William McKee and Issac Morehouse), and Lieutenant Benjamin Mills of the 4th Connecticut is wounded by a British shell in the morning [4].

Notes:

1. I haven’t been able to divine the composition of Mott’s Artillery company from the sources I’ve read. A modern-day reenactor unit implies that Mott’s Artillery was made up of Captain Gershom Mott’s company of the 1st New York. However, the journal of Rudolphus Ritzema, which is where the term appears, seems to indicate that Mott’s company remained infantry. Perhaps then Mott’s Artillery consisted of Captain Edward Mott’s company of the 6th Connecticut, which was sent to Schuyler in June, 1775. Another possibility is that this was a unit of Connecticut volunteers commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel Mott, who was chief engineer to Schuyler’s Army. In any event, these men were clearly drawn from the infantry, and Schuyler tried to get them additional pay as compensation for the hazardous duty they agreed to perform.

2. Some time ago, when I had read fewer sources, I imagined that this force might have had Abenaki serving with it. I now consider that possibility doubtful.

3. The term “Petite-Rivière-du-Nord” appears next to this stream on several maps from the mid-to-late 18th Century. However, the term does not appear in any of the journals or correspondence that I have read pertaining to operations against Fort Saint-Jean. The Americans, at least, seemed to have regarded it as just another muddy brook. The term also would prove to be of short endurance; since at least the 19th Century this stream has been known as Rivière Bernier.

4. How the Americans should have come under relatively accurate shell fire at both the upper and lower breastworks is an interesting question. The Americans were far from the fort’s walls and screened from view by intervening woods. A British journal notes in an entry for September 17 that Captain-Lieutenant Edward Williams of the Royal Artillery had some pieces of artillery “fixt so as to serve as a Mortar,” which I think means rigging a cannon barrel to fire shells at a mortar-like trajectory. The diary provides little information on such weapons. Perhaps the shells fired at the American breastworks on the 6th and 7th were fired from such guns.