Flight of the Militia - Part 3

The American commander, Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan, deployed his infantry in two lines during the battle of Cowpens. He knew that the front line, consisting of militia from Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina, would not be able to hold off a British bayonet charge. Nevertheless, he deployed them in front of his Continentals in the hope that they would inflict significant damage on the British before his main battle line was engaged.

In my last two posts, I explored the question of how the American militia might have retreated from the front line in a manner that 1) would have been minimally disruptive to the main American line and 2) is relatively well supported by participant accounts. In so doing, I indicated that the traditional description of the militia retreat (that the entire front line passed around the left flank of the main line) fails on both counts. Instead, I argued that the model of the militia retreat that is both most plausible and best supported by participant accounts is one in which the left and right wings of the militia line retreated around the left and right flanks of the main line, respectively.

Although the version of events I've proposed has strong features, I'm also cognizant of its limitations. The most significant of these, in my view, concerns the location of the militia's horses. The militia were generally mounted and rode when the Continentals had to walk. A few reliable accounts of the battle of Cowpens mention these horses as being staked or tied up not far from where the Continentals and militia were deployed.

Colonel Henry Lee, in his first history of the Southern Campaign, wrote that, "Washington's cavalry, reinforced with a company of mounted militia armed with sabres, was held in reserve; convenient to support the infantry, and protect the horses of the rifle militia, which were tied, agreeably to usage, in the rear."

Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard, in the letter I quoted previously, wrote that, "The militia all rode to the ground and their horses were tied in the woods in the rear of my left flank." This passage, along with Lee's, suggests that all of the horses had been collected in one spot, and this location was the area east or northeast of the Green River Road, somewhere between Suck Creek (see image below; Suck Creek is at the upper right) and Elevation #3. This area is large enough to have accommodated hundreds of horses.

Three Elevations on the Cowpens Battlefield.

Although I believe the right wing of the militia line (#6 in the image below) retreated to the right rear of the main line (i.e., behind #3), one of the militiamen that I've located on the right side of the battlefield recalled encountering the horses (on the far right of the image) after he retreated.

American Deployment at Cowpens (click to enlarge). 1 = Continental Light Dragoons; 2 = Mounted Militia; 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line; 4 = Continental Infantry; 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line; 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line; 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line.

Private James Collins of South Carolina recalled, "We gave the enemy one fire, when they charged us with their bayonets; we gave way and retreated for our horses, Tarleton's cavalry pursued us; ("now," thought I, "my hide is in the loft;") just as we got to our horses, they overtook us and began to make a few hacks at some, however, without doing much injury."

How could Collins and the men with him encounter their horses?

An answer can be found in Lee's first history. Lee wrote, "The enemy, shouting, rushed forward upon the front line, which retained its station, and poured in a close fire; but, continuing to advance with the bayonet on our militia, they retired, and gained with haste the second line. Here, with part of the corps, Pickens took post on Howard's right, and the rest fled to their horses—probably with orders to remove them to a further distance."

In other words, most of the right wing of the militia line did fall back to a point in the right rear of the main line, where they later returned to the fight, but some (with or without orders) instead ran to the horses. Collins' statement marks him as one of those individuals.

If Collins did cross the battlefield from the right to the left to get to the horses, then this passage surely occurred behind the Continentals, rather than in front of them, and before the Continentals accidentally retreated approximately 100 yards.

Another veteran of the battle that recalled encountering the horses while retreating was Captain Henry Connelly of the North Carolina state troops. Connelly stated in his pension application that he was, "just about to catch up our horses which was tied about four hundred paces in the rear of the line of Battle [when the British dragoons] fell upon us with great fury but we was fortunately relieved by Washingtons legion that hastened to our assistance."

Connelly was not on the militia line, but rather on the right militia wing of the main line. Previously I argued that this formation broke apart during the battle. Perhaps Connelly and his men were also attempting to secure their horses. However, when this formation broke apart the area in the right rear of the main line no longer offered sanctuary. These men may have been running towards their horses solely because they were fleeing from danger.

Connelly specifically noted that the horses were "four hundred paces in the rear of the line of Battle." He did not specify that the horses were tied behind the left rear of the main line, as did Howard.

Location of the Militia Horses Behind the Main Line (click to enlarge).

If Connelly's distance is correct and describes how far the horses were tied up behind Triplett's Virginians (the left wing of the main line), then the horses would have been roughly in the area shown. Connelly's statement does not indicate the exact location because it is unclear what distance he understood to be a "pace," how accurate was his assessment of the distance, and whether he was referring to his company's horses or the horses in general.

Sources:

Henry Lee's 1812 Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States

John Moncure's The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour webpage has a transcription of one of Howard's letter, and the statements by Collins and Connelly.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Henry Connelly (.pdf).

Related: Flight of the Militia - Part 1, Flight of the Militia - Part 2, Flight of the Militia - Part 4

Flight of the Militia - Part 2

In my last post, I raised the question of how the American militia retreated from the front line during the battle of Cowpens. I pointed out that while a number of histories maintain that the Americans retreated from right to left in front of the Continentals, there is little support for this view in participant accounts (none directly describe the retreat in this manner). I suggested that this view of the retreat arose from a misunderstanding by an early chronicler of the battle.

Although Edwin Bearss accepted the traditional view of how the American militia retreated (see his 1967 book, and especially this map), other modern writers have not. John Moncure, in the online Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour book, showed the militia retreating to the left and right around either flank of the main line in apparently equal proportions (see this map), but in his text he claimed that in retreating the militia "streamed around both flanks but mostly around the left."

Lawrence Babit's description of the retreat of the militia in A Devil of a Whipping is more complicated. Like Moncure, he took the view that the militia fell back to positions in the left rear and right rear of the main line with more moving to the left than to the right. However, he also had one part of the militia reforming alongside the main line (the commands of Major John Cunningham and Captain Samuel Hammond) and a second part of the militia remaining engaged with the British after the rest of the militia had fallen back (the command of Major Joseph McDowell).

Babits astutely pointed out the logical problems with having the militia retreat across the front of the Continentals. In particular, such a maneuver would have shielded the advancing British from the fire of the Continentals, and it would have exposed the retreating militia to destruction (those militia units furthest on the right of the militia line, at least, seemingly would have been unable to complete their retreat before the advancing British cut them off).

Babits' solution to this implausibility was to have the greater part of the militia retreating straight backwards from the militia line, through temporary gaps in the main line. He pointed to a statement in David Stewart's (1825) Sketches... of the Highlanders (book link) as support for this position.

Stewart wrote, "the enemy's front line moved off precipitately; and the second, which had as yet taken no share in the action, observing confusion and retrograding in their front, suddenly faced to the right, and inclined backwards; a manoeuvre by which a space was left for the front line to retreat, without interfering with the ranks of those who were now to oppose the advance of the Highlanders."

According to Babits, certain companies in the main line fell back a short distance, allowing the militia to retreat through the main line without disrupting the main line as a whole.

The quote from Stewart does not actually support Babits' account, but rather indicates that the whole line drew back. In fact, when the passage is read in context it is clear that what Stewart understood to be a retrograde movement to make room for the retreating militia was actually the accidental retreat of Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard's Continentals in the climatic moments of the battle.

The full passage is as follows:

"[T]he Highlanders were ordered up; and, rapidly advancing in charge, the enemy's front line moved off precipitately; and the second, which had as yet taken no share in the action, observing confusion and retrograding in their front, suddenly faced to the right, and inclined backwards; a manoeuvre by which a space was left for the front line to retreat, without interfering with the ranks of those who were now to oppose the advance of the Highlanders, "who ran in, with characteristic eagerness, desirous to take advantage of the confusion which appeared among the enemy." But the confusion was only in the front line; for Colonel Howard, commanding the enemy's Reserve, threw in a fire upon the 71st when within forty yards of the hostile force. The fire was destructive; nearly one-half of their number fell."

There are other reasons to doubt that the militia retreated straight back through gaps in the main line. It is generally thought that when the militia line fired at the British, the two forces were only a short distance apart, perhaps as little as 30 yards. If thereafter the militia and the British began moving towards the Continentals at the same speed, then the British should have been able to close to within 30 yards of the main line before the Continentals would have had a clear field of fire. One could argue that the British would have been staggered by the fire of the militia line and that they would have been slow to react to the flight of the militia. However, even if the militia did have a head start, there is still reason to be skeptical of the feasibility of this maneuvre. Babits' maps show two gaps in the main line. The militia units (many of them anyways) had to retreat at an angle to reach these gaps; the British had only to advance straight ahead. In Babits' account, at least 600 men were converging on these two locations, creating the possibility of a significant bottleneck effect at the main line. Further, his maps show the main line units falling back about 30 yards back to allow the militia units to pass. Once the militia were out of the way, these companies would have had to march forward the same distance to close the gaps in the main line. All of this suggests that even if the militia had a head start, some of the advancing British could have either reached the main line, or gotten very close to it, before they were subjected to the fire of the Continentals. The American commander, Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan, is broadly credited for his superb plan at Cowpens; it is difficult to believe that his battle plan would have included such an extremely risky element when simpler alternatives were available.

Morgan's after action report and other sources indicate that the American militia were deployed in two wings separated by a gap squarely in front of the Continentals. Morgan expressly indicated that these wings were intended to protect his flanks. An additional benefit of this formation is that it would have facilitated the retreat of the militia. The gap between the two wings of the militia line allowed the Continentals to check a British pursuit of the retreating militia from the moment that the British came within range of their muskets.

This interpretation is also directly supported by participant accounts.

Last time, I pointed out that Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard's letter to Colonel Henry Lee explicitly indicated that some of the militia in his front retreated to his right rear and implicitly indicated that others retreated to his left rear.

Private John Baldwin, who was in Major Joseph McDowell's battalion of North Carolinians on the militia line recalled that the plan for the militia was "to take aim when they fired, and as they retreated to divide to the right & left & form in the rear."

Private John Thomas, who was in Major Francis Triplett's battalion of Virginians on the main line recalled that the militia "fired five rounds and broke in the centre and flanked the right and left of the musquetry [i.e., the continentals, who carried muskets rather than rifles]. The British then charged bayonets on the musquety."

Major Joseph McJunkin, who was with the South Carolinians on the militia line recalled that when the Continentals counterattacked late in the battle, "the militia comes back, and fall in right and left." This statement suggests that militia units previously in the left rear and right rear joined in the counterattack on either flank of the Continentals.

Sources:

Edwin Bearss' 1967 Battle of Cowpens: A Documented Narrative and Troop Movement Maps.

Lawrence Babits' A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has his interpretation of the militia retreat and transcriptions of the statements by Morgan, Howard, Baldwin, Thomas, and McJunkin.

David Stewart's 1825 Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland.

Related: Flight of the Militia - Part 1, The Militia Line: Composition and Organization, Flight of the Militia - Part 4

Flight of the Militia - Part 1

Below is a diagram of the battle of Cowpens found on the wikipedia entry for the battle (the image is attributed to the United States Army Center of Military History). The diagram clearly shows the militia retreating across the front of the Continentals before circling around behind the Continentals to reenter the fray. This sequence of movements appears in a number of histories of the battle, including that of respected NPS historian Edwin Bearss (see this map). However, it is also wrong.

Rather, one part of the militia line retreated to the left rear of the main line, while the other part retreated to the right rear of the main line. More specifically, I believe that the militia line was divided into a left and right wing and that when the militia fell back, the left wing retreated to the left rear and the right wing retreated to the right rear.

The Planned American Retreat. 1 = Continental Light Dragoons, 2 = Mounted Militia, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line, 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line, 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line, 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line, 8 = Skirmishers

The traditional view of the retreat of the militia is not supported by an examination of participant accounts. Instead, the view that the militia retreated across the front of the Continentals originated with William Johnson's 1822 history, Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of Nathanael Greene. This view also should have ended with him. Johnson had the advantage of being one of the first to write a history of the battle, and he was writing at a time when many of the participants in the battle still lived. Nevertheless, his history is wrong on many counts. Colonel Henry Lee's second history, The Campaign of 1781 in the Carolinas: With Remarks, Historical and Critical, on Johnson's Life of Greene (1824) is devoted in large part to refuting Johnson's history. For the section of his book concerned with the battle of Cowpens, Lee included excerpts from a letter by Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard, one of the principal architects of the American victory, that serves essentially as a point-by-point refutation of Johnson's version of events.

Johnson: "The cavalry of Tarleton's left wing had poured upon the rear of the retreating militia. As the right of the line of militia had to traverse the whole front of the second line to reach the ground on which they were ordered to rally, they were necessarily very much exposed to this danger.

Howard: "The militia were formed in front of me, and the moment the british militia [see Note 1] formed their line they shouted and made a great noise to intimidate, and rushed with bayonets upon the militia who had not time, especially the riflemen to fire a second time. The militia fell into our rear, and part of them fell into the rear of my right flank where they afterwards renewed the action."

In other words, Howard is saying yes, the cavalry of Tarleton's left wing did attack the militia, but the militia did no such thing as retreat en masse across Howard's front. A part retreated to the rear of his "right flank where they afterwards renewed the action," and, by, extension, a part retreated to the rear of his left flank.

Johnson: "Washington flew to their assistance, and repulsing the enemy, enabled the militia to regain the tranquillity necessary for returning to a state of order. The eminence which had covered the reserve was exceedingly favourable to this purpose, and Pickens knew how to avail himself of it. Here most of them gathered round him and were soon reduced to order.

Howard: "I do not think there was such an eminence; there was a slight rise in the ground."

Howard doesn't deny that Washington aided the militia at this point or that Pickens was acting to rally the militia, but he does dispute Johnson's characterization of the terrain.

Johnson: "Apprehensive that the reserve could not be brought up in time to defend his exposed flank, or if it were, that it would leave his other flank too much exposed, Morgan dispatched an order to the militia on his right, to fall back from their right so as to form at right angles with his line, and repel the enemy's, advance upon his right flank. To effect this manoeuvre with precision and dispatch, the commanding officer ordered his men to face to the right about, and wheel on their left. The first part of the order was executed with coolness and recollection, and the militia began to move. At this point of time it was that fortune, ever hovering over fields of battle, played off that celebrated freak which at first threatened destruction to the American arms, but in a moment after, crowned them with the most signal success; Seeing the movement of the right of their line, and supposing that this was the state of things which required a retreat to the eminence in their rear, the whole American line faced about and began to move rather in an accelerating step, but still in perfect order, towards their intended second position. Howard presuming the order must have emanated from the commander, made no opposition, but bent his whole attention to the preservation of order, and encouragement- of his men. Morgan also under the impression that the movement was made under the order of Howard, and thinking favourably of it, under existing circumstances, rode along the rear of the line reminding the officers to halt and face as soon as they reached their ground. But just at that crisis they were accosted by another officer, and their attention drawn to some facts which produced an immediate change of measures."

Howard: "Seeing my right flank was exposed to the enemy, I attempted to change the front of Wallace's company, (Virginia regulars;) in doing it, some confusion ensued, and first a part, and then the whole of the company commenced a retreat. The officers along the line seeing this, and supposing that orders had been given for a retreat, faced their men about, and moved off. Morgan, who had mostly been with the militia, quickly rode up to me and expressed apprehensions of the event; but I soon removed his fears by pointing to the line, and observing that the men were not beaten who retreated in that order. He then ordered me to keep with the men, until we came to the rising ground near Washington's horse; and he rode forward to fix on the most proper place for us to halt and face about. In a minute we had a perfect line."

Johnson is describing here the unordered withdraw of Wallace's company of Virginians. Howard identifies the command and points out that they were regulars, not militia. Then he points out that the order originated not with Morgan, who with Pickens was rallying the militia, but with himself. Then he points out that he (Howard) was in control of the situation. The farcical situation that Johnson describes in which both Howard and Morgan think the retreat has been ordered by the other commander did not occur.

I could go on and on. Reading Johnson and Howard side-by-side is quite instructive. However, my concern is with the retreat of the militia. Where did Johnson obtain the erroneous idea that the militia retreated the field while crossing from right to left in front of the Continentals? My supposition is that he read earlier accounts of the battle, such as the Tarleton-Mackenzie-Hanger exchange, and attempted to reconcile the various contradictory statements in them.

Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton said that, "A captain, with fifty dragoons, was placed on each flank of the corps... The cavalry on the right were directed to charge the enemy's left"

Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie, however, said that, "Captain Ogilvie, with his troop, which did not exceed forty men, was ordered to charge the right flank of the enemy."

Saying that the Americans retreated from right to left, would allow both of their statements to be correct, if they referred to different points in time (the retreating militia were moving from right to left). However, this attempt to finesse Tarleton's and Mackenzie's statements makes no sense. Mackenzie was not adding detail to Tarleton's comments but rather offering a corrective to them. Johnson should have understood as much.

Unfortunately, despite the rhetorical drubbing that Howard delivered, historians remained respectful of Johnson's version of events and his description has had a very large influence on subsequent histories of the battle of Cowpens.

Notes:

1. The word "militia" was seemingly written in error. If it was not, then by "british militia," Howard may have meant the British Legion infantry, whose members were Loyalists. If the latter interpretation is correct then this suggests that the British Legion infantry were most directly opposed to the Continentals.

Sources:

Edwin Bearss' 1967 Battle of Cowpens: A Documented Narrative and Troop Movement Maps

William Johnson's 1822 Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of Nathanael Greene

Henry Lee's 1824 The Campaign of 1781 in the Carolinas: With Remarks, Historical and Critical, on Johnson's Life of Greene

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, includes a complete transcription of Howard's letter, plus the statements by Tarleton and Mackenzie.

Related: Introduction, The Militia Line: Composition and Organization, Tarleton's Narrative

Fitting Large Numbers on the Militia Line

This is the last in a series of posts defending the view that a relatively small number of Americans fought at Cowpens.

The militia line, according to Lawrence Babits in A Devil of a Whipping consisted of four South Carolina militia regiments commanded by Brandon, Hayes, Roebuck, and Thomas. (I previously presented an alternative scheme). Babits noted (p. 36) that there were 5 battalions in these 4 regiments, and that each battalion had 120-250 men. This means, by extension, that the militia line had between 600 and 1,250 men. Elsewhere (p. 189, n. 11) he said that the 4 regiments had 150-200 men each, which means that the militia line had between 600 and 800 men.

In his maps depicting the militia line, each of the 4 regiments (including Brandon's two-battalion regiment) is shown as having a length of 190 feet. If there were 600 men in the 4 regiments, then each man in the ranks would have occupied 1.27 feet of frontage (190 feet / 150 men per regiment). If there were 800 men in the 4 regiments, then the number falls to .95 feet. These numbers do not make allowances for spacing between companies or the presence of trees.

I previously commented on open-order and closed-order formations and produced the estimate that soldiers standing in open order would occupy something like 42 inches, or 3.5 feet (see Modeling Notes). Soldiers standing in close order would occupy something like 33 inches, or 2.75 feet. However, this applies only to a single rank. If the soldiers were standing in two ranks, then each soldier occupies, in a sense, 1.75 feet in open order, and 1.38 feet in close order. Both values are well above the space allotment indicated by Babits' diagrams.

Two Versions of the American Deployment (click to enlarge). My interpretation appears on the left, and is as described above. Babits' interpretation appears on the right; the positioning of the units per his account is approximate. On the right, 1 = American Cavalry; 2 = Main Line; 3 = Militia Line; 4 = Skirmish Line. The two accounts also differ in terms of the location of the Green River Road. The road in my version follows Bearss and is shown in brown. Babits showed the Green River Road following a different course, which I have partially sketched out in black on the right panel.

In my order of battle, I have approximately 315 men on the American militia line (see Cowpens in Miniature 3). Babits not only placed many more men on the militia line, but he placed them in a smaller area. On his maps, the right end of the American line is bounded by a shallow "ravine." This feature does not appear on my topographic map, which is not a reason per se to discount its value as a military barrier. However, other writers well familiarized with the battlefield, namely John Moncure (map) and Edwin Bearss (map), did not indicate a barrier to troop movement in this area.

If Babits had ignored the ravine and gave more room for his large number of militia, then of course, the militia would not be so closely pressed together. However, even if Babits' militia line were spread out across the distance shown in my diagram or the distances covered in the Moncure and Bearss maps, the problem created by such hypothesized large numbers of militiamen might not be entirely eliminated. A moderately wider deployment might allow his numbers of militia to have been deployed in open-order, but it would still have been necessary for the militia to have been deployed in two ranks. Private William Neel of Virginia claimed that the Virginia militia were deployed in one rank (see transcribed statement on John Moncure's website). It's not unlikely that the South Carolinians were deployed in a comparable manner.

Related: Introduction, How Many Fought at Cowpens?, Morgan and Seymour

Morgan and Seymour

This is the fourth in a series of posts defending the view that a relatively small number of Americans fought at Cowpens.

There are only a few participant accounts of the battle of Cowpens that were written around the time that the battle was fought. Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan's after action report was written two days after the battle. Lieutenant Thomas Anderson and Sergeant William Seymour of the Delaware company serving at the battle maintained journals, so too did the Loyalist Alexander Chesney. Of these, Morgan and Seymour mentioned the number of Americans serving at the battle. Both stated that the American force was around 800 men. One of the challenges that Lawrence Babits faced in arguing in A Devil of a Whipping that the American force was much larger than has been usually claimed was addressing Morgan's and Seymour's relatively small estimates.

Morgan

Babits pointed out that Morgan may have had cause to be deceptive in his public description of American strength at Cowpens. By suggesting that the number of militia was relatively small, the continentals would be seen as having played an especially important role in the victory. Leaving aside Morgan's intentions, which of course are difficult to explore, it at least can be pointed out that what Morgan said in his public report did not differ from what he said in his private correspondence. Two days before the battle, Morgan wrote to Major-General Nathanael Greene asking that his detachment be recalled from western South Carolina because it was too small to fight off whatever detachment the British might send against it:

“Upon a full and mature deliberation, I am confirmed in the opinion that nothing can be effected by my detachment in this country which will balance the risks I will be subjected to by remaining here. The enemy's great superiority of numbers and our distance from the main army, will enable Lord Cornwallis to detach so superior a force against me, as to render it essential to our safety to avoid coming to action; nor will this always be in my power. No attempt to surprise me will be left untried by them, and situated as we must be, every possible precaution may hot be sufficient to secure us. The scarcity of forage makes it impossible for us to be always in a compact body; and were this not the case, it is beyond the art of man to keep the militia from straggling. These reasons, induce me to request that I may be recalled with my detachment; and that General Davidson and Colonel Pickens may be left with the militia of North and South Carolina and Georgia. They will not be so much the object of the enemy's attention, and will be capable of being a check on the disaffected, which is all I can effect.”

Alternatively, it could be argued that Morgan might not have fully understand how many militiamen were with him. This argument cannot be taken too far, however, considering how effectively he used his forces in defeating the British. Furthermore, if Morgan was in error, then it stands to reason that his statement would have been corrected during or after the war by the commanders of the Southern militia. Instead, Governor John Rutledge, the commander-in-chief of the South Carolina militia wrote to Morgan of, "This total defeat of chosen Veteran British Troops by a number far inferior to theirs." Colonel Andrew Pickens, the commander of the militia line at Cowpens, corresponded after the war with Colonel Henry Lee. Lee published two histories of the Southern Campaign; in the first of these he mentioned Morgan's "inferiority in numbers." Pickens corresponded with him during this period, but rather than correct a misunderstanding, he wrote to Lee, "You know the particulars of the battle of the Cowpens."

Seymour

I previously provided the text of Morgan's report. Below is the text from Seymour's journal relating to the battle of Cowpens. (You can find this online here and here).

"We lay on this ground [Morgan's camp on the Pacolet River] from the twenty-fifth December, 1780, till the fourteenth January, 1781, and then proceeded on our march farther up the river towards the iron works in order to frustrate the designs of the enemy who were coming round us, Colonel Tarleton on one side and Lord Cornwallis on the other. We encamped on the Cowpen plains on the evening of the sixteenth January, forty-two miles, being joined by some Georgia volunteers and South [Carolina] militia, to the number of between two and three hundred.

"Next day being the seventeenth January, we received intelligence a while before day, that Colonel Tarleton was advancing in our rear in order to give us battle, upon which we were drawn up in order of battle, the men seeming to be all in good spirits and very willing to fight. The militia were dismounted and were drawn up in front of the standing troops on the right and left banks, being advanced about two hundred yards. By this time the enemy advanced and attacked the militia in front, which they stood very well for some time till being overpowered by the superior number of enemy they retreated, but in very good order, not seeming to be the least bit confused. By this time the enemy advanced and attacked our light infantry with both cannon and small arms, where meeting with a very warm reception they then thought to surround our right flank, to prevent which Captain Kirkwood with his company wheeled to the right and attacked their left flank so vigorously that they were soon repulsed, our men advancing on them so very rapidly that they soon gave way. Our left flank advanced at the same time and repulsed their right flank, upon which they retreated off, leaving us entire masters of the field, our men pursuing them for the distance of twelve miles, insomuch that all their infantry was killed, wounded, and taken prisoners. This action commenced about seven o'clock in the morning and continued till late in the afternoon.

"In the action were killed of the enemy one hundred and ninty men, wounded one hundred and eighty, and taken prisoners one Major, thirteen Captains, fourteen Lieutenants, and nine Ensigns, and five hundred and fifty private men, with two field pieces and four standards of colours. Their heavy baggage would have shared the same fate, if Tarleton, who retreated with his cavalry, had not set fire to it, burning up twenty-six waggons. This victory on our side can be attributed to nothing else but Divine Providence, they having thirteen hundred in the field of their best troops, and we not eight hundred of standing troops and militia.

"The troops against us were the 7th or Royal English Fuzileers, First Battalion of the 71st, and the British Legion, horse and foot.

"The courage and conduct of the brave General Morgan in this action is highly commendable, as likewise Colonel Howard, who at all times of the action rode from right to left of the line encouraging the men; and indeed all the officers and men behaved with uncommon and undaunted bravery, but more especially the brave captain Kirkwood and his company, who did that day wonders, rushing on the enemy without either dread or fear, and being instrumental in taking a great number of prisoners.

"Our loss in the action were one Lieutenant wounded, and one Sergeant, and thirty-five killed and wounded, of which fourteen were of Captain Kirkwood's Company of the Delaware Regiment."

Seymour twice referred to the number of American combatants. The first statement is "on the evening of the sixteenth January... [we were] joined by some Georgia volunteers and South [Carolina] militia, to the number of between two and three hundred."

On the morning of January 16th, the regulars and the militia minus a few detachments were encamped together. That day they marched for the Cowpens. The regulars and militia, however, began their march at different times. Josiah Martin of McDowell's battalion wrote (see this .pdf) that "Early in the morning the regulars commenced march, the militia being on horseback started about 12 O'clock & overtook the regulars the evening before the battle of the Cowpens." No doubt what Seymour is describing is these horse-riding militiamen catching up with the regulars in the evening. The 200-300 militiamen he mentions as joining them that evening is therefore basically the entirety of the militia serving on the front line, plus some of those that were on the main line (at least in my version of events: see here, here, and here), and probably the greater part of the mounted militia. This estimate can be disputed (see How Many Fought at Cowpens?). It should be remembered that given his relative position with the army he may have had no better information than the estimate provided by his eyes and the camp rumors that reached his ears. Perhaps he had heard that the militia with them were from South Carolina and Georgia and he did not realize that some were also from North Carolina. Nevertheless, Babits ascribed to Seymour's statement a very specific meaning. According to Babits (p 177-178, n 28), these 200-300 men were "McCall's South Carolina Regiment... three Georgia companies under Major James Jackson... [and those of] Hayes' Little River Battalion not on rear guard." Claiming that Seymour's 200-300 men referred to a small portion of Morgan's total force is convenient to Babits' argument that Morgan's total force was large. However, this is one of the more implausible readings of Seymour's statement. Seymour's account was very concise; he mentioned only the major facts. Why would he pick out one small part of the American force, a part that he was not in, nor served near him during the battle, nor played a crucial role in the victory? Why would he describe only its strength and not that of other militia units?

The other statement by Seymour is that, "This victory on our side can be attributed to nothing else but Divine Providence, they having thirteen hundred in the field of their best troops, and we not eight hundred of standing troops and militia." Seymour mentions 800 men in the American force, just like Morgan did in his report.

Here is Babits on the meaning of Morgan's and Seymour's 800 (p 151), "Morgan claimed 800 men won against 'chosen' British troops... Morgan's 'regulars,' Continentals, and long-service Virginia militia, numbered about 600 men; 300 Continental infantry, 82 Continental dragoons, 160 Virginia militia under Triplett, and about 50 Virginia State Troops. This total does not include Carolina and Georgia militia, nor does it include state troops. On paper, at least, Morgan counted his 'regulars," and perhaps threw in another 200 men to allow for the militia."

In an upcoming post I will present my version of the American order of battle. When I do so I will argue that the continentals, long-service militia, dragoons, and Virginia state troops totaled about 535 men. If there were 800 men in total, this would leave 265 men unaccounted for -- about the midpoint of the 200-300 Georgian and Carolina militia that Seymour witnessed. If Morgan was in fact mistaken about militia totals, his error, like Seymour's, would seem to be on the order of an honest mistake rather than deliberate subterfuge.

Babits continued by saying, "Sergeant Major William Seymour of the Delaware Company validates this interpretation by stating explicitly that "we [had] not eight hundred of standing troops and militia." If Seymour meant 800 regulars ("standing troops") augmented by militia, then Morgan, Seymour, and Tarleton agree. Eliminating the militia made the victory seem more important because American regulars won the battle."

Read in context, Seymour's statement does not validate this interpretation but indicates quite the opposite. He is comparing one total force to another, and he emphasizes the weakness of the American force by indicating not only that was it smaller in size but also that it was partially comprised of militia. It cannot be credibly argued that Seymour used his journal (which was first published long after his death) to mislead the public about the contribution of the Continentals to the victory at Cowpens. Rather, Seymour surely believed the same thing that Morgan, Greene, Pickens, Rutledge, Colonel Otho Williams, and the United States Congress believed (see the passages described in this post as well as the statements quoted above) -- that Morgan's army was substantially outnumbered by Tarleton's command.

Related: Introduction, Problems with Pensions, Veteran Survival, Little River Regiment

Little River Regiment

This is the third in a series of posts defending the view that a relatively small number of Americans fought at Cowpens.

I think Lawrence Babits' efforts to use pension applications to better understand the battle of Cowpens is commendable, even though I disagree that a very large number of Americans fought at Cowpens, and I've previously taken issue with the argument that either the sheer number of pension applications, or pension-derived estimates of unit size convincingly show that a large number of Americans were present. In this post I take issue with a third argument in favor of a large American total, which involves "counting captains."

To illustrate my concerns, I focus on one militia regiment in particular, the "Little River Regiment," of Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Hayes. About this regiment Babits said (A Devil of a Whipping, p 39):

"The Little River Regiment was composed of five companies under Captains James Ewing, William Harris, James Dugan, Samuel Sexton, and James Irby. Captain James Ewing commanded the right flank company located on the Green River Road. Captain William Harris served under Hayes during the fight at Blackstock's Plantation. Captain James Dugan was reported as a major at Cowpens, but his brother appears to have held that rank... Captain James Lindsay commanded a platoon in Dugan's company."

He then further described the companies of Sexton and Irby, which I brought up in my last post.

Babits believed each of these companies to be of a decent size, although considerably less than a full strength company of Continentals. He noted (p 31), "The immediate impression is that a captain commanded about twenty to thirty men."

Under this formula, the five companies would combine to create a regiment of about 100 to 150 men. This falls short of the 150 to 200 men he attributed to each regiment (p 189, n. 11). However, if Sexton was correct that he had 24 men and Irby was correct that he had around 65 men, then the range would be more like 149 to 179.

In working on this project, I've read quite a few of the pension applications that have been transcribed and publicly posted on the website southerncampaign.org. There are, at this writing, a little over 5,500 applications online (and the number has been increasing almost by the day), mostly for veterans that served with units from Virginia and the Carolinas. Many of these veterans claimed service at Cowpens*

*A search for the term Cowpens generates at the moment 598 results, although not all of these "hits" involve applications in which the veteran claimed service at the battle of Cowpens. Some applications mentioned Cowpens because it was a staging ground before the battle of King's Mountain; in some other cases the term refers to an entirely different locale.

I have already disagreed with Babits about where Hayes' regiment was on the battlefield. Searching through these pensions I also found evidence for a very different organization for Hayes' regiment. Mindful that the officers comanding a given company could change with some frequency, I assembled a list of those online applications where the application clearly indicated service in Hayes' regiment under a given company commander at the battle of Cowpens. In some cases the applicant makes these connections; in other cases they appear in statements of support appended to the application. Links (all are to .pdfs) are provided for the benefit of the reader that would to examine these applications for himself/herself.

1. Thomas Blasingame's company. Jethro O'Shields and John O'Shields served in this company.

2. James Dillard's company. See Captain James Dillard's pension application. Babits (p 75) says that "Dillard's company became the left, or second, platoon under Ewing," and cites Robert Long's application as evidence. This contention is by no means clear from Long's application.

3. James Ewing's company Robert Long placed himself in this company.

4. William Harris' company. Lewis Saxon, Joel Harvey, and Joseph Griffin served in this company.

5. John Jones' company. Golding Tinsley served in this company. Although in the application of Robert Long, he implies that was in Ewing's company.

6. John Ridgeway's company. John Ridgeway (junior) places himself in his father's company. William Childress also places himself in this company.

7. Samuel Saxton's company. See Captain Samuel Saxton's pension application.

8. Daniel Williams' company. James Tinsley served in this company.

(9). James Dugan's company. This is one of the companies that Babits described. The online records I examined (which are incomplete) did not indicate a clear connection between James Dugan's company and Hayes' regiment at the time of Cowpens.

(10). John Irby's company. Neither Captain John Irby nor Richard Griffin who was also in this company say that they were adjoined to Hayes' regiment. Irby said he was in the Little River area before setting out for Cowpens. Richard Griffin indicated that he was one of the Georgian refugees, which would seemingly place Irby's company on the left wing of the militia line, while Robert Long's statements clearly place Hayes' regiment on the right wing of the main line. Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan stated that Hayes' regiment was on the left wing of the militia line near the Georgian refugees.

In short, a partial inspection of the pension applications indicates 8 companies that with some confidence can be placed in Hayes' regiment at the time of the battle. Following Babits' suggested company size, this would give Hayes' regiment between 160 and 240 men. However, there are 8 different companies described in these 12 applications, and 1 captain for every 6 applications. These numbers suggest an alternative possibility -- that the militia companies at Cowpens were both very numerous and very small.

A clear indication that the militia companies were very small can be found in a statment made by Private Aaron Guyton of Colonel Thomas Brandon's regiment of South Carolinians. Guyton said:

"I was under Col Brandon who had a few Brave Men who stood true for the cause of Liberty in the back part of the State who composed our little Army I was out the most of this time Some times we had 75 Some Times 150 men, and some times we had 4 or 5 Cols with from 50 to 150 men. Each of them had Command of a Regt at home & some times not more than 5 of his men with him. The Cols were Brandon, Hayes, Roebuck, White,--in December 1780 Genl Morgan & Col. Washington of the Cavalry came out and took Camp near Pacolet River was soon joined with what few Malitia was in our part."

In other words, even if there were a handful of South Carolina militia regiments at Cowpens, the total number of men representing those regiment could still have been very small. Babits, I think, interpreted this statement as an indication that each colonel or lieutenant colonel commanded between 50 to 150 men (although in his book he does not give the strength of any of these regiments as being under 150 men). My interpretation is that this number refers to the combined forces of these officers, as suggested by Guyton's phrases "our little Army" and "what few Malitia was in our part [of South Carolina]."

If a regiment at times could be as few as five men and a colonel, then it requires no stretch of the imagination to believe that the individual companies could also be quite small. Indeed, Guyton went on to say that, "we had no Officer in our Company & only two or three or four men, and the morning before the Battle 17 January 1781 we joined Captain John Thompson's Company."

With such small companies in existence, men would perhaps frequently jump from one company to another as the occassion warranted, especially if their officers were not always present. For this reason I was careful in my pension search to make sure that the application clearly indicated that service with a given company commander occurred at the battle of Cowpens.

Babits suggested that a typical militia company contained around 25 men, which does seem like a reasonable estimate. However, evidence for this in regards to Cowpens is poor. Only Samuel Sexton and John Collins mentioned commanding companies of this size at Cowpens, and Sexton's company was seemingly raised under unusual circumstances. John Irby claimed to have commanded a company of 60 to 70 men at the battle, but I gave reasons for why this is dubious.

In my opinion, one cannot reject the possibility that some, if not many, of the militia companies present at Cowpens consisted of groups of 10 men or less.

One also cannot reject the possibility that some of these statements about companies and commanders are inaccurate. For example, North Carolina militiaman James Patterson stated that he, "was at the battle of the Cowpens; engaged in the battle some time near the middle of January—he was under Col. Rutherford in the battle with the militia who retreated in the first attack but he was wounded and cut down but afterwards recovered and joined the regular troops under Col. Howard and assisted during the rest of the battle in defeating the British and joined in pursuit of the enemy." Rutherford's regiment is not regarded as having been present at the battle. Does Patterson's statement mean that historians have overlooked an entire regiment of North Carolinians? Of course not. More believable is that Patterson was in error. Perhaps Patterson was in Major Joseph McDowell's battalion of North Carolina militiamen and misremembered that fact. In the case of a statement about a large formation, the error is easily caught. Statements in error about smaller formations are both more likely to occur and less likely to be discovered.

As is the case with the other arguments I've considered, the argument that a large number of combatants in Morgan's force is indicated by a large number of companies is insufficient in my view to reject other evidence.

Related: Introduction, Problems with Pensions, Veteran Survival

Veteran Survival

This is the second in a series of posts defending the view that a relatively small number of Americans fought at Cowpens.

In arguing for a large total of American combatants, Lawrence Babits in A Devil of a Whipping pointed out that there were too many pension applications from men claiming to have been at Cowpens for the number of participants to have been only 800 (or perhaps even any number less than 1,000, despite what participants and authorities said at the time. So it would seem. But to me at least this argument is insufficiently persuasive.

First, it's not unreasonable to expect that many veterans of the battle would have survived to old age. This may have been a time when the average lifespan was much shorter than it is today, but these were not average men. The soldiers at Cowpens had of course survived childhood (high mortalitiy among infants and children was one of the primary reasons why the average lifespan was much shorter in the past), and furthermore, they were healthy enough as young men to be able to go to war, and many of them had also already survived exposure to camp diseases and participation in some of the war's bloodiest battles. The real question, then, shouldn't be what percentage of Americans born during this time would have survived into old age, but rather, what was the future survival rate of such a select group.

Second, dead men could, in a sense, file pension applications. At least, a number of widows and children submitted applications in the name of a deceased veteran.

Third, the pension applications are not wholly reliable. Of the transcribed pension applications that I've relied upon (and that are available through southerncampaign.org), some are annotated, and point out probable inaccuracies in the statements. There are a few cases at least when it is possible to discover them: the continental soldier who claimed service at the siege of Charleston, for example, is unlikely to have also been at Camden. For the most part, though, there is no way for the modern reader to confirm or refute the claims made by these would-be pensioners. The typical application contains few details; participation in certain battles is noted but nothing is said about what the participant saw or did. There is, therefore, no way to determine whether the old men submitting these applications (or their widows or children) accurately recalled their service, misremembered details of their service, or even knowingly made a false statement. (Somewhat off topic, see this interesting article on "memory creep," from Boston 1775).

It is possible, at least, to make the total number of applications a more convincing argument than it is now. Imagine that one examines the pension applications for a number of major battles occurring in the South around this time, not just Cowpens, but King's Mountain, Camden, Guilford Courthouse, Hanging Rock, Eutaw Springs, Blackstock's Plantation, and Fishing Creek. Let's say that one then finds that the ratio of pension applications describing participation at these battles to the number of men thought to have actually fought in them is generally X. However, it is found in the case of Cowpens that the ratio is not X, but a larger value (Y). The individual applications may be of questionable reliability, but such a divergence in the overall pattern would seemingly indicate that the conventional wisdom about how many participants fought in that battle is wrong. This in itself would not be decisive evidence (if people were to falsely remember the past, it seems more likely that they would recall in error participation at Cowpens than, say, Fishing Creek). However, it would at least strengthen Babits' case.

Related: Introduction, How Many Fought at Cowpens?, Problems with Pensions