Hanging Rock (and other) Maps

One of the topics I've enjoyed reading and writing about is Thomas Sumter's 1780 campaign against British forces occupying South Carolina.

When I started researching Sumter's August 6, 1780, battle at Hanging Rock, South Carolina, I quickly noticed that the place that has been officially designated as the Hanging Rock battlefield (some hills on the western bank of Hanging Rock Creek, opposite the eponymous rock formation) was unlikely to have been the actual site of the battle to judge from statements in the source material (as explained here and here). I took this as carte blanche to determine where, in this area, the actual fighting took place. Eventually, I concluded that the battle most likely took place over a stretch of ground ranging from a plateau south of Hanging Rock Creek to a hill the northeast (as explained here).

I didn't regard this attribution as definitive because I didn't have access to all sources of information (noted here). And indeed, this year I've come across electronic copies of three old maps of the Hanging Rock battlefield that I wish I had earlier.

One map is attributed to Richard Winn, who was a participant in the battle of Hanging Rock. It can be found here.

The other two appear are in the Draper map collection, and were rendered in the late 19th Century (based, I believe, on local lore). They can be found here and here. (On the first link, north is at right; on the second, north is at top;

The maps partially confirm, and partially disconfirm, my interpretation of the Hanging Rock battlefield site.

All three maps appear to show that I was right about the placement of the main British camp on a plateau south of the creek.

All three maps appear to show that I was wrong about the hill on which British Loyalists were encamped. I concluded the hill was northeast of the main camp; these maps show the Loyalists on a hill northwest of the main camp.

I use the term "appear" because it's unclear how much confidence should be placed in these maps. The Draper maps are of a very late date, and the Winn map is wrong in at least one respect: it appears to show Hanging Rock Creek flowing west into the Catawba River, when it actually flows east into the Lynche's Creek.

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This map is from one of last year's posts on Hanging Rock. The three red squares show places that I suspected to be part of the British encampment. #1 is Hanging Rock, #2 approximately corresponds with the Loyalist camp according to the Winn and Draper maps, #3 and #4 is a flat plateau bisected by the Camden Road; the Draper maps show the main British camp in this area.

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The online Winn and Draper maps also provide insight into two of Sumter's later engagements. See the links listed below.

Battle of Fishdam Ford (November 9, 1780)

• Winn
• Draper

Battle of Blackstock's Plantation (November 20, 1780)

• Winn
• Draper (1)
• Draper (2)

For more on the Draper Manuscripts, see here and here

Looking for More Information on Hanging Rock

Last year I spent a considerable amount of time reading and writing about the battle of Hanging Rock, South Carolina, and turned that into an original, and rather detailed, account posted to this blog.

Recently, however, I came across a new piece of information that has led me to rethink some of my conclusions -- a map that is believed to have been made by Colonel Richard Winn, one of the American commanders at that battle.

The direct link to the map is here. It is one of several Winn maps hosted on John Robertson's Online Library of the Southern Campaign of the Revolutionary War website.

On the map, Hanging Rock is at center right. The map identifies the "Tory encampment under Col Brian," the "old field British encampment," and a "Steep Hill"

A map like this should make it easier to understand where and how the battle was fought, but unfortunately I find this map difficult to reconcile with some of the other statements in the source material and with the modern landscape. For example, the map makes it appear that the battle was not fought along Hanging Rock Creek (as has been supposed by myself and others) but along another creek that flowed south and west into the Catawba River. I'm willing to revise my conclusions (including a draft article I prepared), but it seems to me that other information is needed to help make sense of this map. Folks that are familiar with the area -- especially archaeological work that has been performed -- are encouraged to contact me about what they know, or to point me towards persons or sources that may be helpful. Emails can be addressed to me (Adam) at mini_awi "at" yahoo "dot" com.

Joseph Graham Describes Ramsour’s Mill (1)

Graham’s Description of the Battlefield

Joseph Graham began his account of the battle of Ramsour’s Mill by describing the disposition of the Loyalist militia (or “Tories”). He wrote:

“The Tories were encamped on a hill, three hundred yards east of Ramsour's Mill, and half a mile north of the present flourishing village of Lincolnton. The ridge stretches nearly to the east on the south side of the mill-pond and the road leading from the Tuckasege Ford by the mill, crosses the point of the ridge in a northwestern direction. The Tories occupied an excellent position on the summit of the ridge; their right on the road fronting to the south. The ridge has a very gentle slope, and was then interspersed with only a few trees, and the fire of the Tories had full rake in front for more than two hundred yards. The foot of the ridge was bounded by a glade, the side of which was covered with bushes. The road passed the western end of the glade at right angles, opposite the centre of the line, and on this road a fence extended from the glade to a point opposite the right of the line. The picket guard, twelve in number, were stationed on the road, two hundred and fifty yards south of the glade, and six hundred yards from the encampment.”

Terrain Features at Ramsour's Mill According to Joseph Graham (click to enlarge).

The miniature battlefield I created was based on the Reep/Reinhardt map, but Graham’s description mostly works with it, as shown above. Each of the terrain features mentioned by Graham are labeled, and there are, as he indicated, 300 scale-yards between the mill and the Tory line, 200 scale-yards of open space in front of the Tory Line, and 600 scale-yards between the Tories and their picket guard and 250 scale-yards between the southern end of the glade and the picket guard.

The Tory encampment is not shown in the image above (I imagine this would have included many brush huts, a number of wagons, and a few tents). Also, to facilitate view of the miniatures, I’ve included fewer trees and less undergrowth than historically would have been present.

There are two minor discrepancies between Graham’s description and the Reep/Reinhardt map. Graham mentioned a fence bordering on the right of the Tories; the Reep/Reinhardt map does not show this. The Reep/Reinhardt map shows a line of felled trees on the edge of the glade; Graham did not mention this. I included both the fence and the line of felled trees on the miniature battlefield.

Support From Others

Added evidence in favor of the above account can be found in the observations made by two of Graham’s contemporaries: Richard Winn and William Davie. Like Graham, these officers were with Griffith Rutherford’s force, which arrived after the fighting had ended (cf. Joseph Graham's timeline).

Winn commented that there were 1,000 Tories at the battle, that on the right of their position there was an open plantation with a high fence, that on the left there was a steep hill full of trees, and that in the rear there was a river and mills. Davie commented that there were 1,100 Tories, that there were formed on a high ridge with oaks, that on their right flank there was a fence, and that in their rear there was a mill pond.

How Many Loyalists?

Graham claimed that there were "nearly" 1,300 Loyalists at Ramsour’s Mill, but he did not claim that all of these men took place in the fighting. Graham indicated that ¼ of the Loyalists were without arms and that they fled to the mill before the battle was joined; he also indicated that some men with arms also did not fight, either because they also fled before the battle was joined, or because they were away from the Loyalist encampment at the beginning of the battle [see footnote]. These deductions leave the Loyalists with perhaps 950 men.

If one applies the deductions suggested by Graham's account to Davie’s total of 1,100 men, or Winn’s total of 1,000 men, then it’s possible to come up with an even smaller total. Alternatively, one might suspect that the Americans overstated enemy strength, as commonly occurred (by both sides) throughout the war, allowing one to reasonably propose an even smaller total.

In any event, a total considerably less than 1,000 seems warranted by the dimensions of the battlefield. The approximate location of each flank of the Loyalists' battle line is known from incidents described by Joseph Graham and others. Again, relying on a modern analysis of the Reep/Reinhardt map, it appears that the Loyalist line was around 800 feet in length (give or take a couple hundred feet). If the Loyalists were deployed in 2 ranks in close order, then only about 600 men could have fit in this space. If the Loyalists were deployed in 2 ranks in open order (as seems more likely), then fewer than 500 men could have fit in this space.

For the miniature representation of the battle, I ended up using a battle line consisting of 500 Loyalists (or more precisely, 25 figures using a 1:20 ratio). That total is shown below.

The "Tory" Battle Line at Ramsour's Mill (click to enlarge).

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For Joseph Graham's account, see William A. Graham (1904). General Joseph Graham and His Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary History. Below are statements by Graham that shed light on the number of Loyalists that participated in the fighting.

"By the 20th nearly thirteen hundred men had assembled at Ramsour's, one-fourth of whom were without arms."

...

"As soon as the action began those of the Tories who had no arms and several who had, retreated across the creek.

"These were joined by others when they were first beaten back up the ridge, and by the two hundred that were well armed, who had arrived two days before from Lower Creek, in Burke County, under Captains Whitson and Murray. Colonel Moore and Major Welsh soon joined them, and those of the Tories who continued to fight to the last crossed the creek and joined them as soon as the Whigs got possession of the ridge."

...

"[Whig] Captain M'Kissick was wounded early in the action, being shot through the top of the shoulder; and finding himself disabled, went from the battleground about 80 poles to the west. About the the time the firing ceased he met ten of the Tories coming from a neighboring farm, where they had been until the sound of the firing started them."

Sumter’s Brigade Reforms

Sumter’s brigade was broken by the battle of Fishing Creek (August 18, 1780). According to one participant, "the troops dispersed in every direction each taking care of himself." Sumter, on horseback, headed north. On August 19, he reached William Bratton’s house, near Williamson’s Plantation. From there, a handful of men saw him safely across the North Carolina border. He rode alone into Charlotte on August 20 [1].

Fishing Creek and Camden returned British control over northern South Carolina to the same state that it had been in June, before Sumter took the field. So unsafe was it in this area that "orders were then given out that there should be no assembling of companies even of a few men." However, Sumter's defeat also did not end the broader resistance to the British occupation of South Carolina. During Sumter’s campaign, South Carolina partisans organized in the western part of the state under James Williams and in the eastern part of the state under Francis Marion [2].

In North Carolina, now exposed to British invasion, a debate began over whether the conflict should be continued. Joseph Graham recalled that "several aged and respectable citizens insinuated that further resistance would… only produce more certain destruction to themselves and [their] families… But this was indignantly repelled by a great majority, and especially those who had been in action at Hanging Rock. Several of them stated that they then had seen the British soldiers run like sheep, and many of them bite the dust; that they were by no means invincible; that under suitable commanders and proper arrangements, they would at any time risk a conflict with them, man to man" [3].

Although Sumter bore ultimate responsibility for the debacle at Fishing Creek, he does not seem to have lost the esteem of those that had fought under him. It seems to have been generally understood that the defeat stemmed largely from some rather exceptional circumstances. According to Colonel Richard Winn (at the time recuperating from the wound he received at Hanging Rock), the most important factor was "the inattention of his patrols and rear guard Commanded by Major Crofford." Tarleton agreed: Although Sumter "had sent patrols to examine the road... fortunately for the British, they had not proceeded far enough to discover their approach." Indeed, the two Loyalist women that told Tarleton how to gain Sumter’s flank met the British commander just ½ mile in front of the American rear guard [4].

As Summer turned to Fall, Sumter's brigade reformed and returned to the field. Among the returnees was John Murphey, who had lived in the neighborhood of Fishing Creek, and was captured at the battle there. In early September he was released from the Camden jail upon making the following pledge:

"I John Murphy of Fishing Creek acknowledge myself a prisoner on parole to a detachment of his Majesty's troops under the command of the right Honorable Lieutenant General Earl of Cornwallis and I do promise that I will not act directly or indirectly against his Majesty's Government nor stir up others so to do, that I will not speak or say anything that shall be prejudicial to his Majesty's interest and will confine myself to my own plantation not exceeding one mile from thence until further enlarged."

However, Sumter "persuaded him that no good man and patriot would be bound by such a promise," upon which Murphey "tore up his parole and joined General Sumter" [5].

Notes:

1. The pension application of Samuel Watson, transcribed by Susan K. Zimmerman and R. Neil Vance. The pension application of George McLain, transcribed by Will Graves. The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract].

2. The pension application of Zachary Kitchens, transcribed by C. Leon Harris. John Buchanan. (1997). The Road to Guilford Courthouse: The American Revolution in the Carolinas.

3. William A. Graham (1904). General Joseph Graham and His Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary History.

4. General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780, transcribed by Will Graves. "Major Crofford" is very probably Major Robert Crawford of South Carolina. Banastre Tarleton. (1787). A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781. James Hodge Saye. Memoirs of Major Joseph McJunkin, Revolutionary Patriot.

5. The pension application of John Murphey, transcribed by Will Graves.

Battle of Hanging Rock 10

Part 10: The British Flank Attack

Previous: Battle for the Center Camp

Next: Rousselet's Gallant Stand

Around the time the battle opened, a detachment of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment (PoWAR) was dispatched northward towards the sound of battle. This contingent seemingly reached the center camp while the fighting was still raging at Bryan's encampment. At the time, the British commander at Hanging Rock, Major John Carden, would not have known that Bryan's men had been completely routed or that McCulloch’s company was in the process of being destroyed. He therefore sent this detachment to Bryan's support, while keeping the remainder of the Provincials in a defensive posture [1].

At about the time the men of the PoWAR advanced towards Bryan's camp and "passed into a wood between the Tory and centre encampments" [2], the Americans began their assault on the center camp. Hearing the resulting gunfire, the PoWAR "drew up unperceived" into a line of battle, "and poured in a heavy fire on the militia." The Americans had quickly succeeded in taking the center camp, and at this moment "were forming from the disorder of the pursuit" [3]. Receiving this attack was a band of 30 militiamen [4]. By this "bold and skillful [British] manoeuvre," [5] these soldiers were "separated from the main [American] body" still near Bryan's camp [6]. One Samuel Saxon, a company commander, recalled that they turned about and "rushed upon the [British] line and broke our way [through,] losing in killed and missing 15 men" [7].

The Prince of Wales' American Regiment's Flank Attack (click to enlarge). Saxon's company and others attempt to retreat through the attacking PoWAR. Hanging Rock Creek is at far left. The green patch in the middle distance designates the ravine separating Bryan's camp from the British center camp.

The PoWAR detachment pursued these men towards Bryan's camp, and "nearly changed the fate of the day" [8]. At that moment, however, numbers of Americans led by Thomas Sumter and Robert Irwin were heading towards the center camp, and the attacking British. The Americans were in what appeared to be "an old field," [9] when Sumter saw that the British had "found means to turn my right flank" [10]. "The British advanced in good order" [11] through what appeared to be "a swamp," [12], or "a marsh" [13], while the Americans "halted and awaited their approach." Saxon stopped fleeing once he reached this group and "turned about, and took part in the battle which ensued" [14].

According to one participant:

"The contest was severe and of doubtful issue for some considerable time at length the American troops retreated and occupied a more favorable situation, where undergrowth and brush protected them much from the musketry of the enemy" [15].

Richard Winn, who was at the center camp, recalled that "On hearing a severe firing to my right I ordered my men to repair to the place." They joined the action "as quick as possible," and came upon "the back of the British" who were "in action" with "a party of our men." Winn gave the order to "commence firing as usual," which caught "the British between two fires." Their line soon "gave way," [16] and the Redcoats "took instinctively to the trees and bush heaps," to defend themselves [17].

The Prince of Wales' American Regiment Under Attack (click to enlarge).

Soon "there was not a British officer standing, and many of the regiment had fallen," but still they "returned the fire with deadly effect." [18] Robert Irwin "had his clothes perforated with four separate balls," but "escaped unhurt" [19]. Richard Winn was not so lucky; he received "a most dangerous wound" [20].

At last, 22 men, all the rank and file that were left unhurt, "threw down their arms" "on being offered quarters" [21]. Robert Irwin, who had particularly distinguished himself during the fighting [22] approached an obstinate sergeant major and "wrenched the bayonet" from his hands. Then he too surrendered. [23]

Capitulation (click to enlarge).

The British Flank Attack. A detachment of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment is beset by American militia near Bryan's camp. Meanwhile, the British Legion infantry rally near the center camp.

Notes:

1. That it was a detachment of the regiment that was sent north, and not the whole regiment, was discussed previously, see Note 1 in this post. The timing of these events is not discussed in participant accounts, but this is the most parsimonious explanation. Several American participants, including Thomas Sumter, asserted that this detachment was sent to Bryan's relief. For Sumter's account, see the letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780.

2. William Davie's account; see The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Davie's account also appears in, John H. Wheeler. (1851). Historical Sketches of North Carolina from 1584 to 1851, Vol. 1.

3. Davie, ibid.

4. The pension application of Samuel Saxon, transcribed by Will Graves.

5. Davie, ibid.

6. Saxon, ibid.

7. Saxon, ibid.

8. Davie, ibid.

9. The pension application of John L. Davies, transcribed by Will Graves. Sumter, ibid., places this event near Bryan's camp.

10. Sumter, ibid.

11. Davies, ibid.

12. Sumter, ibid.

13. Saxon, ibid.

14. Saxon, ibid.

15. Davies, ibid.

16. Richard Winn; see General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780, transcribed by Will Graves. (See here for images of the original document).

17. Davie, ibid.

18. Davie, ibid.

19. Joseph Graham; see William A. Graham (1904). General Joseph Graham and His Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary History.

20. Winn, ibid.

21. Davie, ibid. for the quote; Sumter, ibid., and George Cunningham are the source of the number of surrendered men. For Cunnigham's account, see the pension application of George Cunningham, transcribed by Will Graves.

22. According to Joseph McJunkin, before this battle, he was "called Granny Irwin," but "afterwards [he] was spoken very highly of on account of his good conduct that day." See Will Graves. (2005). What Did Joseph McJunkin Really Saye? Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Volume 2, Issue 11.

23. Davies, ibid.

Battle of Hanging Rock 9

Part 9: Battle for the Center Camp

Previous: An Ill-Timed Reinforcement

Next: The British Flank Attack

At the same time that elements of the Americans center and left divisions were battling McCulloch for possession of the Loyalist camp, other American militia were pursuing Samuel Bryan’s Loyalists to the west and south. These panicked men threw the camps of the Provincials into disorder [1]. Amid the chaos, the Provincials mistook some of Bryan's men for Sumter's militia and shot them [2]. The Americans added to the confusion by closing pursuing Bryan's men. According to one remarkable tale told after the war:

"As the tories fled towards the British camp, many of the whigs [i.e., Sumter’s men] rushed pell-mell with them. One named Walker, hurrying along in their midst, was about to fire on those before him, when a tory close to him caught his arm, crying, ‘Those are on our side!’ and then, as if struck with a sudden suspicion, asked ‘What is that green leaf in your hat for?’ The whigs had taken the precaution to put each a leaf in their hats that morning before going into battle. The soldier pulled out the token, but the discovery was already made; one of the tories seized his gun, the other ran a bayonet through his hunting shirt. Letting the weapon go, he turned and fled back. ‘It appeared to me,’ he said, ‘that they fired fifty guns after me; every leap I gave, I heard something fall on the leaves which I took for blood, and thought I must be badly wounded, and would soon fall exhausted. I thought of the intolerable thirst I had witnessed in those bleeding to death, and my mouth began to feel parched. I had now reached the branch [Hanging Rock Creek or a tributary], and stooped to drink. On examination I found I was not hurt, but my powder horn was severely wounded, being pierced through with a rifle ball, and having lost the greater part of its contents’" [3].

Bryan's Volunteers in Flight (click to enlarge). A portion of Bryan's men flee through the camp of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment.

The American right division followed those of Bryan's men fleeing westward. For Richard Winn, the purpose of this movement was to attack the British center camp, his original target [4]. Here, the British "were well posted" [5]. When the Americans came into view, "the British immediately commenced firing from behind some bush tents," [6] and "behind a fence" [7]. Many of the men with Winn were simply moving "in pursuit of the Tories," and were surprised "by this unexpected discharge" from the Provincials [8]. But the Americans were quick to recover. Seeing that the Provincials were without loaded muskets, Winn "set up the Indian hollo," and his men "rushed and fire[d] on their enemy as they went with bullets in their mouths and powder in their pockets." They loaded their rifles on the run, not stopping "to take a tree even where trees was" [9]. "The British… finding such a charge made on them," [10] "broke and joined in the flight of the Loyalists" [11].

Elements of the center and left divisions soon began arriving after having pursued the survivors of McCulloch’s company to the center camp [12]. Among these, two companies of North Carolinians began taking fire from "A party of fifteen or twenty of the enemy," who had taken "shelter in a cabin with a clapboard door," and were "firing through the cracks." In response, "Captain [James] Knox, with half the men, charged the front door, Lieutenant [George] Graham with the rest charged the rear door. Captain Knox ran against and broke down the door, the enemy fled out of the rear door, and Graham's party shot down several of them" [13].

The British Flee the Center Camp (click to enlarge). Loyalist militia, the Royal North Carolina Regiment (red coats), and British Legion infantry (green jackets) abandon the center camp to American riflemen and dragoons. The British manage to retain their cannon.

All-in-all, the Provincials had delivered only "a few discharges," before giving up the center camp. They retreated "for about 300 yards." Here, Joseph Graham thought, was the opportunity to launch the knockout blow against the British garrison. The British infantry "turned their backs for 300 yards," and "a charge of 70 cavalry would have made them surrender, but at that period but few of the cavalry had returned from pursuit of the tories and they were yet unformed." That Davie’s dragoons had charged and scattered so early in the action was a "great blunder" for the Americans [14].

Battle for the Center Camp. The Americans pursue a portion of Bryan's Volunteers to the center camp and attack the British Provincials stationed there. Meanwhile, a portion of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment (PoWAR) advances towards Bryan's former encampment.

Notes:

1. Charles Stedman. (1794). The History of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War, Vol. 2.

2. The pension application of Samuel Saxon, transcribed by Will Graves.

3. Elizabeth Fries Ellet. (1850). Domestic history of the American Revolution.

4. Suggested by the accounts of William Davie and Richard Winn; both describe early attack on center camp, and neither mentioned the battle with McCulloch described in my previous post. Winn's account notes, "as soon as Brian gave way [Winn] marched with his party for the British camp which he found in an open old field about [one] half mile from where Brian was posted." For Davie's account, see The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Davie's account also appears in, John H. Wheeler. (1851). Historical Sketches of North Carolina from 1584 to 1851, Vol. 1. For Winn's account, see General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780, transcribed by Will Graves. (See here for images of the original document).

5. Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780.

6. Winn, ibid.

7. Davie, ibid.

8. Davie, ibid.

9. Winn, ibid.

10. Winn, ibid.

11. Davie, ibid.

12. Implicit in the account of Joseph Graham, and explicit in the account of Joseph McJunkin. For Graham's account, see William A. Graham (1904). General Joseph Graham and His Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary History. For McJunkin's account, see Will Graves. (2005). What Did Joseph McJunkin Really Saye? Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Volume 2, Issue 11.

13. Graham, ibid. According to this source, Knox commanded one company, Graham the other. Graham took over Captain David Reid’s company after Reid was killed in the assault on Bryan’s camp.

14. Graham, ibid.

Battle of Hanging Rock 7

Part 7: Bryan's Defeat

Previous: Sumter's Night March to Hanging Rock

Next: An Ill-Timed Reinforcement

Battle plan in place, the Americans remounted their horses and filed off towards the British camps. For a brief moment, everything went as planned. According to Richard Winn, "the main body [i.e., the center and left divisions] wheeled to the left," while Winn and Davie’s men moved "to the right." The American commanders knew their targets, but they did not know the terrain. Therefore, they were forced to rely on the services of local guides to lead them to their destinations. Unfortunately, the guides leading the right division knew only that they were to lead this column towards the center camp on the Camden Road; they had not been briefed on the placement of Samuel Bryan’s Volunteers [1]. As a consequence, they led the right division into the Hanging Rock Creek bottom and past the front of Samuel Bryan’s men.

At this moment, Bryan’s men were having breakfast [2], but they could hardly fail to notice the Americans. Indeed, Richard Winn claimed that "his party was within 30 steps" of some of Bryan’s men when they began to receive fire. Sumter’s intended plan of attack was quickly abandoned. There was no choice now but for all three American divisions to assail Bryan’s camp.

Davie’s dragoons were in the lead when the right division came under attack. Winn claimed that Davie’s men were "ordered to move on to make room for the [infantry]" [3]. Winn’s men hurriedly began to dismount. At this moment, he recalled, "we received a most tremendous fire from Brian," but "The enemy being on the top of a big hill over shot us." Davie, however, complained that his men "suffered much while tying their horses, and forming under a heavy fire from the Tories" [4].

The Americans Advance Up the Hill (click to enlarge). Leaving their horses near the creek bottom, the Americans advance under fire towards Bryan's Volunteers at upper left.

Bryan’s men, for their part, formed up so as to face all three American divisions, their lines following the contours of the hill. Opposite the American left division, the hill looked "something like a half moon or a workman’s square," [5] and here, their "lines were extended from a point at right angles" [6]. The left division had not yet reached its assigned ground when the firing began. As a consequence, the center and left divisions were forced into an almost head-on assault of the Loyalist camp. William Hill recalled that "This action commenced under many very unfavorable circumstances to the Americans, as they had to march across a water course and climb a steep cliff, being all this time under the enemy's fire" [7].

Bryan's Line of Defense (click to enlarge). In the foreground, a camp follower awaits the outcome of the fighting. Brush huts and barrels mark the site of Bryan's camp.

The first Americans to be attacked were the first to ascend the hill. On the right, "Winn's party was ordered to put up the Indian hollow and rush up the hill before they discharged their pieces. This took place in an instance at this same time [Davie’s troop] was ordered to charge" [8].

Davie's Dragoons Charge Bryan's Left

Bryan’s line was soon rolled up from left to right. On the left, his Volunteers were only able to get off a single volley, and American losses were relatively light: just one killed and two wounded [9]. In the center, the Loyalists got off two volleys before their line collapsed [10]. The most severe losses were inflicted by Bryan’s right. Here, John McClure led his men against the angle in the Loyalist lines. They ran forward in two ranks with a terrific fire began pouring down on them. In a few moments, McClure, Joseph Gaston, and two of his brothers "fell in the front of the action." Gaston "received a ball on the bridge of his nose" that "went under the left eye and out by the ear." One of Gaston’s brothers lay "dead on the ground," while McClure and another brother lay mortally wounded [11]. Much lore developed around the mortal wounding of John McClure. According to one tradition,

"Colonel McClure was shot through the thigh, early in the action, but stuffing the wound with wadding, he rushed ahead of his command, and his clear voice was still heard, urging on his men to the continued charge. Just as the tories fled, he fell, pierced by several wounds. Those near him ran up to his relief, but he ordered them back to the fight, and his voice continued to be heard, urging and encouraging them in the pursuit" [12].

Battle Amid the Trees. The southern end of the Loyalist (left) and American (right) lines during the assault on Bryan's camp.

As Bryan's line was rolled up, many of his men began fleeing toward the south. Just then, a part of the American left "got around the side of their camp" [13], "and as Brian's men went by," the Americans gave them "a severe fire" [14].

Bryan’s men were in full rout, "attacked in front and flank, and routed with great slaughter," [15] they "fled with the utmost precipitation, and spread confusion through every quarter of the post" [16]. Even flight was precarious, for Davie’s dragoons "could not be restrained, but pursued them" across the woodland [17]. Further, some of those Loyalists that fled towards the center camp were mistaken for Sumter's men and shot by Provincials [18]. Winn boasted that "many of these men was so frightened they never stopped [running] until they got into Georgia" [19].

Bryan's Volunteers in Flight

Assault on Bryan's Camp. Some of the unit actions occurring at this time will be described in subsequent posts. PoWAR = Prince of Wales' American Regiment.

Notes:

1. The error of the guides is described by William Davie, Joseph Graham, and Richard Winn. For William Davie's account, see John H. Wheeler. (1851). Historical Sketches of North Carolina from 1584 to 1851, Vol. 1. For Graham's account, see William A. Graham (1904). General Joseph Graham and His Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary History. For Winn's account, see General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780, transcribed by Will Graves.

2. The pension application of Samuel Saxon, transcribed by Will Graves.

3. Winn, ibid.

4. Davie, ibid.

5. Joseph McJunkin's account, in Will Graves. (2005). What Did Joseph McJunkin Really Saye? Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Volume 2, Issue 11.

6. Joseph Gaston. (1836/1873). Joseph Gaston's Narrative. The Historical Magazine and Notes and Queries Concerning the Antiquities, History and Biography of America, Vol. 1.

7. Alexander S. Salley. (1921). Col. William Hill's Memoirs of the Revolution.

8. Winn, ibid.

9. Winn, ibid. However, as already noted, his description of American losses is at odds with Davie’s.

10. Graham, ibid., who was with Robert Irwin and the center division.

11. The pension application of Joseph Gaston, transcribed by Will Graves.

12. Joseph Johnson (1851). Traditions and Reminiscences Chiefly of the American Revolution in the South. See Elizabeth Fries Ellet. (1850). Domestic history of the American Revolution for another version of this story. McClure’s death was mentioned by many participants.

13. Hill, ibid.

14. Winn, ibid.

15. Davie, ibid.

16. Charles Stedman. (1794). The History of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War, Vol. 2.

17. Graham, ibid.

18. Saxon, ibid.

19. Winn, ibid. This is an exaggeration of course, but some of the Loyalists continued their retreat at least as far as Rawdon’s force on Lynche’s Creek, 12 miles away. They reached this point in the evening and were joined there by soldiers from the Royal North Carolina Regiment and the Prince of Wales’ American Regiment who fled during a later stage in the fighting. See Letter from Francis Rawdon to Colonel McMahon, January 19, 1801.

Battle of Hanging Rock 6

Part 6: Sumter's Night March to Hanging Rock

Previous: American Strength and Losses at Hanging Rock

Next: Bryan's Defeat

Thomas Sumter did not command enough men to simply overpower the British in the South Carolina Backcountry, and what men he had were deficient in arms and ammunition. Therefore, he chose to rely on surprise to give him an advantage over his opponents. The battle plan he developed for the attack on Hanging Rock was a repeat of that used at Rocky Mount. On both occasions, he sought to achieve surprise by making a night march to suddenly close with his target. Then, he planned to launch his attack at daybreak from multiple directions. Sumter's subordinates had also adopted this stratagem several weeks earlier at Williamson's Plantation.

The American plans at Williamson's Plantation and Rocky Mount were spoiled by an unexpected obstacle on the eve of the attack [1]. Hanging Rock would be no different. In this case, Sumter's men found the Catawba River to be unexpectedly difficult to cross. Sumter noted:

“I… began to pass the river on Saturday evening [i.e., August 5, 1780]. The rapidity of the current was so great I was not only much delayed, but met with considerable loss; however, [I] proceeded on.” [2].

Once across, Sumter proceeded with some caution. Scouts were dispatched in advance of Sumter’s column [3], and “two spies” had been placed in the British camp before Sumter made his march. During the night, these men stole their way north and reported their findings. They “claimed that “the British camp… did not exceed 300 and that their reinforcement sent to Rocky Mount had not returned” [4].

Armed with this good news, Sumter’s men made their final approach march. According to William Davie, the column “turned to the left of the road to avoid the enemy's piquet and patrol, with an intention to return to it under cover of a defile near the camp” [5].

Soon, the Americans could hear “the sound of horse bells” and see “the smoke settled along the valley of Hanging Rock Creek” [6]. “A whispering order came along the line that any might sit down with arms in hand to be ready” [7]. Sumter had wanted to attack at daybreak, but he claimed that “[I] was obliged to alter my mode of attack” because of the time it had taken during the night to get across the Catawba. Therefore, he “concealed” his men near the British camp, waiting for the British “to scatter” [8].

Both sides understood that early morning was an ideal time to launch a surprise attack. At Rocky Mount, George Turnbull kept his infantry under arms at daybreak, lest an attack should come. Sumter implies that by delaying the attack, the British relaxed and went about their daily routine.

While the Americans waited, they “took two Tories,” who claimed “that the reinforcement sent to Rocky Mount had returned” since the spies’ departure. This was very alarming news, and a council of war was held with Sumter and his principal commanders. Initial opinion was divided: “some for fighting others for retreating.” A consensus, however, was quickly achieved in favor of going forward because “no officer was willing to be out done by the other in bravery” [9].

What the Americans had learned, according to William Davie, was that the British were “pretty strongly posted in three divisions.” This force included “Regulars” [actually Provincials] “on the [American] right; a part of the British legion and Hamilton's Regiment were at some houses in the centre; and Bryan's Regiment, and other Loyalists some distance on the [American] left.”

Sumter downscaled the scope of the attack in view of this unwelcome news. Because the “three large encampments” were “so extensive,” “it was impossible to attack the whole at once.” Therefore, he wrote, “I proceeded against the most considerable of the Tory encampments and that of the British, which lay in the center” [10].

Sumter’s men would attack in three divisions. His left and center divisions would attack Samuel Bryan’s North Carolina Volunteers. The center division would attack in front, while the left division curled around to the rear [11]. These two divisions had “orders not to fire a gun” until the left division had “passed between the British and Tory lines to the extremities [i.e., the flank and rear] [12]. The Americans might not be able to seize the entire post, but the North Carolina Loyalists, at least, were going to get thrashed. Sumter’s right division was sent against the center camp [13]. If this force was unable to capture the center camp on its own, they would at least occupy the Provincials while Bryan’s men were slaughtered.

In order to maximize surprise, Sumter wanted his men to ride up to the camps and dismount in sight of the enemy. Davie claimed that “This plan was approved by all the officers” excepting himself. Davie “insisted on leaving the horses at this place and marching to the attack on foot, urging the confusion always consequent on dismounting under a fire, and the certainty of losing the effect of a sudden and vigorous attack. This objection was, however, overruled” [14].

Notes:

1. At Williamson's Plantation, the Americans were led to believe that the British were encamped at a neighboring plantation, which threw off somewhat the planned timing of the attack, and possibly cost them the services of some of their best men (See Richard Winn's account, in General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780, transcribed by Will Graves). At Rocky Mount, the Americans unexpectedly ran into a detachment of the British Legion before they were in position to attack.

2. Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780. The difficulty in crossing the river might be connected to the rain showers on July 30.

3. The pension application of Edward Rogers, transcribed by Will Graves. He recalled that “The night before the battle he got wounded while spying out the enemy's camp.”

4. Winn, ibid.

5. The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Davie's account also appears in, John H. Wheeler. (1851). Historical Sketches of North Carolina from 1584 to 1851, Vol. 1. There are some basic disagreements between the accounts of Thomas Sumter, Richard Winn, and William Davie on events during this time. Sumter’s and Winn’s accounts are fairly compatible, and as Sumter’s account is especially trustworthy, I side with them over Davie where there are disagreements.

6. William A. Graham (1904). General Joseph Graham and His Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary History.

7. Joseph McJunkin's account of the battle, in Will Graves. (2005). What Did Joseph McJunkin Really Saye? Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Volume 2, Issue 11.

8. Sumter, ibid. McJunkin, ibid., recalled how he spent the time: “I and a fellow soldier sat down by a pine and both slept a little.”

9. Winn, ibid.

10. Sumter, ibid.

11. Inference based on statements by Winn and McJunkin

12. McJunkin, ibid.

13. Winn and Davie have the right division attacking the Provincials.

14. Davie, ibid. His apprehension may stem, in part, from the particularly dangerous undertaking assigned to his men (the right division).

Battle of Hanging Rock 5

Part 5: American Strength and Losses at Hanging Rock

Previous: British Strength and Losses at Hanging Rock

Next: Sumter's Night March to Hanging Rock

Thomas Sumter claimed that he had “Six hundred brave men,” [1] and other participant statements point to a similar total [2]. Not everyone in his command was armed or fought during the battle (among these was Andrew Jackson, future 7th president of the United States) [3]. The number of men who were engaged may have been closer to 540 [4]. Those who were armed were badly supplied with ammunition. It was thought that Sumter's men had no more than 5 [5] or 10 [6] bullets apiece.

Sumter divided his force into three parts, and each contained around 200 men. These divisions are henceforth referred to as the left, center, and right divisions, after their relative positions at the beginning of the battle. Possibly the left division was commanded by William Hill, the center by Robert Irwin, and the right by Richard Winn [7].

Left Division: Several small South Carolina militia regiments, including William Bratton’s regiment, Andrew Neal’s regiment (commanded by either Samuel Watson or William Hill [8]), Edward Lacey’s regiment (possibly commanded by John McClure [9]), and Joseph Brandon’s regiment (commanded by James Steen) [10]. Most of the men in these regiments had seen action before, including at Williamson’s Plantation and Rocky Mount. Of the men that fought in this division, Joseph McJunkin of Brandon’s regiment left a detailed description of the battle.

Center Division: A battalion of 200 North Carolina militiamen under the command of Robert Irwin [11]. These men hailed from Mecklenburg County. Of the men that fought in this division, Joseph Graham left a detailed description of the battle.

Right Division: Major William Davie’s troop of dragoons (70-80 men) [12], supported by a mixture of North and South Carolina militia units [13]. Of the men that fought in this division, William Davie and Richard Winn left detailed descriptions of the battle.

American Losses:

Thomas Sumter claimed that he lost 20 killed, 40 wounded, and 10 missing [14]. Other American participants gave lower figures, but their claims are less reliable. The 10 missing men were likely killed or wounded, but as the fighting took place over a wide area, they were not found by their comrades before the end of the battle. Among these was Matthew McClurkin, who "was severely wounded on the head... taken prisoner by the British troops... confined in jail and... sent to Charleston to be put aboard a prison ship." Fortunately, before arriving in Charleston, "he and the other prisoners overpowered the guard and made their escape" [15]

The British estimated American losses at about 100 [16].

Notes:

1. Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780.

2. James Hodge Saye. Memoirs of Major Joseph McJunkin, Revolutionary Patriot; Alexander S. Salley. (1921). Col. William Hill's Memoirs of the Revolution.

3. Augustus C. Buell. (1907). History of Andrew Jackson: Pioneer, Patriot, Soldier, Politician, President.

4. According to Joseph McJunkin. Richard Winn claimed that Sumter had 500 men with arms and another 200 without. The men without arms were left to take care of the horses, but later these men took up the arms of the killed and wounded and joined their comrades in the action.

Will Graves. (2005). What Did Joseph McJunkin Really Saye? Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Volume 2, Issue 11. General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780, transcribed by Will Graves.

5. Hill, ibid.

6. William Gordon. (1801). The History of the Rise, Progress, and Establishment of the United States of America, Vol 3.

7. This description is based primarily on the account of William Davie. See The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Davie's account also appears in, John H. Wheeler. (1851). Historical Sketches of North Carolina from 1584 to 1851, Vol. 1. Davie identified Hill and Irwin with the left and center, respectively. Davie claimed he had command of the right division, but Richard Winn also claimed that role. Winn's claim seems more credible as he outranked Davie and had served with Sumter longer.

8. Andrew Neal was killed 7 days earlier at Rocky Mount. One Samuel Gordon of this regiment claimed that Samuel Watson took over after Neal was killed, whereas Thomas Lofton remembered Hill becoming his commander. See the pension application of Samuel Gordon, and the pension application of Thomas Lofton, both transcribed by Will Graves.

9. Joseph Gaston claimed that before Sumter's men crossed the Catawba River to attack Hanging Rock, "General Sumter ordered an election for general officers in the Chester Regiment." He claimed that John McClure was elected colonel, "Colonel E. Lacy having, at that time, become unpopular among the Chester Whigs." However, several accounts placed Lacey at the battle, suggesting either that Gaston was in error or that he was serving in some other capacity. See Joseph Gaston. (1836/1873). Joseph Gaston's Narrative. The Historical Magazine and Notes and Querries Concerning the Antiquities, History and Biography of America, Vol. 1.

10. Will Graves. (2005). What Did Joseph McJunkin Really Saye? Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Volume 2, Issue 11. Brandon's absence on this occasion is not explained in the available sources. Steen was his second in command.

11. William Davie, ibid. Letter from Allen J. Davie to Archibald D. Murphey, August 9, 1826.

12. Graham said 70; Hill, ibid., said 80. William Davie, ibid., placed his troop on the American right. For Graham, see William A. Graham (1904). General Joseph Graham and His Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary History.

13. William Davie, ibid. Winn, ibid., identified his regiment as one of the specific units.

14. Sumter, ibid.

15. The pension application of Matthew McClurkin, transcribed by Will Graves.

16. Banastre Tarleton. (1787). A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781. Charles Stedman. (1794). The History of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War, Vol. 2.

Battle of Hanging Rock 2

Part 2: Sumter's Second Target

Previous: Introduction

Next: Rawdon's Defense of South Carolina

Retreat from Rocky Mount

Thomas Sumter had tried, without success, to capture the British post of Rocky Mount, South Carolina, on July 30, 1780. That battle ended after a rain shower put an end to the Americans' efforts to burn down the British-occupied buildings. The Americans subsequently withdrew, but only for a short distance. The rain raised the level of Rocky Creek, which crossed their path of retreat [1]. Sumter might have directed his men towards a shallow ford upstream, but remaining close to the British post was good for morale, or at least his pride. He claimed that he spent this period "relieving and covering the country" from excursions by Provincials and Loyalist militia [2].

Sumter's decision to remain close to Rocky Mount was a dangerous one, for the British soon learned of the attack on Rocky Mount [3] and organized a retaliatory expedition against Sumter’s men. This force reached Rocky Mount on August 1 [4]. Late the following morning, the Americans found that the waters in the creek had receded somewhat, and a crossing was effected. Once on the other side, “the men turned out their horses and they themselves scattered about in search of roasting ears and green peaches” [5]. Sumter’s men did not realize their danger until “the enemy to the number [of] 8 or 900 men and 2 pieces of artillery was in a mile in our rear” [6]. According to one soldier, the British force reached the creek crossing “before our vittles were cooked,” and the Americans promptly fled, “leaving our provisions and some baggage” [7].

Colonel Richard Winn assembled an ad hoc rear guard, but the British could not close with the Americans before the latter made their escape. Winn then followed Sumter and detailed one “Captain Coleman from Midway in Georgia,” and a South Carolinian “by the name of Stroud” “to watch and give notice of the Enemy's motions.” Unfortunately, “these two men ventured too near the British. Both was made prisoner stripped naked and immediately hung up by the side of the road” [8].

Sumter’s Next Target

Sumter’s brigade returned to the Catawba Nation, its former base of operations. The brigade had grown steadily in size since its initial formation in late June, and new arrivals once again began to appear [9]. Sumter immediately began considering how to strike another blow at the British, even though he had by this time used up most of his ammunition.

Some authors, in considering Sumter’s actions during this period, have determined that he was at best imprudent, and at worse foolish. Others regarded him as a kind of genius. Banastre Tarleton claimed that, “This active partizan was thoroughly sensible, that the minds of men are influenced by enterprize, and that to keep undisciplined people together, it is necessary to employ them” [10]. Joseph Graham held the same opinion:

“[Sumter] had discovered that his men, while marching and fighting and fighting and marching would keep with him, but to encamp and remain stationary he might calculate with certainty his force might diminish; therefore if he failed in his enterprise the loss to the Country would only be those who were killed and wounded, the remainder might be organized in a short time as formidable as before. If he succeeded it would considerably weaken the Enemy’s effective force and have considerable weight in the operations which he expected shortly would take place” [11].

Having determined it was most prudent to remain on the offensive, he began to consider his options. Rocky Mount, now reinforced, was clearly unassailable, but the nearby post of Hanging Rock was defended by only 250 men [12]. The post at Hanging Rock was "very weak," because "the principle part of their troops" had been sent to reinforce Rocky Mount [13]. Moreover, Hanging Rock, he realized, was “of very great consequence” to the British. If Hanging Rock fell, Rocky Mount would have to be abandoned, and the central part of the state would be accessible to the Americans [14]. The British realized this, too, and they ensured that Hanging Rock was not vulnerable [15]. Before Sumter could strike, the post would receive a large reinforcement.

Notes:

1. General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780, transcribed by Will Graves. (See here for images of the original document).

2. Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780.

3. For the circumstances in which the British learned of this attack, and their initial reaction to it, see the letter from Francis Rawdon to Charles Cornwallis, July 31, 1780. (In William T. Sherman, 2009, Calendar and Record of the Revolutionary War in the South: 1780-1781. 6th Ed).

4. Winn, ibid. Winn claims that this event occurred on Tuesday, August 2nd, but Tuesday was the 1st. Similarly, his account has the correct day of the week, but the wrong date, for the battles of Rocky Mount and Hanging Rock.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. The pension application of John Whelchel, transcribed by Will Graves. Whelchel served in Thomas Brandon’s regiment.

8. Winn's notes. Whelchel also referred to the capture and hanging of the two men.

9. This is claimed by several sources. See Winn’s memoir, Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton’s A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781, Joseph Graham's papers, and the pension application of John Whelchel.

10. Tarleton, ibid.

11. Graham, ibid.

12. See this intelligence report.

13. Letter from Thomas Polk to Thomas Pinckney, August 6, 1780.

14. Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780. William Davie claimed that the loss of Hanging Rock would cause the abandonment of Rocky Mount. See The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Davie's account also appears in, John H. Wheeler (1851). Historical Sketches of North Carolina from 1584 to 1851, Vol. 1.

15. Letter from Charles Cornwallis to George Germain, August 20, 1780.

The Hanging Rock Battlefield - Part 4

An Alternative Proposal

In the previous two posts, I considered two different points of view about the location of British forces at the battle of Hanging Rock in South Carolina (see here and here). To evaluate these accounts, I developed an "objective" rating system that compared how well the landscape identified by these accounts matches that appearing in descriptions of the battlefield. Noteworthy, is that neither account rated better than a 75% under this system, suggesting that there is room for improvement. I therefore set about examining the terrain features in this area carefully, in order to determine whether there is some constellation of terrain features that would match participants at a higher rate.

A scheme that is a good match for participant accounts is shown in the map below. A description follows.

The center camp is located on top of a hill overlooking Hanging Rock Creek, at the approximate spot identified as the Hanging Rock battlefield on Mills' 1825 map of Kershaw District, South Carolina. (#3 on the map).

The right camp is located on top of a nearby high that is bounded by Hanging Rock Creek on two sides, a short distance upstream from the eponymous rock formation (the rock formation is #1 on the map).

The left camp is located on the Camden Road, at the approximate site of Cole's Old Fields. (#4 on the map).

Objective Assessment

1) The three camps were on elevations. 2 points.

2) Colonel Samuel Bryan and his North Carolina volunteers were encamped on the right of the British position. 2 points.

3) Bryan's men were encamped on a steeply-sloped hill bordering a creek. 2 points.

4) Bryan's men were encamped south and west of Hanging Rock Creek, near the "Hanging Rock." 2 points.

5) The hill on which Bryan was encamped curved in one place at nearly a 90-degree angle. 2 points. Remarkably, the hill has exactly this feature, as shown in the topographic map below. To highlight the hill shape, I've marked two of the contour lines in bold. Also important that this bend in the hill is pointed towards a defile (on which a blue arrow is placed) through which I believe the Americans advanced (see section below concerning William Davie's account of the American advance).

The red circles on this map are the three camps. The green box is described below.

6) To the left of Bryan's position there was a swampy patch of ground. 1 point. There is a flat patch of ground in the appropriate area in which several streams converge, but there is no "swamp" icon on this spot. This area is marked by the green box in the map above. The absence of a swamp icon may only be because the area is not large in extent.

7) Bryan's camp was about 1/4 to 1/2 mile from the center camp. 2 points. The distance is about .37 miles.

8) The Provincials were encamped, in part, on or near "Cole's Old Field." 2 points.

9) The Provincials were encamped on or near the Camden Road. 2 points. This is the brown line on the map above.

10) More than 1/4 mile separated the center camp from the left camp. 2 points.

Total Score: 19 points (95%).

Subjective Assessment

Aside from agreement with the 10-item list, there are several good reasons to adopt this interpretation of the placement of the British camps at Hanging Rock. These include 1) agreement with William Davie's description of the American route of attack, 2) agreement with participant descriptions of a British flank attack during the battle, and 3) the relative military soundness of this alignment.

1) William Davie on the American Advance. William Davie described the difficulties the Americans faced in attacking the British post as follows:

"the situation of the regular troops could not be approached without an entire exposure of the assailants, and a deep ravine and creek covered the whole point of the Tory camp."

In the account that I've described, this makes perfect sense. The center camp included two 3-pounders and a force of infantry. The cannon probably could not stop movement over the creek (both because of the distance and because of tall trees obscuring the view of the creek). However, south of the creek, an American force advancing along the Camden Road, would come to a high hill that was cleared of trees (participant accounts indicate that the center camp was on farmland). At that point, the cannon would have been a very significant obstacle to advancing infantry.

Both according to Davie's account and the maps above, an American force that crossed the creek further downstream would have had to cross a ravine and creek directly in front of the Loyalist militia. Note that in Davie's account, and that of other American participants, the Loyalists are called "Tories," and the Provincials are called "regulars."

Davie's description does not fit well with the Battlefield Property site. The creek covers the front of both camps, and attacking one hilltop camp would not seem to have entailed more exposure than attacking the other.

Davie also described the route the Americans took to the battlefield: "They [Sumter's force] turned to the left of the road to avoid the enemy's piquet and patrol, with an intention to return to it under cover of a defile near the camp, but the guides, either from ignorance or timidity, led them so far to the left that the right, centre, and left divisions, all fell on the Tory encampment."

As shown on the maps above, advancing parallel to the road, but on its east side (i.e., left, when one is heading south), would lead the Americans in the direction of the "Tory" camp. The defile that Davie referred to is readily identifiable in the account I've proposed: it runs parallel to the Camden Road, beginning in modern-day Heath Springs, and then joins the ravine through which Hanging Rock Creek runs. In the map below, the grey arrow shows the extent of the defile; the hilltop on which I've proposed that Bryan's Loyalist militia were encamped is at the bottom.

As will be seen when I describe the battle, the guides did not know that the Loyalist militia were on a hilltop across from this juncture, and thus this path lead Davie's men into Bryan's North Carolina Volunteers.

Davie's description of the route taken by the Americans, however, is not a good fit for the Battlefield Property site. They didn't leave the road "to avoid the enemy's piquet and patrol," but evidently swung far off to the east with the purpose of reaching the well-known Hanging Rock. Once at this point, they were directly across the creek from the Loyalist militia and Provincials. There would not have been a defile to follow from this position to reach the British encampments -- the only avenue of attack was to cross the creek.

2) The British Flank Attack. Thomas Sumter, writing 3 days after the battle, noted that "They [i.e., the Provincials] had Detached a Colum[n] to support Bryant [i.e., Samuel Bryan, commander of the Loyalist militia], who, through a swamp, found means to turn my Right flank." This "column" consisted of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment.

Richard Winn's force at that time was assaulting the center camp, but upon "hearing a Severe firing to my Right," from this column, he moved his men towards the regiment "as quick as possible." They then arrived "on the back [i.e., rear] of the British," who were engaged with another party of Americans. Once Winn's men opened up, the British detachment was caught "between two fires [and] gave way." Davie claimed that this attack occurred "between the Tory and centre encampments."

A comparison with the terrain I've identified as the battle site shows that there is a flat patch of ground fed by several streams between the center and right camps. A British force advancing into this area from the direction of the Camden Road would have run into the Americans that had seized the Loyalists' camp. A force of Americans attacking the center camp (i.e., Winn's men)could have turned around and fallen on the rear of this force. In short, the pieces appear to fit. (Some additional explanation is required concerning the movements of all of the units involved; that will appear in the description of the battle).

A comparison of these statements by Sumter, Winn, and Davie with the Hanging Rock Battleground Property is not a good fit. Yes, there is a swampy patch of ground on the right flank of the Americans' initial position east of Hanging Rock Creek, but not on their right flank once they seized Bryan's camp and turned south. The only way for a British force to get between the two camps would be to enter a wooded ravine dividing the hills on which the Loyalist militia and Provincials were allegedly camped. Such an attack would not have been a turning maneuver.

3) Strength of the Position. The British post was in place to defend the Camden Road at the point it crossed Hanging Rock Creek. The camps, one might expect, would be laid out in a way to provide for a strong defense of the crossing. The scheme I've described seems to have this feature. The British are deployed in three camps so as to prevent a coup de main, yet the three camps are within close supporting distance of each other, forming a kind of defensive "triangle." Each camp is also in a strong location. One camp (the center camp) is on high hill south of the creek, on the Camden Road. A second camp covers the right flank of this position, on a high hill next to the creek. The third camp is also on the Camden Road, in position to either cover the left flank of the position or to act as a reserve. Befitting the fighting style of the different forces on hand, the Provincials were on cleared land along the road, while the Loyalist militia were encamped in a wooded area.

The Hanging Rock Battlefield - Part 1

What Did Participants Say about the Hanging Rock Battlefield?

The largest battle of Sumter's first campaign against British-occupied South Carolina was the bloody battle of Hanging Rock (August 6, 1780). As will be seen, Hanging Rock was a remarkable battle in a number of respects, but unfortunately, it has not received the kind of detailed treatment from historians that it deserves. One hindrance to a detailed account of the battle is that the exact site of the fighting is unknown. The topographical map below (click to enlarge) shows four locales linked to the battlefield during the 19th Century. All are on or near Hanging Rock Creek, south of the present-day town of Heath Springs, South Carolina.

Briefly, Heath Springs is at the top of the map. Flat Rock Road (or State Road S-29-15) runs north to south. Hanging Rock Creek flows from the top left of the map down to the bottom right.

Locations on the map:

1. "Hanging Rock" -- a peculiar rock formation which lent its name to both the creek and the general area. It has long been believed that the battle took place not far from this rock formation. However, to the best of my knowledge, no account has claimed that the fighting actually occurred on this spot.

2. Site of the Hanging Rock battlefield, as indicated by Mills' 1825 Atlas of the State of South Carolina.

3. Site of the Hanging Rock battlefield, as indicated by Mills' 1825 map of Kershaw District, South Carolina.

4. The approximate site of Cole's Old Field. Benjamin Lossing, in his Field Book of the Revolution, Volume 2 (1850) visited the Hanging Rock battlefield, and noted that "Along a by-road, across the high rolling plain upon which (at Coles’s Old Field) tradition avers the hottest of the battle was fought." The farm of one "Colly" is shown in James Cook's 1773 A Map of the Province of South Carolina...

Lossing's sketch of Hanging Rock.

A complicating factor is that when Sumter attacked the British post at Hanging Rock, the British were encamped in three distinct position (e.g., William Davie wrote that the British "were pretty strongly posted in three different encampments the British Regulars... were encamped on the right, a part of the British Legion and Hamiltons regiment at some Houses in the centre, and Bryan's regiment with the other Loyalists... some distance on the left.") A complete treatment of the battle should identify the location of each of these camps.

In the next few posts I will consider the location of each encampment. Later, I will use this information to describe, in considerable detail, how I believe the battle of Hanging Rock was fought. In identifying the location of the Hanging Rock battlefield, I relied mainly on statements made by participants in the battle; an exception is that I was also influenced by Benjamin Lossing's mid-19th Century description of the battlefield. Below are ten clues about the location of the British camps appearing in these sources.

1) The three camps were on elevations. Thomas Sumter claimed that "The enemy had three large encampments... all upon exceeding advantageous hights."

2) Colonel Samuel Bryan and his North Carolina volunteers were encamped on the right of the British position. William Davie wrote that before the battle, "the army turned to the left of the road... the guides... led them so far to the left, that... [Sumter's whole force ran up against] the Tory encampment." This statement indicates that Bryan's men were on the right of the British position. Davie also wrote that when Bryan was attacked, the British attempted to support him by making "a movement to their right."

In a seeming contradiction of this description, Davie also wrote that "the British Regulars... were encamped on the right, a part of the British Legion and Hamiltons regiment at some Houses in the centre, and Bryan's regiment with the other Loyalists... some distance on the left." However, he doesn't indicate in this passage whether he is referring to his left and right or that of the British. If he meant his left and right, then there is no discrepancy.

3) Bryan's men were encamped on a steeply-sloped hill bordering a creek (presumably, Hanging Rock Creek). William Hill wrote that the Americans "had to march across a water course & climb a steep cliff" to attack Bryan. William Davie wrote that "a Creek with a deep ravine covered the whole front of the Tory camp." Richard Winn recorded that Bryan's men were "On the top of a big hill."

4) Bryan's men were encamped south and west of Hanging Rock Creek, near the "Hanging Rock." Joseph McJunkin stated that Bryan's regiment was "to the South of Hanging Rock creek." Benjamin Lossing recorded that "Bryan’s corps [was] on the verge of the western bank of the creek, near the Great Rock."

5) The hill on which Bryan was encamped curved in one place at nearly a 90-degree angle. Joseph McJunkin stated that the hill formed "something like a half moon or a workman's square." Joseph Gaston recalled, "The enemy's lines [i.e., Bryan's men on the hill] were extended from a point at right angles."

6) To the left of Bryan's position there was a swampy patch of ground. Thomas Sumter wrote that while the Americans were attacking Bryan, the British sent "a Colum to support Bryant, who, through a swamp, found means to turn my Right flank." Samuel Saxon stated that "a body of British had taken up a position near that of the Tories separated from them by a marsh."

7) Bryan's camp was about 1/4 to 1/2 mile from the center camp. Edward Doyle claimed, "the British Troops were stationed about four hundred yards from the Tories." William Hill claimed that "the British camp [was] about one quarter of a mile from this Tory camp." Joseph Graham noted that "the British [were] near a quarter of a mile distant" from Bryan's men. Joseph Gaston recalled that "From that [Bryan's] post, the British lay about a quarter of a mile." Matthew McClurkin claimed that "the British soldiers [were] encamped about half a mile from the place where the Tories were attacked." Richard Winn claimed that the British were "about half [a] Mile from where Brian was posted." Benjamin Lossing wrote that Bryan’s corps... [was] half a mile from the British camp."

8) The Provincials were encamped, in part, on or near "Cole's Old Field." Richard Winn wrote that the British were "in an Open Old field." Private Thomas Gill said that he "marched to the hanging rock Coles old fields where he was in another battle with the British & Tories." Lossing claimed that "the main body [of troops were] stationed upon the plain at Coles’s Old Field." [cf. #4 in the above map]

9) The Provincials were encamped on or near the Camden Road [i.e., today's Flat Rock Road]. Joseph McJunkin stated that "the British were... encamped in Camden road." William Davie claimed that the Provincials in the center camp were "at some Houses."

10) More than 1/4 mile separated the center camp from the left camp. During the battle, the British were forced to give up their center camp; they fell back on their third camp, which they successfully defended. Joseph Graham, describing this retreat, noted that the British first retreated "about 300 yards where they rallied," and then "they were compelled gradually to give ground 200 yards further." Presumably, the third camp was not far behind this final position.

The "high rolling plain" at Hanging Rock. This image previously appeared in the post Touring the Revolution with Google Earth.

Sources:

William R. Davie. The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie. [excerpt]

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Edward Doyle. (.pdf file).

Joseph Gaston. (1873). A reminiscence of the war of the revolution, in South Carolina. The Historical Magazine..., Vol 2.

C. Leon Harris transcribed the pension application of Thomas Gill. (.pdf file).

The website, The Colonial and State Records of North Carolina, hosted by the University of North Carolina, includes a transcription of a letter from Joseph Graham to Archibald D. Murphey, March 9, 1821.

Will Graves transcribed William Hill's memoir. (.pdf file).

Benson John Lossing. (1860). Pictorial Field-Book of the Revolution (Vol. 2).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Matthew McClurkin. (.pdf file).

Will Graves. (2005). What Did Joseph McJunkin Really Saye? Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Volume 2, Issue 11.

The website, The Colonial and State Records of North Carolina, hosted by the University of North Carolina, includes a transcription of a Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780.

Will Graves transcribed General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780. (.pdf file).