Mapping Pell's Point

Several weeks ago, one of the folks on RevList, expressed an interest to me in seeing Revolutionary War-era maps of the New York campaign combined with modern satellite imagery. I recently came up with a way to do this using nothing more sophisticated than Microsoft Excel and MS Paint. The results appear below.

The Revolutionary War map used for this comparison is from a circa 1776 Charles Blaskowitz map that shows the movements of the British army from Throg’s Neck, to the roads leading to White Plains. Below is a segment of his map showing the place where the battle of Pell’s Point was fought.

Below are a series of images that show the area today either alone or in combination with part of the Blaskowitz map. The modern maps and the Blaskowitz map don’t align perfectly, but on the whole the comparison shows that the Blaskowitz map was executed skillfully and that it does providea good guide as to the appearance of the area in 1776.

In the part of the Blaskowitz map shown below, the British can be seen landing at Pell's Point on the bottom of the map and marching inland along a road leading north (towards the top). The skirmish site is at upper right.

A note to readers: Most of the people who visit this blog use Microsoft Explorer as their web browser. My recommendation is to use Google Chrome – when you click on one image, it will bring up a slideshow of full-sized versions of all of the images in a given post. It’s a pretty cool effect. Please note, however, that if you have a slow connection, the images in the slideshow may not instantly load.

Below is a copy of the map I used in my first blog post on Pell's Point. This roughly shows where the British and American units were in relation to the modern terrain during the main phase of the fighting. The red lines correspond with roads present at the time of the battle.

Three American units are represented by blue circles. They are: 1 = Joseph Read’s 13th Continental Regiment, 2 = William Shepard’s 3rd Continental Regiment, and 3 = Loammi Baldwin’s 26th Continental Regiment. These units were commanded by Colonel John Glover.

Two British units are represented by white circles with red letters. They are 1 = the British light infantry, and 2 = the British grenadiers. Some British and Hessian units that were in the vicinity at the time are not marked on the map for lack of clear guidance from the source material. For example, the 1st Jager Company and possibly Colonel Carl von Donop’s brigade of Hessian grenadiers were somewhere in the wooded area between #1 and #2 (cf. the accounts by Archibald Robertson and Carl Leopold Baurmeister [list]).

October 26, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 26th: The British raided Mile Square.

Previous entry: October 25th; next: October 27th.

The Americans felt that they had bested the British by reaching White Plains before the British and fortifying the village, but apprehension remained over the looming showdown with the British army.

Colonel Joseph Reed (Washington’s adjutant general) wrote:

“We have taken post here in such a manner, that we hope they will not be able to execute their plan of surrounding us, and cutting off our communication. I can only conjecture that finding themselves baffled in this, they are now advancing to engage us. The business of this campaign, and possibly the next[,] may probably be determined this week.”

Adjutant Samuel Shaw (Knox’s Artillery Regiment) wrote:

“We shall remain at this place till we have a brush with the enemy. They are within three miles of us. Their movements have been such as to occasion us a great deal of trouble, and it is happy for us that they did not effect our ruin... In several skirmishes with the enemy, we have had constantly the better; so that our troops are in good spirits, and impatiently desire an action. Something decisive must soon be done, as cold weather approaches and we want winter-quarters.”

According to Lieutenant Tench Tilghman (aide to George Washington), When Major-General Charles Lee pulled out of Mile Square on the 25th, “he was obliged to leave [behind] eighty or ninety barrels of provisions… for want of wagons.”

A Loyalist informed Hessian Captain Johann von Ewald that the Americans' supplies “could be approached without discovery.”

Ewald was willing to raid this post with his jaegers, but Brigadier-General William Erskine decided a larger force was needed for this operation, and Erskine placed himself at its head. According to Ewald:

“General Erskine arrived at my post with a hundred dragoons from the 17th Regiment and the 1st Battalion of Light Infantry. He ordered me to march with sixty jägers and form the advanced guard, which was to be reinforced with one officer and twenty dragoons.” [see Footnote 1]

At this time, Westchester County, between Kingsbridge and White Plains, was defended by few American troops. Close to Kingsbridge, Colonel John Lasher of New York had 400 men detached from Major-General William Heath’s division (specifically, from two brigades of New York militia and from William Prescott’s 7th Continental Regiment). Lasher’s chief responsibility was to defend Fort Independence near Kingsbridge, but he also had men patrolling the roads to the north and east. It was a weak force, and Lasher lamented that “many of the detachments have not ten rounds a man”.

At Mile Square, Lee had left behind some troops to guard over the supplies that could not be moved. According to Sergeant John Smith (Lippitt’s Regiment), this included “a guard of about 30 men… under the command of Lieutenant [Abraham] Turtelow”.

When the British advanced on Mile Square, they first encountered one of Lasher’s detachments. Ewald described it as “an enemy patrol of riflemen which gave fire and ran back.” He noted that “Several dragoons gave chase, but could not overtake any of them.”

The British expedition continued on until they came to the American depot. The British then swiftly attacked.

Ewald recalled:

“The jägers deployed, supported by the light infantry, with the dragoons following. The enemy guard drew up behind the stone walls which surrounded the plantation and received us with a lively fire. I quickly separated the jägers into four to five parts to surround the enemy and advanced under steady fire from wall to wall. The light infantry likewise divided into three to four parts and attacked the guard with the bayonet. Nearly everyone was struck down and only a few officers and men were taken prisoner.”

Archibald Robertson (Royal Engineers), who was also present, wrote that “the rebels had a guard of 1 captain and 25 men who ran… The dragoons pursued, killed the officer and 2 others and took 16 or 18 prisoners.”

Lieutenant Turtelow of Lippitt’s Regiment escaped “from the light horse” but he reported (in the words of John Smith) that the British “took the stores… and killed the doctor and some of the men belonging to the hospital”. [see Footnote 2]

Afterwards, according to Hessian Major Carl-Leopold Baurmeister, “We dispensed the wine and rum we could not take with us in bottles and destroyed the flour magazine… We also found the two jagers who had been missing since the attack of the 23rd.”

Ewald summarized how the successful raid concluded:

“Several enemy patrols which ran into our outpost withdrew quickly after a few shots. After midnight we withdrew, the light infantry covering the rear, and at daybreak of the 27th we arrived back at the army. I had the honor to receive a compliment from the commanding general.”

Footnote 1. In addition to the above, Baurmesiter stated that Regiment von Rall was also sent on this expedition. Archibald Robertson wrote that “1 Battalion of Hessians” was present, but didn’t name the unit.

Footnote 2. A return for Daniel Hitchcock’s 11th Continental Regiment (Nixon’s brigade, Lee’s division) stated that 8 men were captured at Mile Square on this date. My guess is that these men were either left behind to help guard the baggage, or had been left at the hospital.

October 25, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 25th: The British army advanced towards White Plains; Clinton and Howe grew irresolute; the Americans prepared for battle; New Yorkers celebrated George III.

Previous entry: October 24th; next: October 26th.

In the morning, one of the British vessels on the Hudson came under fire near Dobb’s Ferry. The Americans fired on it with a 12-pounder gun they brought down to the shore under cover of darkness. An officer in New Jersey bragged, “They hulled her eleven times out of fifteen” before the British ship was towed out of range. He added, “Little skirmishes happen almost every day; but they are thought so little of that they seldom are mentioned as news.”

Since October 21st, Major-General Charles Lee’s division had been defending the crossings of the Bronx River while the rest of the American army moved to White Plains. It's mission now virtually complete, Lee's men began to move towards White Plains also.

Sergeant John Smith (Lippitt’s Regiment, Nixon’s brigade) wrote:

“about one o’clock in the morning the major called to us in our tents and ordered us to strike out tents at 4 o’clock in the morning and to cook our provisions… and get in readiness to march by day[light][.] We turned out immediately and cooked our provisions… and ate our breakfasts… and got ready to march[.] About 9 or 10 o’clock we began to load our baggage[.] The officers destroyed their chests not being allowed any wagons to carry them… and about 12 o’clock we began to move forward… We marched about northwest 7 or 8 miles and then east 2 miles[.]… we halted about two miles from the White Plains and posted ourselves as a picquet[.] We were 250 in number[.] It was very cold lodging on the ground without tents and but little fire[.]”

At about 9 A.M. the British army marched towards White Plains in two columns. The right column halted “at the distance of four miles from the White Plains”, according to Howe, on the Mamaroneck Road. The left column halted on the East Chester Road, about 6 miles from White Plains.

The troops in the left column could see part of Major-General Charles Lee’s division, but the two forces remained on opposite sides of the Bronx. According to Archibald Robertson (Royal Engineers) “[we] took a position on the East Chester Road… facing west[,] the Bronx River in our front and the rebels on the heights [on the] other side of the river facing us.”

Situation of the armies on October 25th (click to enlarge). Howe’s forces in Westchester County were divided into three parts. One part, under Henry Clinton, approached White Plains from the direction of Mamaroneck (10). Another part, under Leopold Philip von Heister, approached White Plains from the direction of Eastchester. The third part, under Wilhelm von Knyphausen, remained near New Rochelle. Washington had four divisions at White Plains (11); Charles Lee’s division was at Mile Square (9), and Nathanael Greene’s division was positioned along the Hudson.

This map shows the location of British and American army units between New Rochelle (lower left) and White Plains (upper right). Heister's column encamped on the East Chester Road, near the Bronx River; Clinton's column encamped on the Mamaroneck Road, only 4 miles from White Plains. Lee's division is shown at Mile Square, the position he held in the morning; by nightfall, his brigades were 2 miles from White Plains. North is at upper right.

Charles Blaskowitz made this representation of British units on the road leading from Mamaroneck to White Plains. Text on the map states that this was the position held by the British army on October 21st, but a comparison with the accounts of the campaign by William Howe and others suggests that this was the position occupied by Clinton’s forces on the 25th. Clinton commanded the first and second battalions of light infantry (red triangles at top), the British Reserve (which included three battalions of British grenadiers), a brigade of British regulars, a brigade of Hessian grenadiers, the Brigade of Guards, part of the 16th Light Dragoons, and a company of jaegers (green triangles at right).

The British were now within easy striking distance of Washington’s army, but Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton had become irresolute. He later wrote, “not knowing the ground about White Plains or how the rebels had posted themselves on it, I could not think an immediate attack of their camp there prudent”. He felt that if Howe “had any such intention” as attacking, he should first “reconnoiter in force,” develop a plan of attack, and then engage in an elaborate ruse so as to surprise the Americans at daybreak. He recommended first marching back to New Rochelle, then making a feint towards the town of Rye (to the east of Mamaroneck, on Long Island Sound), and then finally performing a countermarch to White Plains during the night.

Whether these maneuvers would have improved the odds of a successful assault on White Plains was doubtful; whether the marching would have tired the troops was certain. Howe ignored Clinton’s suggestion, but he clearly harbored reservations of his own, for no attack plans were made.

The Americans closely monitored the British advance. Robert Harrison (Washington’s secretary) wrote: “The general officers are now reconnoitering the several passes leading from the enemy, [so] that the most important may be immediately secured.”

Before long, parties of armed men were sent out to watch the British movements and contest the roads to White Plains. Among these was Sergeant James McMichael of the Pennsylvania State Rifle Regiment; he wrote: “One captain, two subalterns, three sergeants with one hundred men, were ordered on a scouting expedition. We left White Plains at 11 P. M. direct for the enemy’s advance sentries.”

At the end of the day, according to British Ensign Henry Stirke, “the pickets” of the two armies were “within musket shot of each other.”

Washington even considered making some kind of preemptive attack. Major-General William Heath recalled that “Eight American regiments were ordered to be ready to march in the approaching night. [Major] General [Israel] Putnam was to command them; and they were intended to make an attack on the enemy’s advance, if it should appear to be practicable.” One of these may have included Sargent’s 16th Continental Regiment (Sargent’s brigade, Sullivan’s division). Private How wrote, “This evening we all marched to East Chester in order to attack the enemy there[,] but the General thought best not to attack them there and we returned to camp in the morning.”

Captain Johann von Ewald (2nd Jaeger Company) was placed in a position to guard the left flank of the British army. He felt vulnerable in this situation and he took every precaution to ensure the security of his men:

“Here I was left alone for the first time with my own theory of partisan warfare, which I had acquired through much reading. I took my post in a large apple orchard surrounded by a wall of fieldstones, behind which, since it lay on a hill, I thought I could defend myself well against an enemy attack. I placed two pickets on two knolls from which we could see far around, and dispatched constant patrols as far as Mile Square.”

In New York City, the British celebrated the anniversary of George III’s accession to the throne. According to the New York Gazette:

“the day was celebrated here with every demonstration of joy. The flag ships hoisted the royal standard; and all the ships in the harbour gave a salute of twenty-one guns each. So noble an appearance, and so grand a salute, was never known in this port before. The two admirals [i.e., Richard Howe and Molyneux Shuldham] gave entertainments, and many loyal toasts were drank upon the occasion.”

October 24, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 24th: The British prepared for another move.

Previous entry: October 23rd; next: October 25th.

At White Plains, the Americans continued to improve their defenses. William Heath’s division was encamped on the left of their position, Joseph Spencer’s division was on the right, and the divisions of John Sullivan and Israel Putnam were in the center. Chaplain Benjamin Trumbull (Spencer’s division) jotted down in his journal: “A very pleasant day and nothing very special seems to be going on.”

For some days after moving his army to Pell’s Point, British Lieutenant-General William Howe was unsure of where the Americans were and what intentions they had; he also had little knowledge about the layout of the Westchester countryside. He gathered information, deliberated with his officers, and took on stores of provisions and reinforcements.

By the end of this date he had the information he needed and his preparations were complete. He was now ready to make his next move. As he later explained it:

“[the Americans had] quitted their position about King’s Bridge with some precipitation, leaving two thousand men for the defense of Fort Washington, extending their force behind the Bronx from Valentine’s Hill [near Mile Square] to White Plains in detached camps, everywhere entrenched. Their left by this means covering an upper communication with Connecticut as well as the road along the North River [i.e., the Hudson], it was judged expedient to move to White Plains and endeavour to bring them to an action.”

At 9 P.M. he ordered “Tents to be struck tomorrow morning at 6 o’clock; the baggage to be loaded, and the army to be ready to march at seven, in two columns by the right.”

The British army would divide into two parts: the right column was given to Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton, and the left column was given to Lieutenant-General Leopold Philip von Heister. Clinton would advance towards White Plains from the direction of Mamaroneck, while von Heister would advance towards White Plains from the direction of East Chester. Screening the columns on their march would be the jaegers, the light dragoons, and a company of the New York Volunteers.

Part of the army remained near the coast to safeguard the provisions.

Wilhelm von Knyphausen’s division (minus Ewald’s jaegers) remained near New Rochelle for the time being, but Howe planned to use this force before long.

October 23, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 23rd: The British sent a reconnaissance in force towards Mile Square.

Previous entry: October 22nd; next: October 24th.

The Hessians of Lieutenant-General Wilhelm von Knyphausen’s newly arrived division were inspected at New Rochelle. George Osborn scoffed that “they are in every respect far inferior to the first [division]”. Actually, the men of Captain Johann von Ewald’s 2nd Jäger Company were found to be excellent troops, and that morning they were called upon to participate in a reconnaissance in force towards Mile Square.

Captain Johann von Ewald recalled, “I was delighted with the message, for there was nothing I dreaded more in the world than a rest camp, and I wished for nothing more than to get to know the enemy.”

Archibald Robertson (Royal Engineers) thought the British sent two or three thousand men on this mission. The two jäger companies were placed at the head of the advance, with Captain Carl August von Wreden’s 1st Jäger on the right of the road, and Ewald’s 2nd Jäger on the left. Ewald turned to his company and “informed each officer and corporal what they were to do during the march and exhorted the jägers to demonstrate their good conduct, since they would get their first test today.”

The jägers then began to fan out and advance, but, according to Ewald, “The area was heavily intersected by woods, hills, and fields enclosed by walls; hence it was impossible to see far around, and I lost sight of most of my company.”

Also on the move this morning was Sergeant John Smith (Lippitt’s Regiment, Nixon’s brigade). He recalled:

“I having not much business to do I went out of the camp with Sergeant Harvey and a lad to take a walk to get If I could something for myself as most of the others had done [in other words, he was looking for plunder]… we went over a hill about 2 miles from our camp and going down the hill I espied a number of Hessians in an orchard getting apples which we took for our own men but… one… on seeing us stepped behind some bushes… to wait [for] our coming [and] gave us some suspicion of their being enemies[.] We turned back and ran up the hill again for we had no arms with us and as soon as we got to the top of the hill we heard a volley of small arms beyond the orchard[.] An affray soon began”.

The affray was started by a much larger party of Americans –200 or so men – that Colonel John Glover described as “a scouting party, principally from my own regiment”.

Ewald recalled:

“We had marched only a few minutes when several shots rang out on our left. As I tried to gain a hill from which I could look around, our left wing suddenly came under fierce fire [from Glover’s men]. With the half of the platoon I had taken with me I rushed toward the sound of the firing, where I found a handful of my jägers engaged with several battalions of Americans. I could not retreat… and I could not advance with my few men, since I caught sight of a camp nearby which must have belonged to the enemy army.”

“I maneuvered as well as I could to cover both my flanks, which had formed into a circle lying an acre’s length apart under heavy fire. I discovered a house on a hill to the right toward which several jägers were crawling. Through their fire I gained some air on the right flank, but on my left I was completely hemmed in.”

Soon Colonel Carl von Donop came to his aid with a battalion of light infantry and two field pieces. Ewald wrote that their “bayonets and grapeshot provided the precious air by which I was saved. I got off with a loss of six dead and eleven wounded, including [Second] Lieutenant [Carl von] Rau, who was shot in the foot, and two taken prisoner.”

The Americans lost 1 man mortally wounded in Baldwin’s Regiment and six or eight others who were less severely wounded [see footnote].

Major-General Charles Lee wrote later with satisfaction:

“Glover, an admirable officer… fairly beat ‘em—a shooting match betwixt the riflers and Hessian chasseurs [jaegers] demonstrated our superiority at this time [when] the parties were equal in numbers, and we won the match”.

The sound of heavy firing brought the British general officers onto the field. Ewald noted that “[Lieutenant] General [Leopold Philip von] Heister, who seemed to be unfriendly, gave me a sharp reprimand. But [Lieutenant] General [William] Howe, who apparently noticed that the Hessian general must have said something unpleasant to me, expressed his satisfaction to me through one of his adjutants.”

The reconnaissance-in-force then continued forward. Ensign Henry Stirke (light infantry company, 10th Foot) saw “small parties” of the Americans “at a great distance, but [they] always retreated as we advanced.”

The British force did not attempt to cross the Bronx, and after several hours they returned to camp, having made no great discoveries.

Sergeant Smith meanwhile had hurried back to Mile Square. He was afraid that:

“I should come under blame for leaving the camps as it was against general orders to cross over the [Bronx] River without a pass from the general[.] The regiment was at their alarm post and I got into camp without being discovered by anybody there[.] About sundown the regiments turned into quarters again[.]”

Footnote: Ewald’s company consisted of approximately 125 men. Various claims were made about Ewald’s losses, These include 2 killed, 2 wounded, 2 missing (Carl Leopold Baurmeister); 4 killed, 3 wounded, 2 missing (historian Edward Lowell, citing a Hessian source); 4 killed, 9 wounded (Archibald Robertson); 6 killed, 11 wounded, 2 captured (Ewald); 9 killed and 2 captured (John Smith); 10 killed, 2 captured (Robert Harrison); 10 killed, 3 captured (Charles Lee); 12 killed, 3 captured (John Glover); 13 killed, 2 captured (Benjamin Trumbull).

William Heath claimed that the Americans had 200 men; Robert Harrison gave the number as 240; he also stated they were some of Edward Hand’s Pennsylvania riflemen. Benjamin Trumbull wrote that one American was mortally wounded (“an Indian fellow”), and six or eight were less severely wounded. Glover also admitted to one mortally wounded man, and said that he was in Baldwin’s Regiment. John Smith heard that “we had a rifleman killed and an Indian wounded in the action”.

October 18, 1776 (Part 1)

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for the morning of October 18th: The British army crossed to Pell’s Point, but were met by Glover’s brigade; Washington’s divisions scrambled to turn back the British advance.

Previous entry: October 17th; next: Afternoon of October 18th.

For a second straight day, the British vanguard marched at 1AM. This time the weather cooperated, and the troops boarded flatboats and crossed from Throg’s Neck to Pell’s Point. As the British ships approached shore, they were fired on by some American sentries [see footnote]. Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton, who commanded the vanguard, recalled, “They… began to fire a few shot. But, as I was certain they could not be in any great force, I ordered the debarkation to proceed”.

The sentries quickly withdrew, and the British began to assemble on the shore. According to Clinton, “The moment the whole avant garde was ashore I… detached Lord Cornwallis with the grenadiers, light infantry, and [jaegers]… to our right”.

Meanwhile, Colonel John Glover was hurrying forward with his brigade of Massachusetts Continentals to contest the British advance. Glover wrote that:

“[The British had] stole a march [of] one and a half miles on us. I marched down to oppose their landing with about seven hundred and fifty men, and three field-pieces, but had not gone more than half the distance before I met their advanced guard, about thirty men; upon which I detached a captain's guard of forty men to meet them, while I could dispose of the main body to advantage.”

Glover’s advanced troops were able to surprise the head of the British column.

Archibald Robertson (Royal Engineers) recalled:

“I was ordered to join the light infantry and grenadiers under Lieutenant General Clinton… I was ordered by the General to the top of a rising ground in front with the advance guard of the light infantry to reconnoitre, but we were immediately fired upon from behind trees and heaps of stones where the rebels lay concealed”.

Ensign Henry Stirke (light infantry company of the 10th Foot, 1st Light Infantry Battalion) was also with the leading troops. He recorded, “we received a very heavy fire, as we marched up a hill, from behind stone walls, pickets etc. by which I had 1 sergeant killed, another, with a private man wounded.”

Glover wrote that the advanced troops “kept the ground till we exchanged five rounds” with the British. Soon, however, they were forced to withdraw. The advanced troops had lost “two men killed and several wounded,” and the British aggressively pressed ahead:

“Their body being much larger than mine… [and] the enemy pushing forward not more than thirty yards distant, I ordered a retreat, which was masterly well done by the captain that commanded the party. The enemy gave a shout and advanced”.

However, as the British light infantry advanced, they ran into Colonel Joseph Read’s 13th Continental Regiment. These men, Glover wrote, were “laying under cover of a stone wall undiscovered till they [the British] came within thirty yards, then rose up and gave them the whole charge [i.e., a volley]; the enemy broke, and retreated for the main body to come up.”

According to Archibald Robertson, “we halted until General Howe came up. The Rebels appeared drawn up in our front behind all the fences and high stone walls.”

One of the clearest indicators of the site of the battle of Pell’s Point is a map prepared by Charles Blaskowitz documenting the movements of the British army in Westchester County. Below is an excerpt of his map (click to enlarge) that shows the British landing on Pell’s Poin.

Note the road network on Pell’s Point: there is a road that goes inland, goes through a marsh, and on the far side of the marsh forms a “V” with one branch going north, and the other brance going east. Blaskowitz indicated that the battle was fought on the road leading to the north.

A comparison with later maps helps make it possible to determine the site of the main phase of the fighting (see especially Part 2). The first row in the image below (click to enlarge) shows a series of maps that illustrate how the road system at Pell’s Point changed over time.

The first map dates to the Revolutionary War. On this map the “V” pattern is quite distinct; the road connecting the V with the shore is also visible, but it is quite short in length. The second map dates to the early 19th Century and the third map dates to the late 19th Century. Both of these maps show the V present in the Blaskowitz map, with a road leading to the shore. These maps show additional roads as well, indicating that the area was becoming more developed. The fourth map is from the 20th-Century, and on this map the V is no longer visible. Instead, the northern branch, on which the battle was fought, was removed to accommodate a golf course. The eastern branch, however, remains. The fifth map is from a modern satellite image. It shows the same road network present in the fourth map. Larger versions of these maps are available are available through the Library of Congress, the David Rumsey Map Collection, Acme Mapper, and Google Maps.

In the second row is a series of close-up views of the area where the road leading north once was. Based on clues in 18th and 19th Century maps, I sketched in the old road network in red. Based on clues in the Blaskowitz map and participant accounts of the battle, I marked the approximate site of the battle with a blue square. Note that Glover’s men were deployed just shy of the crest of a hill. As described above, the battle began when the British were ascending this hill and came under fire from the men in Glover’s advance party. The British were able to seize the high ground, and Glover’s men were deployed somewhat shy of the crest. Glover noted, “The enemy had the advantage of us, being posted on an eminence which commanded the ground we had to march over.” He also referred, in his account of the battle, to “the ground being much in their favour”.

Glover deployed three of his regiments in a staggered manner to meet the British: the lead regiment was on the left of the road, the other two were on the right. Their relative placement (but not absolute position) is indicated in the map below: Blue 1 = Joseph Read’s 13th Continental Regiment, Blue 2 = William Shepard’s 3rd Continental Regiment, Blue 3 = Loammi Baldwin’s 26th Continental Regiment. Red 1 = the route taken by the British light infantry, Red 2 = the route taken by the British grenadiers. The Hessian jaegers (position not marked) likely occupied the woods to the right of the light infantry.

When the British army moved to Pell’s Point, they left behind, at Throg’s Neck, the 2nd and 6th British brigades. These troops made a feint to distract the Americans, by making it appear as if the British army was going to advance overland from Throg’s Neck.

Major-General William Heath scrambled to respond. First he was informed “that the British were opening an embrasure in their work at the end of the causeway [i.e., by Westchester Creek bridge]… [which made it appear that] they intended, under [cover of] a cannonade… to attempt to pass.” Heath instantly ordered a brigade stationed near Valentine’s Hill to hurry towards the bridge. Then, “When the troops had advanced to about half the way… another express met him, informing him that the whole British army were in motion, and seemed to be moving towards the pass at the head of the creek.” Heath ordered the troops to change direction “and march briskly to reinforce the Americans at the pass at the head of the creek.”

General Washington was not deceived by these movements, and he called off Heath’s response. Washington, however, saw a large number of British vessels heading up the East River (a change in wind direction now favored the movement of British ships), and he expressed concern over the possibility that the British might land troops west of Throg’s Neck. Therefore, according to Heath, Washington “ordered him to return immediately, and have his division formed ready for action”.

The other divisions on the New York mainland similarly prepared for a fight. At Mile Square, Major-General Charles Lee positioned his forces (minus Glover’s brigade) to defend the crossings of the Bronx River.

Sergeant John Smith (Lippitt’s Rhode Island State Regiment; Nixon’s brigade) listened to the sound of British cannon fire at Pell’s Point, while his troops moved into position:

“we heard a heard a heavy firing of cannon after breakfast[.] We were ordered to parade ourselves under arms and marched over to General Lee’s quarters who ordered our regiment to take post on a hill… to prevent the enemy’s crossing the land from east to west”.

To further protect these key crossings, George Washington sent Major-General Joseph Spencer’s division to nearby Valentine’s Hill.

This map shows the distribution of Washington’s army units in Westchester County on October 18, 1776 (click to enlarge). The placement of the units on this map is inexact. North is up at the upper-right corner of the map. A part of the Hudson is at the top of the map, and a part of Long Island Sound is at the bottom.

While Howe’s army landed at Pell’s Point, the 2nd and 6th British brigades conducted a feint on Throg’s Neck. (The 2nd brigade is shown near the head of Westchester Creek; the 6th brigade was in an off-map location near the bridge at extreme lower left). The divisions of William Heath and John Sullivan watched over the British on Throg’s Neck and defended the shoreline between Throg’s Neck and Manhattan (off map, at left). The crossings of the Bronx River are marked by the numbers 1-4. One part of Charles Lee’s division guarded these crossings, while another (John Glover’s brigade) contested the British advance from Pell’s Point. During the day, Joseph Spencer’s division marched from Kingsbridge (upper left) to Valentine’s Hill (upper right).

Footnote: The sentries were probably a detachment of militia. Militia units from Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Hampshire were placed in various locations along the shore of Long Island Sound and Hudson’s River to watch the movements of the British navy, safeguard caches of supplies, and keep key points out of the hands of the Loyalists. The detachments were not expected to stop a major drive by the British army. New York militiaman Benjamin Bogardus later wrote, “The orders came from [Major] General [Charles] Lee, for all the guard along the shore to draw back and let them [the British] land”.

October 13, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776.Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 13th: The Americans brought reinforcements into Westchester County; the British prepared for their next move.

Previous entry: October 12th; next: October 14th.

Major-General William Heath commanded the American troops in lower Westchester County. He observed that at Throg’s Neck “a large number of vessels, ships, brigs, schooners, sloops… etc.” were at anchor offshore. During the night of October 12-13, “[their] lanthorns were lighted and hung out at their yard arms which made a very extraordinary appearance.”

The Americans suspected the landing on Throg’s Neck was only a feint, and they thought the British might make a new landing elsewhere. Sure enough, the British showed no signs of attempting to force their way overland from Throg’s Neck. Instead, there was only scattered firing between the armies. According to Heath, “Captain Bryant [of Knox’s Artillery Regiment], now and then… saluted the British with a field-piece.”

To prepare against the various possible British moves, the Americans poured reinforcements into Westchester County. Alexander McDougall’s marched into Westchester County from Manhattan, and the brigades of John Glover and John Nixon were sent across the Hudson from New Jersey to Kingsbridge.

Screenshot of a Google Maps satellite view of Throg’s Neck (click to enlarge). The marked sites of the British landing and of Westchester Creek bridge are based on the Charles Blaskowitz map, shown partially below.

Excerpt of a Charles Blaskowitz showing the position of British and American forces on either side of Westchester Creek (click to enlarge). The American positions at the bridge (lower left) and at the head of the creek (upper left) were defended by troops from Colonel Edward Hand’s Pennsylvania brigade, Colonel William Prescott’s 7th Continental Regiment, Colonel Morris Graham’s New York militia regiment, and a couple of pieces of artillery. These troops (among others) were commanded by Major-General William Heath. Only part of the British army is visible. Blaskowitz depicted close to the bridge some companies of British light infantry (the red triangles), the 1st Jäger Company (two green triangles), and a detachment of light dragoons (the red and white square). Near the head of the creek is the 2nd British brigade (5th, 28th, 35th, 49th regiments of foot). The rest of the British army was encamped to the east or southeast.

The Throg’s Neck area is today heavily urbanized. The image below (screenshot using Google Maps) shows that the humble Westchester Creek Bridge has given way to several major traffic arteries.

British Commissary Charles Stedman later criticized Lieutenant-General William Howe for not immediately making another move. He called the landing on Throg’s Neck a “mistake” and said that it “should have been remedied instantly, by pushing along some other route”. The British landing craft were on hand, and the troops were already carrying provisions for this day and the next, but no move was made. Howe explained later that another move “would have been an imprudent measure, as it could not have been executed without much unnecessary risk.” Instead, Howe decided to wait until he was more fully prepared. During this time, he later wrote, “we were employed in getting up stores and provisions” and “the carriages and horses for transporting provisions, artillery, ammunition, and baggage.” More men were on the way as well.

October 10, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 10th: Gunning Bedford described life in the American army; the Americans feared the British would seize key points on the Hudson; William Howe prepared for the move to Throg’s Point.

Previous entry: October 9th; next: October 11th.

The passage of the British ships up the Hudson on the 9th alarmed the American army. Once it became clear that no major movement was afoot, the officers and men returned to their usual routine. Lieutenant-Colonel Gunning Bedford (the Delaware Regiment) described the situation of the army on this date:

“We are strengthening our [defensive] lines,--the enemy are also busy with theirs. Our duty continues hard, having the lines to man every morning before day, and they are a mile and a half from here, and [we have] a great deal of other duty… many of our men have deserted to the enemy, though none from our regiment... [British] deserters say the enemy are apprehensive of an attack from us. They all, likewise, say they are healthy, and their army strong,--above thirty thousand… Our army is very sickly yet. We have one hundred and forty of our regiment unfit for duty. We have neither hospitals nor medicines for them, which makes them suffer much… Our army seems in good spirits, and we think our lines are secure, if they should be attempted.”

Although the British vessels on the Hudson posed no immediate threat to the American army, their presence was suggestive of Britain’s longer-term plans. Writing from the town of Fishkill, the New York Committee of Safety described to George Washington their fears that British vessels, acting in conjunction with local Loyalists, would take control of key points on the river:

“Nothing can be more alarming than the present situation of our state; we are daily getting the most authentic intelligence of bodies of men [i.e., Loyalists] enlisted and armed in order to assist the enemy[.] We much fear that they[,] cooperating with the enemy may seize such passes as will cut off all communication, between the army and us and prevent your supplies.”

This map (click to enlarge) shows the lower Hudson River, which was a primary route for the flow of men and materials to and from Washington’s army. On October 9th, a handful of British vessels successfully passed Fort Washington (4) and Fort Constitution (5) and took post in a wide stretch of the Hudson’s River near Dobb’s Ferry (7) and Tarrytown (8). The Americans had previously begun construction on Fort Montgomery (10) to defend one vital chokepoint on the river, but other points seemed vulnerable, such as Stony Point (9) and West Point (11).

The painting is Dominic Serres’ depiction of the frigates Phoenix, Roebuck, and Tartar passing, on October 9th, between the American batteries in and around Fort Constitution (left) and Fort Washington (right).

The Americans were well aware that their supply lines extending north and east of Manhattan were also vulnerable. Although they had no forts to control the shoreline (like they did on the Hudson), the Americans were at least aided by geography: British vessels moving troops into Long Island Sound would have to pass through a treacherous passageway known as Hell Gate.

Colonel George Weedon (3rd Virginia Regiment) wrote with amazement that the British kept a vessel anchored in this passage: “at this time a 28 gun frigate lays in Hellgate, a place not much wider than the streets of Williamsburg, [Virginia]”

Lieutenant-General William Howe had in fact decided to move his entire army through this passage and land on Throg’s Point (cf. October 8, 1776). At this time he was attending to the details of this operation. In brief, the British occupied several posts in the New York City area: the lower half of Manhattan, western Long Island, Staten Island, Paulus Hook on the New Jersey shore, and a couple of islands in New York’s East River. Howe decided to largely strip these posts of troops, although on Manhattan Lieutenant-General Hugh Percy would be left with three brigades of British troops and one of Hessians.

Howe’s force would consist, at first, of the 1st, 2nd, and 6th brigades of British regulars, the British Reserve (three battalions of British grenadiers, and the 33rd and 42nd regiments), the brigade of Guards, one brigade of Hessian grenadiers, one brigade of Hessian musketeers and fusiliers, three battalions of light infantry, two battalions of the 71st Foot, some light dragoons, the Hessian jaegers, and a couple of recently formed Loyalist corps.

Howe expected to receive substantial reinforcements while the campaign was underway, including an entire division of Hessian troops that was then crossing the Atlantic. In addition, Percy would be able to release some of his men to Howe if and when Washington pulled back from Manhattan.

The exact timing of these decisions was unrecorded, but by this time the British were nearly ready for the offensive to begin. On this date the army was issued 6 days’ worth of provisions (a sure sign that a move was imminent) and they were ordered to “dress” these provisions on the 11th.

Guilford Courthouse in Miniature (9)

This is the eighth in a series of posts depicting the battle of Guilford Courthouse in miniature. Previous posts: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6, Part 7, Part 8.

At the beginning of the battle, Lieutenant-Colonel James Webster commanded the left half of the British line (the 23rd and 33rd regiments, aided by part of the British Guards and a company of jaegers). With these men, he overcome part of the North Carolinians defending the rail fence (Part 4), and got into a nasty fight with William Washington’s flank corps in the woods (Part 5). During these actions, Webster gravitated to wherever the action was hottest. He boldly led the 23rd Foot through the open fields in front of the North Carolinians on the first line, and then joined the 33rd Foot after its flank was threatened by Washington. [1]

Webster’s men fought with skill and courage, and eventually they pushed through the woods to the Americans’ third and final line. Probably their advance was facilitated by the early and almost total collapse of the second line troops nearest them (i.e., Randolph’s and Holcombe’s regiments of Lawson’s brigade, see Part 6).

In any case, Webster reached the third line before the rest of the British army. Many of the Continentals on the third line were placed on a wooded hillside and hidden from view; Webster, however, could see that part of the line which abutted an old field to his front. He ordered an attack.

According to Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Lee:

Webster… sought with zeal the continental line; and presently approached its right wing. Here was posted the first regiment of Maryland… The enemy rushed into close fire; but so firmly was he received by this body of veterans, supported by Hawe's regiment of Virginia [i.e., the 2nd Virginia] and Kirkwood's company of Delawares… that with equal rapidity he was compelled to recoil from the shock. [2]

A soldier with the 2nd Virginia vividly recalled that the Continentals were positioned “along behind a fence near a creek”, and that “when the British marched up towards us we fired upon them and there was a dreadful slaughter indeed… he could have walked for one hundred yards upon dead men and not have touched the ground.” [3]

According to Lee, Webster fell back across “a ravine in his rear,” “occupied an advantageous height,” and waited “for the approach of the rest of the line.”

Then, the men in Washington’s flank corps tried to exploit this reverse. Sergeant-Major William Seymour of the Delaware regiment wrote, “Washington’s Light Infantry… pursued them up a very steep hill, almost inaccessible”. The British “lay concealed in ambush,” and when the Americans approached they “[rose] up, and [poured] in a very heavy fire” by which the Americans “suffered very much” and “were obliged to retreat”. [4]

Webster's men (at center) approach the 3rd line (here and below, click to enlarge). The blue-coated Continentals are, from left-to-right, the 1st Maryland Regiment, the 2nd Virginia Regiment, and the 1st Virginia Regiment (cf. the third line at Guilford Courthouse). Some of the Virginia militia can be seen retreating from the second third line or rallying behind the Continentals.

The 33rd Foot is staggered by a volley.

“Washington’s light infantry” pursue Webster's men.

Notes:

William Seymour served in Captain Robert Kirkwood’s company of the 1st Delaware Regiment and kept a journal during the southern campaign of the Revolutionary War. At Cowpens, Kirkwood’s company participated in a sudden American counterattack that broke apart the British and turned the battle into a major American victory. Something similar appears to have been attempted on this occasion. The British had fought their way through the militia, only to be bloodily repulsed by the Continentals. The Americans then made a bold counterattack. However, the counterattack at Cowpens is famous, while this counterattack at Guilford Courthouse has been almost wholly forgotten (presumably because the former succeeded while the latter did not). At Cowpens, the American counterattack was made by all of the Continentals and across a short expanse of fairly level ground. At Guilford Courthouse, only “Washington’s Light Infantry” are credited with the counterattack, and the movement was made across a wider and more difficult expanse of ground.

Washington’s Continental light infantry included Kirkwood's Delaware light infantry company, and Captain Phillip Huffman's Virginia light infantry company [cf. Babits & Howard (2009) Long, obstinate, and bloody: The battle of Guilford Courthouse]. Possibly some or all of Colonel Charles Lynch’s Virginia riflemen, who also served in Washington’s flank corps, participated in this counterattack.

1. See the accounts by Charles Cornwallis, Charles Stedman, and Roger Lamb in this compendium of sources.

2. Henry Lee (1812). Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States.

3. Pension application of Henry Ingle.

4. William Seymour (1896). A journal of the southern expedition: 1780-1783. Papers of the Historical Society of Delaware, 15, 3-42.

Guilford Courthouse in Miniature (6)

This is the sixth in a series of posts depicting the battle of Guilford Courthouse in miniature. Previous posts: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5.

Brigadier-General Robert Lawson commanded the right wing of Virginia militia on the American second line. Lawson’s brigade consisted of three regiments commanded by (from his left to his right), Robert Mumford, John Holcombe, and Beverley Randolph. [1]

During the opening cannonade of the battle, British round shot came bounding through the woods and into their position. According to Lawson’s brigade-major, St. George Tucker:

“Major Hubbard, of Col. Mumford’s regiment, had the skirt of his surtout shot away by a cannon ball, and his horse slightly wounded by the same. There were not, however, above ten men killed and wounded during the whole cannonade…” [2]

Lawson decided against waiting passively for the redcoats to reach his front. Instead, according to Tucker, “When the cannonade ceased, orders were given for Holcombe’s regiment and the regiment on the right of him [Randolph's] to advance and annoy the enemy’s left flank.”

This was the kind of bold gamble that potentially could win or lose a battle. The British left flank was vulnerable (see Part 5), but Lawson’s decision undermined the planned defense-in-depth.

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John Holcombe’s and Beverley Randolph’s regiments advance through the woods and encounter North Carolinians retreating from the first line.

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While the Virginians trudged through the woods, the British infantry broke the North Carolina line (Part 4). The rapidity of the British advance prevented Lawson’s men from acting as planned. Instead, the Virginians found their own flank imperiled when some British troops – probably from the brigade of Guards – moved into the area between Mumford’s right and Holcombe’s left. This unexpected advance unnerved the Virginians. According to Tucker:

While we were advancing to execute this order [i.e., to harass the British left], the British had advanced, and, having turned the flank of Col. Mumford’s regiment… we discovered them in our rear. This threw the militia into such confusion, that, without attending in the least to their officers who endeavored to halt them, and make them face about and engage the enemy, Holcombe’s regiment and ours instantly broke off without firing a single gun, and dispersed like a flock of sheep frightened by dogs. [2]

A chasm had suddenly opened in the Americans’ second defensive line. Fortunately for the Americans, Tucker was equal to the occasion. He wrote:

With infinite labor Beverley and myself rallied about sixty or seventy of our men, and brought them to the charge. Holcombe was not so successful. He could not rally a man… With the few men which we had collected we at several times sustained an irregular kind of skirmishing with the British, and were once successful enough to drive a party for a very small distance. [2]

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Fighting on the Second Line. At left, the 33rd Foot, supported by Hessian Jaegers and the Guards light infantry (the latter not shown) battles William Washington’s flank corps. Meanwhile, other elements of the Guards brigade (upper right) and the 23rd Foot (lower right) battle parts of Lawson’s brigade.

Another view of the above. Mumford’s regiment is at left. Most of the remainder of Lawson’s brigade is fleeing, although St. George Tucker and others skirmish with the 23rd Foot in the woods.

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Sergeant Roger Lamb of the 23rd Foot (Royal Welch Fusiliers) was one who got caught up in the “irregular kind of skirmishing” with Lawson’s men. He wrote, “Here the conflict became still more fierce.” When the Virginians finally gave way, he spotted a fleeing American officer. He wrote:

“I immediately darted after him, but he perceiving my intention to capture him, fled with the utmost speed. I pursued and was gaining on him, when, hearing a confused noise on my left, I observed several bodies of Americans drawn up within the distance of a few yards.” [3]

Were these more of Tucker’s men? Or had Lamb reached Mumford’s position? In any event, he was now in grave danger:

Whoever has been in an engagement well knows that, in such moments all fears of death are over. Seeing one of the guards among the slain, where I stood, I stopped and replenished my own pouch with the cartridges that remained in his; during the time I was thus employed, several shots were fired at me; but not one took effect. [3]

Lamb was relieved when a company of the guards appeared and attacked the parties of Americans. He watched with admiration as British troops “with calm intrepidity [attacked] superior numbers,” and he noted that “this instance was not peculiar; it frequently occurred in the British army, during the American war.”

In this manner, the Guards and Fusiliers dislodged the last of Lawson’s men.

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Yet another view of the above. In the foreground is the cavalry component of William Washington’s flank corps – chiefly troopers of the 1st and 3rd Continental Light Dragoons. In the middle ground, most of Lawson’s men stream out of action. In the distance, a great blaze of smoke arises from where other Virginia militiamen battle British Guards and Fraser’s Highlanders (more on this next time).

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Notes:

I noted at the outset of this series that I would be presenting a fairly conventional account of the battle of Guilford Courthouse. The present post is something of an exception. The advance made by part of Lawson's brigade has been omitted from virtually every account of the battle (Babits' and Howard's recent history being a notable exception). My feeling is that the major source on this advance -- a letter by St. George Tucker to his wife, written shortly after the battle --provides a clear and believable description of this movement.

1. Letters of St. George Tucker to his wife (from the Magazine of American History); Lawrence E. Babits & Joshua B. Howard (2009) Long, obstinate, and bloody: The battle of Guilford Courthouse. Henry Skipwith led Mumford's regiment on the day of the battle.

2. Tucker, ibid.

3. A copy of Lamb's account (among others) can be found in this compendium.