New York Volunteers

The New York Volunteers were one of several regiments of Provincials (Loyalists that were essentially trained and equipped in the manner of British regulars) that served in the Southern campaign of the American Revolution.

Loyalist refugees in New York began fleeing in 1775 to the British authorities, and these were formed in early 1776 at Halifax into two companies of Volunteers. The companies were first deployed at the battles of Long Island (1776) and White Plains (1776). The Volunteers were subsequently expanded and in 1779 were placed on the American Establishment and designated the 3rd American Regiment (although they continued to be referred to as the New York Volunteers). The Volunteers participated in the storming of Fort Montgomery, New York (1777), the capture of Savannah, Georgia (1778), the siege of Savannah (1779), and the siege of Charleston, South Carolina (1780). Following the capture of the American army at Charleston, the regiment was assigned to garrison the post at Rocky Mount, South Carolina, one of a string of posts across the northern portion of the state. The regiment was engaged at the battle of Rocky Mount (1780), and, after that post was abandoned, Hobkirk's Hill (1781), and Eutaw Springs (1781). Detachments were also present at Williamson's Plantation (1780), Camden (1780), and King's Mountain (1780).

The regiment appears to have worn red coats, faced blue, while in South Carolina.

Bibliography:

René Chartrand (2008). American Loyalist Troops 1775-84. Osprey.

Philip R. N. Katcher (1973). Encyclopedia of British, Provincial, and German Army Units 1775-1783. Stackpole Books.

The On-Line Institute for Advanced Loyalist Studies. New York Volunteers Officers' Memorial.

New Topics

Having at last wrapped up blogging about the battle of Cowpens, I will next post on an earlier phase to the Southern Campaign of the American Revolution. Specifically, I will write about four battles that were fought in July and August, 1780 between Colonel Thomas Sumter's brigade of militia, and the British forces occupying the South Carolina "backcountry." These engagements included one smashing victory for the Americans (Williamson’s Plantation; July 12, 1780), one minor defeat (Rocky Mount; July 30, 1780), one bloody but drawn battle (Hanging Rock; August 6, 1780), and one serious defeat (Fishing Creek; August 18, 1780).

None of these battles will receive the thorough reappraisal that I gave the battle of Cowpens. Michael Scoggins’ recent work on the battle of Williamson’s Plantation is perhaps the most thorough treatment given to any battle of the Revolution. I still intend, at least, to put together some kind of representation of the fighting in miniature. My treatment of Rocky Mount, Hanging Rock, and Fishing Creek will also be circumspect, but chiefly because I do not have ready access to some crucial sources of information, such as Draper’s Sumter Papers or British correspondence and official records found in the Public Records Office. With that said, I do have access to quite a few accounts of these battles thanks to online transcribed memoirs and pension applications, early histories that have been digitalized by Google Books, and the resources of my local library. With these I can at least describe the major features of each battle. Good descriptions of the battle of Hanging Rock are particularly wanting in my opinion, and I expect to devote more posts to that topic than the others.

References:

Michael C. Scoggins' 2005 The Day It Rained Militia: Huck's Defeat and the Revolution in the South Carolina Backcountry, May-July 1780 (link to amazon.com).

Cowpens: Battlefield Maps

Cowpens is one of the more frequently written about battles of the American Revolution; it's a staple, at least, of general military histories of the war. Having perused a number of such histories over the year, my feeling is that the textual summaries of the battle found in these histories are more-or-less adequate. However, the battlefield map that accompanies these histories (at least when one is present) is usually quite inaccurate. Why is this?

The oldest extant maps of the battlefield are the so-called "Pigee map" and "Clove map" first published in Lawrence Babits' A Devil of a Whipping. These were evidently drawn not long after the battle, although by whom is unclear. My view is that these were not the work of a participant at the battle, but rather that they were produced by someone that had read (and wished to illustrate) the disposition of the British and American forces indicated by Morgan's after action report. Morgan's report mentions in one place that "The light infantry, commanded by Lieut. Col. Howard, and the Virginia militia under the command of Major Triplett, were formed on a rising ground, and extended a line in front." In another place it states that "Capts. Tate and Buchanan, with the Augusta riflemen, [were] to support the right of the line." Consistent with this description, the author(s) of the maps drew a battle line consisting of Howard's and Triplett's troops with another two companies forming a wing to the right rear consisting of Tate's and Buchanan's companies. This is exactly what someone relying solely on the report would have drawn; a participant would have known that Tate and Buchanan were part of Triplett's command, not a separate entity.

In any case, these maps have only recently come to light. The first battlefield map to be widely circulated was the map that William Johnson included in his 1822 Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of Nathanael Greene. I previously noted that the depiction is inaccurate, but it does have some strong points worth noting.

The Johnson Map (click to enlarge).

First of all, William Johnson clearly visited the battlefield. The three major elevations which I've previously described in connection with the battlefield are both present and correctly placed on his map.

Three Elevations on the Cowpens Battlefield.

Second, Johnson correctly placed the main American line between the first and second elevations on the battlefield. Although counterintuitive, this is indicated in various participant memoirs and pension applications (for a previous discussion, see: The Main Line: Location). For example, in one application, the son of North Carolina militiaman Thomas Lackey learned from his father "That at the Battle of the Cowpens the regulars were situated rather behind a hill."

Third, Johnson shows both troops of British dragoons attached to their front line charging the American militia, a point which most writers overlook, but which does seem indicated, on balance by participant accounts (see: British Cavalry Charges at Cowpens - Part 1, British Cavalry Charges at Cowpens - Part 2, Cowpens in Miniature 16, Cowpens in Miniature 18).

Fourth, Johnson shows that at the end of the battle, the British line had broken into two parts, which separately surrendered. This does not appear in Morgan's or Tarleton's description of the battle, but it is indicated in participant accounts (see: Cowpens in Miniature 21, Cowpens in Miniature 23). This further suggests that Johnson made an investment into learning what really happened at Cowpens rather than just rely on authority. This is clearly to his credit, even if he did err in some respects.

The chief problem, however, isn't the problems with Johnson's map, but it's rather with what was done with it. Henry Beebee Carrington printed a modified version of this map in his 1881 Battle Maps and Charts of the American Revolution.

For reasons not easily guessed at, Carrington turned Johnson's three elevations into two and he placed the Broad River on the edge of the battlefield, when in actuality it is miles away. Carrington's other deviations from Johnson were likewise unhelpful: he placed the main line on the crest of the foremost ridge and he reduced the number of charging troops of dragoons from two to one. Strangest of all, Carrington mistook the small rectangles representing the retreating American militia (lower right panel in Johnson's map) for British infantry units, and so has the British infantry drifting off to the right rather than directly advancing on the Continentals.

The Carrington Map (click to enlarge).

Although the Carrington map does not adhere well to the physical geography of the battlefield or participant accounts of the fighting, most of the subsequently-published battlefield maps adhere closely to the Carrington map. Notable exceptions can be found in the histories published by Edwin Bearss, Lawrence Babits, and John Moncure. All three of these distinguished writers prepared detailed maps based on multiple participant accounts and a careful consideration of battlefield topography. Two of these three works can be read in their entirety online, and Bearss' history is more than 40 years old. What does it say about the quality of contemporary treatments of the battle of Cowpens when Carrington should remain the gold standard and Bearss, Babits, and Moncure should have little discernable impact?

One of Edwin Bearss' excellent maps (click to enlarge).

Sources:

Lawrence Babits' 1998 A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Thomas Lackey (.pdf file).

Henry Beebee Carrington's 1881 Battle Maps and Charts of the American Revolution.

Edwin Bearss' 1967 Battle of Cowpens: A Documented Narrative and Troop Movement Maps. (Also valuable is Edwin Bearss' 1974 Historic Grounds and Resource Study).

John Moncure published The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour.

Related: The Cowpens Battlefield, Morgan's Report, Cowpens Battlefield in Miniature

Cowpens: Addendum

I've read numerous participant accounts pertaining to the battle of Cowpens, but I expect that there are some accounts out there that I haven't read yet and which may alter to some degree my views about the battle. Recently I read a couple of British accounts that I hadn't cited previously, and I feel compelled to briefly comment on each.

One source is the widely-read history of the American Revolution authored by Charles Stedman, commissay during the war to Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis. Stedman was not present at the battle of Cowpens; his account of it is therefore largely based on Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton's history and Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie's commentary on that history. Earlier I argued that Mackenzie contradicted (and likely corrected) Tarleton's description of the first British cavalry charge. I also blamed William Johnson for creating confusion about this charge by adopting a nonsensical position halfway between Tarleton and Mackenize. Stedman, however, adopted this position before Johnson did. Stedman wrote:

"The first line of the Americans being composed of militia, did not long withstand the charge of the British regulars: It gave way in all quarters, and was pursued to the continentals. The latter, undismayed by the retreat of the militia, maintained their ground with great bravery; and the conflict between them and the British was obstinate and bloody. Captain Ogilvie, with his troop of dragoons on the right of the British line, was directed to charge the left flank of the enemy. He cut his way through their line, but being exposed to a heavy fire, and, at the same time, charged by the whole of Washington's cavalry, was compelled to retreat in confusion. The British reserve now received orders to move forward; and as soon as they felt the advance of the Seventy-first regiment, the whole again moved on. The continentals, no longer able to withstand the shock, were forced to give way."

I also observed with interest, that while Tarleton claimed the British were outnumbered by the Americans and Mackenzie hedged on this point, Stedman unequivocally stated that the "The British were superior in numbers." I have no idea whether Stedman, by virtue of his having served with the British army in the South had special insight into the true strength of the two armies. At the very least, this statement indicates that the American view about the relative strength of the two armies eventually came to prevail on both sides of the Atlantic. (In regards to the strength of the two armies, see: How Many Fought at Cowpens?, Cowpens in Miniature 2, and Cowpens in Miniature 3).

The other source is Mark Urban's recently published, Fusiliers: The Saga of a British Redcoat Regiment in the American Revolution, which focuses on the experience of the 23rd Foot. In it, I was surprised to find an unpublished officer's account of Cowpens. The officer, Lieutenant Harry Calvert, was with Cornwallis' army at the time, and he described in his journal what was being said about the battle. One passage stands out. Urban, summarizing the journal, wrote:

"As one fugitive after another wandered into the British camp, Calvert pierced together the story of what had gone wrong. Tarleton, as was his custom, had hurled his troops into action before they were all up, and the 71st had advanced towards their enemy, taking significant losses from enemy sharpshooters as they went" (p 226).

Assuming that the description is faithful to the source, Calvert echoed Mackenzie's complaint that the British attack against the first line (militia and skirmishers) occurred before all of the British troops were in position (see Cowpens in Miniature 13). However, Mackenzie complained that the 71st Foot was out of position when the attack was launched, while Calvert seemingly indicated the opposite. I make this observation not because I feel compelled to reverse course but because it helps illustrate how difficult it can be to reconcile the various participant accounts. To summarize on this issue, participants indicated that the 71st directly participated in the attack on the first line (Morgan, Calvert), that it was a short distance in reserve and joined the fighting soon after the Continentals were attacked (Tarleton and, sycophantically, Hanger), and that it joined the fighting after the British had begun to retreat (Cornwallis). Regardless of the view adopted (I deferred to Tarleton), it is necessary to stand in contradiction with key sources.

Sources:

Charles Stedman's 1794 The History of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton's and Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie's accounts of the battle.

Mark Urban 's 2007 Fusiliers: The Saga of a British Redcoat Regiment in the American Revolution is available through amazon.com.

James Graham's 1856 The Life of General Daniel Morgan has a copy of Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan's report of the battle.

A transcription of Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis' report of the battle can be found here.

Related: How Many Fought at Cowpens?, Cowpens in Miniature 16, Cowpens in Miniature 17

Looking Ahead

At this point, my Cowpens project is basically complete -- the culmination of about 2 years' worth of reading, painting, and writing. My views about the battle have evolved somewhat since I've started blogging, and I have ended up revisiting older posts and editing them, where necessary, to present a consistent view. I may well make a few additional "tweaks" to what I've already written, but for the most part I intend to leave things as they are. I'm not sure, however, that I'll be able to completely leave the topic of Cowpens aside. I expect to have at least a couple of posts on Cowpens in the weeks ahead.

Already I've begun making preparations for my next battlefield project. I'll make an announcement about it either at the end of June or the beginning of July. I had a lot of time to work on my Cowpens project before I started blogging, which enabled me to blog at a rapid pace over the past five months. I've only recently started working on the new project, which means output will significantly slow. I don't think the new project will take 2 years to complete, however. My goal is to be finished within 12 months.

Looking Back

So, I have written what basically amounts to a book-length treatment of the battle of Cowpens. Clearly I have enjoyed this endeavor, from reading the various participant accounts, to painting the military miniatures, to arranging them on the miniature battlefield and writing the whole thing up. But I’ve asked myself, is this good history?

My answer is… maybe.

The usual history of the battle of Cowpens seems to be one that is based on a few well-known participant accounts (Morgan’s and Tarleton’s, in particular) and that is deferential towards earlier histories. While this sounds reasonable, the result is often wanting. I’ve noticed that dubious details present in earlier histories tend to be echoed uncritically in later ones. For example, William Johnson's 1822 history of the battle included one of the first maps of the battle of Cowpens. Although his history was flawed (I criticized him in particular on his description of the retreat of the American militia; see Flight of the Militia - Part 1) and the accompanying map crude, this nevertheless became the model on which later maps were based.

The Johnson Map. Initial positions are shown on the left, the retreat of the front-line militia is shown at the lower right, and the American counterattack is shown at the upper right. This map does not reflect the actual geography of the Cowpens battlefield (see The Cowpens Battlefield).

Henry Carrington's 1881 compendium of battlefield maps of the American Revolution included a refined version of the Johnson map. This map repeated the errors present in the Johnson map, and added additional ones as well. Most notably, the Broad River is shown closely skirting the edges of the battlefield. Remarkably, most recently-published histories of the battle present a battlefield map that closely follows Carrington.

The Carrington Map.

Not every history of the battle has uncritically followed earlier histories. Henry Cabot Lodge's 1903 history, for example, wisely did not adopt Johnson's map of the battle or his description of the militia's retreat. In general, Lodge's approach seems to have been one of reporting details that seemed relatively certain and omitting ones that were not. He entirely avoided the topic of British cavalry charges during the battle, perhaps because of the varying and confusing claims made in this regard by Tarleton and Mackenzie (see British Cavalry Charges at Cowpens - Part 1). Regardless of the causes of these omissions, the result is something less than a complete description of the battle.

Lawrence Babits' recent history, which I have frequently cited, improved in important respects on earlier histories. Babits eschewed the usual practice of relying solely on a few well-known participant accounts and earlier histories, but rather built off of a huge amount of source material offer a completely new interpretation of what took place.

Delving into a battle in such great detail can lead to numerous new insights into how the American Revolution was won (or lost, depending on the point of view). Drawing upon new sources of information can also shed new light on the contradictions present in the well-known accounts. The downside is that the greater detail and wider array of sources necessitate an increase in how frequently interpretation must substitute for fact. This in turn means that errors in the account are likely, perhaps even inevitable.

Despite these hazards, I have more-or-less emulated Babits. I decided that it would be possible to describe the battle in detail based solely on participant accounts and for the most part ignore postwar histories (which I consider to be largely unreliable). I did make an exception for a few secondary accounts. The postwar histories by Henry Lee and William Moultrie were cited with some frequency, for example, because of the authors’ familiarity with the Revolutionary War, because of their acquaintanceship with key participants at Cowpens, and because their histories usually agree with participant accounts. The inclusion of David Stewart’s history was based principally on the unique perspective it provides; I noted more than once that its description of the battle is not wholly reliable.

Having decided to use these sources, I next sought to show how they could be strung together to create a fairly reasonable and coherent narrative of the battle. There are numerous ways to connect the dots among these accounts. My guiding principle was that the narrative should be true to a natural reading of the accounts, have the actors making rational decisions, and avoid unnecessary complexity.

In this regard, I believe I have had considerable success.

Consider again Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan’s official report of the battle, which is arguably one of the most important and trustworthy participant accounts. In considering this report I took it for granted that Morgan did not describe every facet of the fighting, but instead emphasized how the Americans won rather than how they almost lost (for this reason he said very little about the British cavalry charges). Likewise, I presumed that the report named all of the major officers, but not all of the minor commands. Given those caveats (which I think are reasonable), a side-by-side reading of Morgan’s report and my account shows that they are well matched, although there are some discrepancies.

Morgan wrote:

"An hour before daylight one of my scouts returned and informed me that Lieut. Col. Tarleton had advanced within five miles of our camp. On this information, I hastened to form as good a disposition as circumstances would admit, and from the alacrity of the troops, we were soon prepared to receive them. The light infantry, commanded by Lieut. Col. Howard, and the Virginia militia under the command of Major Triplett, were formed on a rising ground, and extended a line in front. The third regiment of dragoons, under Lieut. Col. Washington, were posted at such a distance in their rear, as not to be subjected to the line of fire directed at them, and to be so near as to be able to charge them should they be broken. The volunteers from North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, under the command of the brave and valuable Col, Pickens, were situated to guard the flanks. Maj. McDowall, of the North Carolina volunteers, was posted on the right flank in front of the line, one hundred and fifty yards; and Maj. Cunningham, of the Georgia volunteers, on the left, at the same distance in front, Colonels Brannon and Thomas, of the South Carolinans, were posted on the right of Maj. McDowall, and Cols. Hay and McCall, of the same corps, on the left of Maj. Cunningham. Capts. Tate and Buchanan, with the Augusta riflemen, to support the right of the line [Cowpens in Miniature 8].

"The enemy drew up in single line of battle, four hundred yards in front of our advanced corps. The first battalion of the 71st regiment was opposed to our right, the 7th regiment to our left, the infantry of the legion to our centre, the light companies on our flanks. In front moved two pieces of artillery. Lieut. Col. Tarleton, with his cavalry, was posted in the rear of the line [Cowpens in Miniature 11, 12].

"The disposition of battle being thus formed, small parties of riflemen were detached to skirmish with the enemy [Cowpens in Miniature 12], upon which their whole line moved on with the greatest impetuosity, shouting as they advanced. McDowall and Cunningham gave them a heavy and galling fire, and retreated to the regiments intended for their support [13]. The whole of Col. Pickens' command then kept up a fire by regiments, retreating agreeably to their orders [14]. When the enemy advanced on our line, they received a well-directed and incessant fire [15]. But their numbers being superior to ours, they gained our flanks, which obliged us to change our position [17]. We retired in good order about fifty paces, formed, and advanced on the enemy, and gave them a fortunate volley, which threw them into disorder [19]. Lieut. Col. Howard observing this, gave orders for the line to charge bayonets [20], which was done with such address that they fled with the utmost precipitation leaving their fieldpieces in our possession [21]. We pushed our advantage so effectually, that they never had an opportunity of rallying, had their intentions been ever so good [22].

"Lieut. Col. Washington, having been informed that Tarleton was cutting down our riflemen on the left [Cowpens in Miniature 18, 19], pushed forward, and charged them with such firmness [20, 21], that instead of attempting to recover the fate of the day, which one would have expected from an officer of his splendid character, broke and fled [22].

"The enemy's whole force were now bent solely in providing for their safety in flight [Cowpens in Miniature 22] -the list of their killed, wounded, and prisoners, will inform you with what effect [23, 25]. Tarleton, with the small remains of his cavalry, and a few scattered infantry he had mounted on his wagonhorses, made their escape. He was pursued twenty-four miles, but owing to our having taken a wrong trail at first, we could never overtake him [25].

By my count, there are three notable discrepancies between Morgan’s account and mine.

First, I did not place Hayes’ regiment in the position Morgan indicated, because I deferred to Robert Long’s description of his position. Instead, I indicated that Andrew Pickens’ regiment of South Carolina militia (not mentioned by Morgan) was in this area [see Cowpens in Miniature 8, The Militia Line: Composition and Organization, The Statements of Private Robert Long].

Second, I did not place Tate’s company on the right of the Continentals. Instead, I deferred to Howard’s description of Tate’s whereabouts and placed Tate on the Continentals’ left (see Cowpens in Miniature 8, The Main Line: Composition). (Babits sidestepped this disagreement between Morgan and Howard by claiming that there were two captains Tate present: one James and one Edward).

Third, I adopted a very different British deployment, because I deferred (with some reluctance) to Tarleton’s account (see Cowpens in Miniature 11, Note 5).

Although not without problems, I think my account provides a fairer treatment of Morgan’s report than is found in Babits’ history of the battle. Babits’ history contains 11 notable discrepancies by my count. 1) He did not show the American militia under Pickens to be situated to guard the flanks. 2) He did not have McDowell and Cunningham 150 yards in front of the Continentals, but rather 150 yards in front of Pickens and the South Carolina militia. 3) He did not have the commands of Brandon, Thomas, McDowell, Hayes, McCall (Hammond), and Cunningham positioned relative to each other in the manner Morgan indicated. 4) He deferred (as did I) to Tarleton’s description of the British deployment. 5) He had the skirmishers deployed before the British deployment, not after. 6) He had the skirmishers to be a fairly numerous, consisting of several small battalions (McDowell, Cunningham, and Hammond), not "small parties." 7) He did not have McDowell, Cunningham, and Hammond partaking in the "fire by regiments," although they were under Pickens’ control. 8) He did not show the attacking British infantry to be more numerous than the American main line; their numbers would have been roughly comparable following British losses on the militia line (possibly, the British would have been outnumbered). 9) He had the British gaining the American right flank of the main line chiefly because of a regiment-sized gap between the 7th Foot and 71st Foot. He did not have the British right extending beyond the American left. 10) He had Washington’s cavalry charge to the left occurring well before Howard’s counterattack. Also, he did not directly connect this charge with the charge that carried Washington into the rear of the British line. 11) He had Washington’s climatic charge launched from the American right.

Also noteworthy is that my method of interpreting the source material led me to some relatively unorthodox conclusions about how the battle was fought. Nevertheless, the present account holds together fairly well. The unusual manner in which I’ve shown the American main line to be deployed [see Cowpens in Miniature 8, The Main Line: Organization], for example, wasn’t based on a whimsical desire to elevate Samuel Hammond’s description of the main line deployment. Rather, Hammond's description, in combination with other participant accounts, led to a reasonable and parsimonious explanation for how Morgan intended to protect his retreating front-line militia [see Cowpens in Miniature 9], why Tarleton directed Ogilvie to charge [see Cowpens in Miniature 16], why Howard felt compelled to refuse his right flank [see Cowpens in Miniature 17], why the Continentals retreated up to 100 yards during the main line fighting [see Cowpens in Miniature 19, Note 5], and why Triplett’s Virginians held their ground [see Cowpens in Miniature 17, Note 2].

Just because things fit well together, however, does not mean that there isn’t a great deal of room for improvement. Two major concerns spring to mind:

First, I relied frequently on interpretation, and I’m sure that I have erred along the way. The fact that I have worked on this project in isolation is particularly problematic. Persons taking a fresh look at this account may discover errors in my reasoning to which I’ve been blind. In particular, there are key passages in the accounts of Alexander Chesney, James Collins, and Thomas Young describing the fighting on the extreme left and right that caused me difficulty. I'm not wholly satisfied with how I finessed those accounts, and I suspect a better interpretation is possible.

Second, I certainly have not exhausted every possible source of information. I did not examine all of the extant relevant documents, such as muster rolls, or perform a detailed examination of the terrain. If I had, I would have likely refined my estimate of the number of British and American participants and losses, and the exact positioning of units on the battlfield. I avoided estimating with any precision the duration of specific events on the battlefield and the speed with which specific units moved. I'm sure that a series of detailed time-motion studies would lead to numerous refinements.

Sources:

Henry Beebee Carrington's 1881 Battle Maps and Charts of the American Revolution.

Henry Cabot Lodge's 1903 The Story of the Revolution.

Lawrence Babits' 1998 A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

Cowpens in Miniature 25

Part 25: The Battle Ends

Previous: The Last Gambit

At the time that Tarleton and the remnants of the British cavalry fled the battlefield, it was still morning. For many of the Americans, the remainder of the day would be spent in pursuit of the British. The Continentals would not return to the battlefield until the evening.

The main body of British Legion dragoons were in the foremost of the retreat. When they reached the British baggage train, according to Lieutenant Mackenzie, the British guards soon mounted the wagon horses and retreated after them. After their departure, some Americans began arriving on the scene and began raiding the baggage train. Tarleton noted that his group, the last of the British to flee the battlefield, came up behind and attacked "a party of the Americans, who had seized upon the baggage of the British troops on the road." In the official British report, Tarleton "retook the Baggage of the Corps, & cut to pieces the detachment of the Enemy who had taken possession of it."

Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie disputed Tarleton’s characterization of it describe this event. Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard believed that "Baron Glaubeck… with some five or six militia men… had taken the baggage," but when Tarleton’s band arrived, "he was obliged to leave." Howard did not refer to British losses; however, one of the raiders, militiaman Thomas Young, described running into Tarleton’s group while returning to camp and being severely injured by them [see Note 1].

Meanwhile, on the battlefield, according to Major Joseph McJunkin, "You might have seen some five or six hundred tall, brawny, well clad soldiers, the flower of the British Army, guarded by a set of militia clad in hunting shirts ‘blacked, smoked and greasy.’"

McJunkin also recalled that "The plain was strewn with the dead and dying." But at least "The number of the slain on the side of the Americans was inconsiderable compared with that of the Enemy." Private James Collins remembered that "After the fight was over, the sight was truly melancholy." Remembrance of the scene was also persevered in local lore. Obadiah Haggis, a mid-19th Century visitor to the battlefield, learned of "A woman who lived 2 miles away… [that] When the firin’ stopped and she knowed which side had whipt, she ventured to the place, with the rest of the neighborhood, and found the place all covered with dead people."

Those men that had pursued the British slept on the battlefield that night, and in Lieutenant Thomas Anderson’s words, "lay amongst the Dead & Wounded Very Well pleased With Our days Work."

Losses:

One of the more difficult questions to address in connection with the battle of Cowpens concerns how many British and American soldiers were killed, wounded, or captured. Quite a few participants commented on losses, but their claims are not particularly trustworthy for the reason that they are typically reporting on what they heard others claim rather than on what they personally witnessed.

The numbers of Americans killed or wounded are stated in most histories to be quite few, about 72 in number, and they refer to a seemingly unimpeachable source: Morgan’s official report of the battle. Lawrence Babits, writing in A Devil of a Whipping, claimed to have a list of 128 Americans known to have been killed or wounded based on a number of different sources, including pension applications [see Note 2].

I’m inclined to believe that the number was higher, but for a different reason. Consider carefully Morgan’s language (see Morgan's Report). He said first, "Our loss is inconsiderable, which the enclosed return will evince. I have not been able to ascertain Col. Pickens loss, but know it to be very small" [see Note 3].

Then in a postscript he added, "Our loss was very inconsiderable, not having more than twelve killed and about sixty wounded." Notice, however, that he previously defined "our loss" as something different than Pickens’ loss. Therefore, the 72 casualties is arguably limited to the force he took with him from North Carolina: Howard’s battalion of Continentals, Washington’s regiment of dragoons, and Triplett’s battalion of Virginia militia.

If 72 is an "inconsiderable" number, then Pickens’ "very small" loss would likely be something a bit less, say around 50. This produces a total loss in the neighborhood of 120, or near Babits’ number.

Sergeant Major William Seymour recorded in his journal that "Our loss in the action were one Lieutenant wounded, and one Sergeant, and thirty-five killed and wounded, of which fourteen were of Captain Kirkwood's Company of the Delaware Regiment." In this case, "our loss" would seem to mean something different than it did in Morgan’s report. It’s possible that he is describing only the losses sustained by Howard’s Continentals (which included Kirkwood’s company). When Morgan’s and Seymour’s statements are combined, American losses would have included 37 men in Howard’s Continentals (about 13% of the battalion), of which 14 men were lost in Kirkwood’s company (23% of the company; see Note 4). This leaves about 35 men lost between Washington’s dragoons and Triplett’s Virginians (about 14% of those commands). These numbers are not unreasonable, and they are reflected in the four miniature casualties on the battlefield (again, the representation is 1:20).

I also placed on the battlefield three miniature casualties representing around 50 killed and wounded between the various detachments of Georgia and Carolina militia attached to Morgan’s army (about 12% of those forces, not including the baggage guard and other detachments). One casualty was placed on the militia line, another with the militia charged by Ogilvie, and the last with the militia charged by Nettles.

For the American army, exclusive of detachments, losses are estimated to have been in the neighborhood of 13% (~120 out of ~950 participants).

Quite a few sources provide an estimate of British casualties. All agree that British losses were considerable. The exact number given, however, differs widely from one source to another. An exact count of the British killed and wounded was not performed, and most sources report their impression of British losses or what had been related to them by others.

The Americans did not linger long on the battlefield. Morgan was concerned that the British army under Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis would soon advance on him in an effort to free the British prisoners. Morgan, did, however, have an officer ride over the battlefield and do a rough count of British losses. Subsequently, Morgan stated in his report of the battle that the British had 10 officers and 100 or so rank and file killed, and 200 or so wounded. A total in the low 300s is also suggested by subtracting from total British strength the number of unwounded prisoners captured by the time Morgan filed his report, a number of infantry and cavalry that were captured after the report was filed, a small contingent of infantry that escaped capture, and the British Legion dragoons and 17th Light Dragoons that escaped wounding or capture. Therefore, I have placed 16 miniature British casualties on the battlefield. A number of American sources pegged British losses higher than Morgan, but those claims are generally less trustworthy.

For the British army, exclusive of the baggage train detachment, losses are estimated to have been around 29% (~320 out of ~1,115 participants).

In addition to the killed and wounded, the British lost large numbers of prisoners to the Americans. Morgan indicated that 531 were captured soon after the battle (some others were captured after Morgan wrote his report). For reasons that I will not wholly recount, it appears that a certain portion of Tarleton’s infantry escaped capture during the battle, but some of these men were captured later. It also appears that while almost all of Tarleton’s cavalry escaped capture during the battle, some of these men were also captured afterwards (notably, the British Legion lost 277 rank and file around the time of the battle; far too many to be accounted for by infantry losses alone). Samuel Otterson recalled how some of the Legion dragoons were captured by the American militia. Others were likely taken by William Washington’s dragoons during the pursuit. Some of the Americans must have been mounted on faster horses than some of the British, especially as the latter had made an all-night march to reach the battlefield.

Notes:

1. Howard’s acknowledgement that the Americans were forced to withdraw is the only acknowledgement on the American side that such an encounter took place. However, American participants were more likely to recall triumphs rather than setbacks, and it’s possible that there were some American casualties (aside from Young). That’s not to suggest, however, that Tarleton’s description is without exaggeration. Young’s vivid description of his wounding and capture is worth reading, but it is not recounted here.

2. Babits also suggested that the actual number may have been even higher, because these records did not cover all participants and because of an ambiguous document in the archives of the state of North Carolina [a transcription of which can be found here].

Conversely, counting the losses mentioned in pension applications may overstate the number of American killed or wounded as the information in the pension applications may in some cases be inaccurate. It’s possible, even likely that some of the claims about having been present at the battle and even wounded there were in error.

3. I have not seen a transcription of this return, but I suspect it is extant. Babits alluded to it in recounting American losses.

4. There are quite a few reasons for why Kirkwood’s losses exceeded those of the other companies. I show in the maps (although not in the miniature representation) one of the two three-pounders lined up with Kirkwood’s company during the British advance against the American main line. One or more salvos of grapeshot could have led to significantly higher casualties. William Seymour’s journal gives Kirkwood’s company a leading role in the American counterattack. It’s possible they sustained greater losses in the subsequent melee than did other companies. Henry Wells’ account suggests that Kirkwood’s company was also attacked during the final British cavalry charge; perhaps other companies were not.

Sources:

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Mackenzie's and Tarleton's accounts of the battle.

A transcription of the British after action report, written by Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis, can be found here.

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statements by Howard, McJunkin, Collins, Anderson among others.

Joseph Johnson's 1851 Traditions and Reminiscences Chiefly of the American Revolution in the South has Young's account of the battle.

This issue (.pdf file) of The Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine includes a review by Will Graves of McJunkin's statements.

Edwin Bearss' 1974 Historic Grounds and Resource Study (.pdf file) has a transcription of Obadiah Haggis' description of an 1857 visit to the Cowpens battlefield, in which Haggis related some local lore about the battle.

Lawrence Babits' 1998 A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

James Graham's 1856 The Life of General Daniel Morgan has a copy of Morgan's report.

A transcription of William Seymour's journal can be found on this Battle of Camden website.

François-Jean de Chastellux's 1787 Travels in North-America, in the Years 1780, 1781, and 1782 has a comparison of British rank and file returns before and after the battle of Cowpens.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Samuel Otterson (.pdf).

Will Graves trancribed the pension application of Henry Wells (.pdf file).

Related: How Many Fought at Cowpens?, Morgan and Seymour, The British Legion